Ayin Tachat Ayin Sources

(1) One who injures his fellow is liable concerning him for five categories [of payment]: damages, pain , healthcare, unemployment, and shame.

For damages, how [is this calculated?] One who puts out his eye, cuts off his hand, breaks his leg—we see him as if he were a slave sold in the marketplace, and we evaluate how much he was worth [the injury] and how much he is worth now.

..Why [pay compensation]? Does the Divine Law not say 'Eye for eye'?

Why not take this literally to mean [putting out] the eye [of the offender]?

Let not this enter your mind, since it has been taught (in a Baraitha):

You might think that where he put out his eye, the offender's eye should be put out, or where he cut off his arm, the offender's arm should be cut off, or again where he broke his leg, the offender's leg should be broken.

[Not so; for] it is laid down, 'He that smiteth any man…' 'And he that smiteth a beast …' just as in the case of smiting a beast compensation is to be paid, so also in the case of smiting a man compensation is to be paid.

And should this [reason] not satisfy you, note that it is stated,

'Moreover ye shall take no ransom (satisfaction) for the life of a murderer, that is guilty of death',

implying that it is only for the life of a murderer that you may not take 'satisfaction',

whereas you may take 'satisfaction' [even] for the principal limbs, though these cannot be restored.'

..To what case of 'smiting' does it refer?

If to [the Verse] 'And he that killeth a beast, shall make it good: and he that killeth a man, shall be put to death',

does not this verse refer to murder?

— The quotation was therefore made from this text:

And he that smiteth a beast mortally shall make it good: life for life,

which comes next to: and if a man maim his neighbour: as he hath done so shall it be done to him.

But is [the term] 'smiting' mentioned in the latter text?

— We speak of the effect of smiting implied in this text and of the effect of smiting implied in the other text:

just as smiting mentioned in the case of beast refers to the payment of compensation,

so also does smiting in the case of man refer to the payment of compensation.

But is it not written: And he that smiteth any man mortally shall surely be put to death [which, on account of the fact that the law of murder is not being dealt with here, surely refers to cases of mere injury and means Retaliation]? —

[Even this refers to the payment of] pecuniary compensation.

How [do you know that it refers] to pecuniary compensation?

Why not say that it really means capital punishment?

— Let not this enter your mind; first, because it is compared to the case dealt with in the text, 'He that smiteth a beast mortally shall make it good', (in the aforementioned gezerah shavah) and furthermore, because it is written soon after, 'Just as he has given a wound upon a person, so shall be given unto him , thus proving that it means pecuniary compensation.. (here, based on the word "given")

But what is meant by the statement, 'if this reason does not satisfy you'? [Why should it not satisfy you?] — The difficulty which further occurred to the Tanna was as follows:

What is your reason for deriving the law of man injuring man from the law of smiting a beast and not from the law governing the case of killing a man [where Retaliation is the rule]?

I would answer: It is proper to derive [the law of] injury from [the law governing another case of] injury, and not to derive [the law of] injury from [the law governing the case of] murder.

It could, however, be argued to the contrary; [that it is proper] to derive [the law of injury inflicted upon] man from [another case of] man but not to derive [the law of injury inflicted upon] man from [the case of] beast.

This was the point of the statement 'If, however, this reason does not satisfy you.' [The answer is as follows:] 'It is stated:Moreover ye shall take no ransom for the life of a murderer that is guilty of death; but he shall surely be put to death,

implying that it was only 'for the life of a murderer' that you may not take ransom whereas you may take ransom [even] for principal limbs though these cannot be restored.'

But was the purpose of this [verse],

Moreover ye shall take no ransom for the life of a murderer, to exclude the case of principal limbs?

Was it not requisite that the Divine Law should state that you should not make him subject to two punishments, i.e. that you should not take from him pecuniary compensation as well as kill him?

— This, however, could be derived from the verse, According to his crime, [which implies that] you can make him liable for one crime but cannot make him liable for two crimes.

But still was it not requisite that the Divine Law should state that you should not take pecuniary compensation from him and release him from the capital punishment? —

If so the Divine Law would have written, 'Moreover ye shall take no satisfaction for him who is guilty [and deserving] of death'; why then write 'for the life of a murderer' unless to prove from it that it is only 'for the life of a murderer' that you may not take ransom, whereas you may take ransom [even] for principal limbs though these could not be restored?

But since it was written,

Moreover ye shall take no ransom [implying the law of pecuniary compensation in the case of mere injury],

why do I require [the analogy made between] 'smiting' [in the case of injuring man and] 'smiting' [in the case of injuring beast]? —

It may be answered that if [the law would have had to be derived only] from the former text, I might have said that the offender has the option, so that if he wishes he may pay with the loss of his eye or if he desires otherwise he may pay the value of the eye;

we are therefore told [that the inference is] from smiting a beast: just as in the case of smiting a beast the offender is liable for pecuniary compensation so also in the case of injuring a man he is liable for pecuniary compensation....

Praised are You, Lord our God King of the universe, who with wisdom fashioned the human body, creating openings, arteries, glands and organs, marvelous in structure, intricate in design. Should but one of them, by being blocked or opened, fail to function, it would be impossible to exist. Praised are you, Lord, healer of all flesh who sustains our bodies in wondrous ways.