*Compare/contrast the offerings the 2 brothers bring
*What is the tone of "Am I my brother's keeper?" Stubborn avoidance? Really doesn't know?
*Does God's punishment of Cain fit the crime?
*Is God 'soft' on Cain, banishing him and protecting him at the same time?
*What does the end of this part of the story suggest about Cain's life after punishment?
Alan Dershowitz - "The Genesis of Justice" (2000) NY: Warner Books
*Why then is God so much more sympathetic to Cain...than he was to Adam and Eve -- who did not know right from wrong, who were tricked into committing a victimless crime, and who admitted their violation (though blamed it on others)?
*Did God provoke Cain by denigrating Cain's offering?
*Other points to consider:
1. Adam & Eve left a legacy of knowledge of right and wrong and 'anyone with such knowledge understands it is wrong to murder'. Malum in se vs. Malum prohibitum
2. Cain knew his brother had sacrificed animals so Cain 'understands death'
3. 'Am I my brother's keeper?' suggests Cain is aware he 'had done something so terrible he would deny it even to God'
4. Cain buried his brother after killing him - an act that indicates he both understood the finality of death and attempted to conceal the evidence.
5. Bible uses the plural of blood (dam) which is di'may in describing what was 'crying out from the ground'-- leading commentators to suggests Cain inflicted 'multiple wounds on Abel to ensure he would die'
6. God 'warned' Abel by asking Cain why he was upset and admonishing him (to keep a stiff upper lip and reject sin) -- he has free will
Ethical Issues that arise in this story:
1. The power of provocation - how much does influence does provocation have on how we perceive and punish wrongdoing?
2. Malum in se - Are actions we believe to be inherently wrong condoned by others? How do we resolve these contradictions in society?
3. Are we our brother's keeper or are we primarily (perhaps only) responsible and liable for ourselves and the actions of our 'families' (nuclear family? extended family?) Are we liable for anyone else but ourselves?
4. Does punishment, then, only fall upon us or also upon generations after us? Is the Torah consistent on this question?
5. Is murder justified in cases of self defense?
ושפיכות דמים ע"ז הא דאמרן גילוי עריות ושפיכות דמים דתניא ר' אומר (דברים כב, כו) כי כאשר יקום איש על רעהו ורצחו נפש כן הדבר הזה וכי מה ענין רוצח אצל נערה המאורסה הרי זה בא ללמד ונמצא למד מקיש רוצח לנערה המאורסה מה נערה המאורסה ניתן להצילה בנפשו אף רוצח ניתן להצילו בנפשו ונערה המאורסה מרוצח מה רוצח יהרג ואל יעבור אף נערה המאורסה תהרג ואל תעבור ושפיכות דמים גופיה מנלן סברא הוא כי ההוא דאתא לקמיה דרבא א"ל מרי דוראי אמר לי זיל קטליה לפלני' ואי לא קטלינא לך א"ל ליקטלוך ולא תיקטול מאי חזית דדמא דידך סומק טפי דילמא דמא דההוא גברא סומק טפי
Just as with regard to a potential murderer the halakha is that if one is being forced to murder someone else, he should allow himself to be killed and not transgress that prohibition, so too, with regard to a betrothed young woman the halakha is that she should allow herself to be killed and not transgress the prohibition of forbidden relations. The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive this halakha with regard to murder itself? The Gemara answers: It is based on logical reasoning that one life is not preferable to another. The Gemara relates an incident to demonstrate this: This is similar to a certain man who came before Rava and said to him: A local official said to me: Go kill so-and-so, and if not I will kill you. Rava said to him: It is preferable that he should kill you and you should not kill. What did you think, that your blood is redder and more precious than his? Perhaps that man’s blood is redder. Apparently, one may not save his own life by taking someone else’s.
(ב) לא ידעתי השמר אחי אנכי. לא השיב השומר הבל אנכי אלא השומר אחי פי׳ שלא ידעתי כי השומר אחי אנכי שהנני מחויב בממשלתי עליו לשמרו ג״כ כאח שלא יוזק ולא יהרג. ואני הייתי סבור שאני כמושל והוא כעבד ואין לי עוד לשמור אחוה:
I didn't know...am I my brother's keeper: He did not answer, "Am I Abel's guardian?" rather "Am I my brother's guardian?" - meaning, "I didn't know I was my brother's guardian and I am therefore obligated over him to guard him like a brother who will not be harmed nor killed. And I thought I had authority over him and he is like a servant, and I do not have to maintain friendliness to him."
(א) ויאמר יי אל קין אי הבל אחיך. פליאה גדולה על קין איך אמר לא ידעתי אם טעה בזה לומר לא יראה יה ולא יבין במעשה התחתונים אם כן למה הקריב מנחה ליי. ונראה לומר כי ודאי הבין קין ששאלו הקב״ה על הריגת אחיו והשיב לא ידעתי השומר אחי אנכי. ר״ל לא ידעתי שיש עון בדבר ההריגה והשומר אחי אינו לשון תמיהה אלא מוסב על לא ידעתי, כי אמר לא ידעתי אם אני מחויב לשמור את ראש אחי שלא יהרג על ידי, ושמירה זו מלשון אך את נפשו שמור (איוב ב ו) כך טען קין כי לא ידע אם הוא מחויב לשמור את ראש אחיו או לא. ואמר לו הקב״ה איך לא ידעת והרי מצוה זו מן המושכלות וזה שאמר קול דמי אחיך צועקים אלי מן האדמה שהשכל מחייב לקיים מצוה זו אף אם לא נצטוית עליה, כי בבטלה איש את רעהו חיים בלעו.
It is a great wonder how Cain could say "I don't know". Did he make a mistake in this [as if] to say [to himself] 'God will not see what is happening here on earth.' If so, why did he make an offering [to God in the first place]? It seems to me Cain definitely did know God asked him about killing his brother, and he answered 'I don't know, am I my brother's keeper?' That is to say, 'I didn't know that this [the murder] was a sin...'I didn't know if I was obliged to protect my brother's head that he should not be killed by my hand.'...God responded, 'How could you not know? It is a logical mitzvah (muskelet) and this is what it means 'your brother's blood cries to me from the ground', the intellect obligates [us] to keep this mitzvah even if it wasn't commanded, for if we were to forgo it, each person and his neighbor would be swallowed up.'
(1) 'ויאמר ה, the reason G’d spoke to him now was only in order to show him that he could not hide his deed from G’d, and that whatever man does, or even plans to do is fully known to Him. Kayin had thought that by burying Hevel he could hide his deed from G’d, just as he had been able to hide it from his father. This is why he had killed Hevel in the field where there had not been any witnesses. The additional reason why G’d addressed him was to inform him of his impending punishment. The reason that G’d phrased His remarks as if He questioned him, saying: אי הבל אחיך, was only an opening line, just as He had asked Adam in 3,9 איכה, “where are you?,” knowing full well where Adam was hiding. He also had asked Moses in Exodus 4,2 מזה בידך, “what is this in your hand?,” knowing full well that Moses held a staff in his hand. There are more such examples of a question by G’d being for purposes other than to obtain information not at His disposal. Seeing, however, that He had not said to Kayin: “why did you kill your brother?” Kayin thought that G’d was not yet aware of Hevel being dead. He denied all knowledge, saying: לא ידעתי, השומר אחי אנכי, claiming that Hevel had gone about his work just as he, Kayin, had gone about his work.. He added, gratuitously, that he could not be expected to know the whereabouts of his brother all the time, seeing he had not been hired to be his keeper. He acted far worse than his father at the time, as Adam had never denied that he had done wrong. He had only made excuses for himself. Adam was well aware that G’d was well informed about all such matters, and that even though He had commenced the conversation with a question, it was not because He had not known the answer.
A note on names -- Kayin (Creator), Hevel (Breath/Vapor/Nothingness)
אמר האי רודף הוא והתורה אמרה אם בא להרגך השכם להרגו
And the Torah said: If one comes to kill you, kill him first.
Rashi's commentary: If a thief comes tunneling in, and it is certain that the thief will steal your property, and the thief [in this case] knowingly comes in with the intent to kill you, then the Torah teaches you should rise up and kill him first.
Sheva ben Bichri (Encyclopedia Judaica): A member of the tribe of Benjamin. Sheba ben Bichri belonged to the clan of Becher, whose eponymous ancestor was the second son of Benjamin (Gen. 46:21; I Chron. 7:6).
Playing on the jealousy which was aroused among the tribes of Israel by David's apparent favoritism in arranging to have Judah welcome him back first at the Jordan after the crushing of the revolt of *Absalom in Transjordan, Sheba blew a horn with the cry, "We have no share in David, neither have we any portion in the son of Jesse; every man to his tents, O Israel" (II Sam. 19:41–44; 20:1); and instead of escorting David to Jerusalem, the men of Israel marched ahead after Sheba to their homeland. Had David not taken successful steps to assert his authority over Israel, Sheba would presumably have tried to induce Israel to make him king.
*As far as 'self-defense', may we sacrifice the life of one person for the good of the many?
*For Trekkies, think of Star Trek 3 - Spock sacrifices himself in order to save the Enterprise, restart its power so that it can fly out of harm's way.*
The legal significance of this story is spelled out in the Tosefta (Terumot 7:23): “If a group of people is approached by Gentiles and told: “Hand over one of you so that we can kill him, otherwise we will kill all of you,” they should all let themselves be killed rather than hand over a single Jewish life. However, if they specified a particular person, they should hand him over and not give up their lives, as in the case of Sheva ben Bichri.”
Chazal derive from the story of Sheva ben Bichri that although it is prohibited to turn over a Jew, even in order to save many other lives, if the enemy demands a particular individual, it is permitted to turn him over. In this specific case, the rule of “one does not defer one life before another” is waived.
The Jerusalem Talmud (Terumos 8:4) cites a dispute between Amoraim concerning whether the above halachah applies even to an innocent individual, or whether it is limited to a guilty person such as Sheva ben Bichri, who was liable for death due to his rebellion against David. According to Rabbi Yochanan, the halachah applies universally; according to Reish Lakish, it applies only to guilty individuals.
Poskim disagree over the halachic ruling in this dispute. The Rambam (Yesodei Ha-Torah 5:5) rules according to Reish Lakish, and adds that even when the individual is guilty, and the person may be turned over, “we do not instruct this” (the rabbis must try to avoid giving the instruction of sending a person to his death). However, other authorities point out that in general, the halachah follows Rabbi Yochanan in his disputes with Reish Lakish (Yevamos 36a), and that the halachic ruling should therefore follow Rabbi Yochanan’s position. The Rema (Yoreh De’ah 157:1) mentions both opinions, without deciding between them.
The Taz (ibid.) concludes that the halachah should follow the Rambam’s stringent ruling, citing a similar stance from his father-in-law, the Bach. However, the Chazon Ish (Choshen Mishpat, Sanhedrin 25) writes that the principle halachah follows the opinion of Rabbi Yochanan, explaining that the halachah of turning over the requested individual is based on the concept of rodef: “The one that is singled out is considered a rodef, for his escaping among them causes them all to be killed. Although he does not have the full status of a rodef, because he does so to save his own life, nonetheless the entire town does not have to die, for he is the cause, and it is permitted to turn him over.”...
http://dinonline.org/2014/11/27/killing-shepherds-on-mission/