Talmud Commentary: Bavli 2/7. bSukkah 28a-b (mSukkah 2:8)

@Manuscript evidence

@General observations

The gemara presents three sugyot that discuss three aspects of mSuk 2:8:

1. Why are women and minors exempt from the commandment of sukkah? It does not discuss the exemption of slaves.

2. The definition of a minor who does not require his mother.

3. Shammai’s action in connection with the sukkah.

The first sugya is the longest and most complicated. This stama sugya links three amoraic sayings and two tannaitic midrashim into a dialectical discussion of the contradictions pertaining to the exemption of women from the obligation to live in a sukkah. The first dispute inquires whether the word האזרח (the citizen), found in the biblical verse (Lev 23:42), which instructs the Israelites to dwell in sukkot, includes or excludes women. One baraita excludes women based on this verse while a contradictory baraita, citing Lev 16:29, includes women.[1] In order to resolve this paradox, the gemara presents Rabbah’s view, that the exemption of women is not a biblical law but rather a rabbinic halakhah that is supported by verses from the Torah. The stama then asks which of the two halakhot is biblical and which is rabbinic – the exemption of women from dwelling in the sukkah or the obligation of women to afflict themselves (fast) on Yom Kippur.

It should be noted that the grammatical form of the question asked by the stama and Rabbah’s statement are inconsistent. In the Vilna print the stama asks about two laws, one biblical and one based on tradition (הי קרא והי הלכתא “Which [of the two laws] is based on a biblical verse and which on a tradition?”), while Rabbah’s statement concerns traditions and their proofs (הלכתא נינהו, ואסמכינהו רבנן אקראי “They are traditions, but the rabbis applied biblical verses to them”). Rabbenu Hananel’s commentary, and some MSS, however, use the singular form for Rabbah’s statement: “It is a tradition and the passage was taken as support – one verse and one tradition” (חדא קרא וחדא הלכתא). The Vilna print version demonstrates the copiers’ difficulty with the jumble of the singular and plural forms. Still, the statement הלכתא נינהי ואסמיכונהי רבנן אקראי (“They are traditions, but the rabbis applied biblical verses to them”) is found in various other contexts in the gemara and is always in the plural form. There is only one other instance in which a question in the singular form asymetrically follows a statement in the plural (bNid 32b).

Following the clarification that the halakhah exempting women from the obligation to dwell in the sukkah is a rabbinic injunction, and is only supported by the biblical verse, the question of why there is a need for a special exemption of women from the commandment of sukkah arises. After all, there already is in existence a halakhah that exempts them from all positive timebound commandments and sukkah is included in this ruling. The words of Abbayye and Rava are produced in response to this query. These are important for our discussion, since they reveal difficulties the sages encountered in deciding whether or not women should participate in the ritual of sukkah, probably dating from the amoraic time in Babylonia. Both Abbayye and Rava explain the need for a special halakhah concerning women’s exemption from the commandment of sukkah by saying that had such a halakhah not existed, one might have made the mistake of believing that women are obligated to fulfill it. Based on the verse “you shall live in booths seven days” (Lev 23:42), Abbayye explains that since the commandment is to dwell in the sukkah, and a man dwells with his wife in their house, one might assume that the Torah applies this “dwelling” in sukkot to both men and women (the family). Therefore women were specifically exempted from the obligation of sukkah. This saying of Abbayye seems to express a thought process that existed amongst the sages and reflects a common assumption about women’s exemption from participating in the family rituals in the sukkah. Rava, however, says that by conflating the verse that proclaims the time of the sukkah ritual with the one that proclaims that of Pesah, one could suppose that since women are obligated to eat the matsah on Pesah they are equally obligated to dwell in the sukkah. The words of Rava express a rational argument against the exemption of women from the ritual of sukkah. It is based on another family holiday – Pesah – in which women are obliged to participate equally with the men.

Abbayye uses an argument which is based on the Torah and on a logical inference (היקש), whilst Rava uses an argument based on similar wording (גזרה שוה), both characteristics of the homiletic interpretation of the Bible developed by the tannaim. Both ideas are based on a common perception, probably popular at their time and place, according to which both Sukkot and Pesah are family holidays from which it would be impossible to exclude women. Subsequently, the gemara discusses the necessity for the verse to state “All the citizens in Israel shall live in booths” and concludes that its purpose is to teach that converts are obligated to live in the sukkah. This makes it even more surprising that women are exempted (and see further on this below, under feminist observations).

The gemara continues with a discussion of women’s obligation to fast on Yom Kippur. The gemara cites Rav Yehuda’s statement in the name of Rav that, since “man or woman” (Num 5:6) compares the two for all the punishments in the Torah, women are obligated to afflict themselves on Yom Kippur. The style of this discussion resembles that of the exemption of women from sukkah but differs in that here the discussion focuses on the biblical verse and not on the halakhah.

The final section of the sugya reverts to the opening baraita in order to substantiate the halakhah in the Mishnah that “women, slaves and minors are exempt from the obligation of residing in the sukkah.” These are the midrash’s words: “‘citizen’ [אזרח] means what it says; ‘the citizen’ [האזרח] excludes women; ‘all’ [כל] includes minors” (bSuk 28a). The contradiction between the Mishnah’s exemption of minors and the gemara obligating them is resolved by distinguishing between children who have reached the age of education and must participate in the commandment of sukkah and those who have not. The gemara notes that this obligation (similar to the exemption of women) is a rabbinic injunction supported by a biblical verse.

The two sections of the sugya, one discussing the word האזרח (the citizen) and the other discussing the word כל (all), determined by the two halakhot in the baraita – exclusion of women and inclusion of minors – are asymmetrical both in their length and in the form of the discussion. Furthermore, the first section is based upon the sayings of the amoraim Rabbah, Abbayye and Rava while the second section is attributed to a stama. Still, the opening phrase of both is identical: “the Master said.” Likewise they reach the same conclusion regarding the validity of the halakhot in the baraita. Hence, this sugya may have been appended by the editor in order to present two stylistically similar rabbinic halakhot – the exemption of women from and the obligation of minors to participate in the commandment of sukkah – supported by a biblical verse.[2]

The last part of the sugya may have been constructed in line with bHag 4a, which discusses the obligation to make pilgrimages to the Temple three times a year. It presents the contradiction between the baraita which determines that “every male to include minors” (כל זכורך לרבות את הקטנים) is obligated and the mishnah that exempts minors – “except for the deaf, idiot and minor” (חוץ מחרש שוטה וקטן). Abbayye’s statement resolves this issue: “Here it [is with regard to the case of] a minor who has reached the age of education and [in the second case] a minor who has not yet reached the age of education. bHagigah also notes that the obligation of a minor to appear at the Temple is a rabbinic injunction, but there it bases the need for a biblical verse on a baraita. On the other hand, our sugya briefly states that the verse is only a prooftext. In light of the above, we may deduce that the final stamaitic part of our sugya initially originated in bHagigah.

The short second sugya continues with the words: “A minor that does not need to be attended by his mother is obliged to participate in the commandment of sukkah” (mSuk 2:8). The amoraim of the school of Rabbi Yannai (in the first generation) claimed that a minor who does not need to be attended by his mother is “whomever, when he relieves himself, his mother need not clean him” (bSuk 28b) whilst Rabbi Shim‘on ben Laqish, an amora of the second generation, said: “He who awakes from his sleep and does not call his mother” (bSuk 28b). The parallel sugya in the Yerushalmi cites the sayings in reverse, describing a minor (and not a minor who is no longer in need of his mother): “Anyone who needs his mother to wipe him. Rabbi Yohanan said: Anyone who wakes up and calls for his mother” (ySuk 2:9, 53b).

Because of the possibility that grown children are still known to call for their mothers at night, our sugya proposes an emandation to Rabbi Shim’on ben Laqish’s statement and repeats the word “mother” twice. In bEruv 72a the sugya of bSukkah is cited and the age of a minor who does not require his mother is given – between four and five years old.

The third sugya expresses puzzlement that Shammai the Elder formed a makeshift sukkah for his baby grandson (or daughter-in-law, see Mishnah 2) since this contradicts the halakhah that minors who require their mothers are exempt from the sukkah. In response, the gemara claims that the mishnaic text is incomplete and should included a qualification where Shammai is presented as taking a stricter view than the first of the quoted authorities. We may justify this approach to Shammai’s act by comparing it with the sages’ saying concerning minors and Yom Kippur:

This tradition has a parallel in the Tosefta with a direct reference to Shammai:

Here too, Shammai holds the stricter opinion, that children should fast on Yom Kippur. Thus, in the matter of sukkah, a historical perspective on the development of halakhah is appropriate. There was a dispute concerning the exemption of minors from sukkah during Shammai the Elder’s time, and Shammai was of the opinion that young children should take part in the commandments. The halakhic ruling on this matter was determined later on.

@Feminist observations

In the course of the discussion about women’s exemption from the commandment of dwelling in the sukkah, the Bavli cites a baraita which includes a midrash. The midrash cites Lev 23:42 as a prooftext for the exemption: “[If the Torah had said:] “citizen” (Lev 23:42) [it would have included] every citizen, [but since it says] “the citizen” (ibid.) it excludes women. “Every” (ibid.) includes minors” (bSuk 28a). However, the gemara itself, as the discussion continues, cites another midrash interpreting a phrase in Leviticus 16:29, which contradicts the one above: “‘The citizen’ (Lev 16:29) includes the citizen-women that they must fulfill the law of afflicting themselves [on Yom Kippur]” (bSuk 28a).

However, in three different midrashim, concerning three different issues, the prefix “the” was meant, in fact, to include women: Regarding resting on Shabbat, the Sifra states: “‘Citizen’ means what it says, ‘the citizen’ includes wives of citizens” (אזרח – זה אזרח, האזרח – לרבות נשי אזרח) (Sifra aharey mot, pereq 7:9). Another midrash in the Sifra, concerning forbidden sexual relations, contains a similar wording and maintains that “‘citizen’ means what it says, ‘the citizen’ includes wives of citizens” (אזרח – זה אזרח, האזרח – לרבות נשי אזרחים) (Sifra aharey mot, pereq 13:18). The most interesting midrash is the one about Sukkot in Sifra emor cited above: “‘Citizen’ (Lev 23:42) means what it says. ‘The citizen’ (ibid.) includes women. ‘All the citizens’ (ibid.) includes minors. ‘In Israel’ (ibid.) includes converts and liberated bondmen[1]” (Sifra emor, pereq 17:9).

The printed text of this tradition, however, reveals a dilemma regarding women’s exemption from the commandments of Sukkot, inserting into the text the word “exclude” (להוציא) after the word “include” (להביא). Probably the original “include” was changed to “exclude” after the halakhah exempting women from the obligation of sukkah prevailed, whilst during the creation of the midrash, women, as well as children, and perhaps even slaves, participated in the commandment of sukkah. Yet, even as the contradictory phrasing of this midrash leaves us baffled, a midrash from SifNum 112 dealing with a priest’s redemption of a citizen or convert who sinned unintentionally, attempts to resolve this confusion:

The midrashic reasoning here runs as follows: Why was Num 15:29 formulated with the words: “For the citizen among the sons of Israel”? The midrash’s response is that one might have thought that this verse applies to both men and women due to the prefix “the” in Lev 23:42, therefore Num 15:29 lets one know that such reasoning is plausible, but erroneous. The verse includes both a “the” prefix and an explicit specification as to whom it refers: “the citizen among the sons of Israel” (Num 15:29). Thus, the prefix “the,” in Lev 23:42, also does not indicate women’s inclusion in the commandment to reside in booths.

However, the stama now juxtaposes a dissenting tradition. The problem this voice raises is as follows: If one cannot deduce from the existence of the prefix “the” women’s inclusion, it seems reasonable to deduce their inclusion from the absence of this prefix. But the gemara informs us that this is not so. There is a tradition according to which the absence of the prefix also indicates women’s exclusion.

From the sources quoted above it becomes relatively clear that the Babylonian version of this midrash, in which a “the” prefix is applied to exclude women, is not the only possible interpretation. It makes sense that this version is a late Babylonian reworking in order to support and establish women’s exemption from dwelling in the sukkah. Yet, at the time when the halakhic midrashim were created, women’s obligation to participate in the commandment of dwelling in the sukkah was debated, as is evident from Sifre Numbers.

It is possible that the halakhah of the Land of Israel, which exempted women from dwelling in the sukkah and which I assume was enacted because of troubled times,[1] stirred disagreement in the days of Abbayye and Rava who lived in Babylonia at a different time and under different circumstances. It is possible that the background for this disagreement can be found in an explanation given by two ancient amoraim from the Land of Israel mentioned in this sugya. The halakhah “women, slaves and minors are exempt from the commandment of sukkah” (mSuk 2:8) continues with the words: “A minor who is not dependent on his mother is bound by the obligation of sukkah” (mSuk 2:8). As we saw above, these children are probably around five or six years old. This assumption matches the stama’s decree in the previous sugya, according to which children who have reached the age of education must participate in the commandment of sukkah. In any case, it appears that there was an all around agreement on including very young children in the ritual of sukkah. It is also likely that young children’s long stay in the sukkah, without their mothers, even if they were considered old enough to do without them, presented a strain on their fathers and the rest of the family.

To conclude, based on a comparison of the words of Abbayye and Rava and the words of the late stama presented in the sugya which opened our discussion of the amoraic period, it is possible to deduce that the Babylonian rejection of women’s exemption from the ritual of sukkah, present in these words, triumphed in reality.