מַתְנִי' כׇּל מִצְוֹת הַבֵּן עַל הָאָב אֲנָשִׁים חַיָּיבִין וְנָשִׁים פְּטוּרוֹת וְכׇל מִצְוֹת הָאָב עַל הַבֵּן אֶחָד אֲנָשִׁים וְאֶחָד נָשִׁים חַיָּיבִין וְכׇל מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁהַזְּמַן גְּרָמָהּ אֲנָשִׁים חַיָּיבִין וְנָשִׁים פְּטוּרוֹת וְכׇל מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁלֹּא הַזְּמַן גְּרָמָהּ אֶחָד הָאֲנָשִׁים וְאֶחָד הַנָּשִׁים חַיָּיבִין וְכׇל מִצְוֹת לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה בֵּין שֶׁהַזְּמַן גְּרָמָהּ בֵּין שֶׁלֹּא הַזְּמַן גְּרָמָהּ אֶחָד הָאֲנָשִׁים וְאֶחָד הַנָּשִׁים חַיָּיבִין חוּץ מִבַּל תַּקִּיף וּבַל תַּשְׁחִית וּבַל תִּטַּמֵּא לְמֵתִים גְּמָ' מַאי כׇּל מִצְוֹת הַבֵּן עַל הָאָב אִילֵּימָא כׇּל מִצְוֹת דְּמִיחַיַּיב בְּרָא לְמִיעְבַּד לְאַבָּא נָשִׁים פְּטוּרוֹת וְהָתַנְיָא אִישׁ אֵין לִי אֶלָּא אִישׁ אִשָּׁה מִנַּיִן כְּשֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר אִישׁ אִמּוֹ וְאָבִיו תִּירָאוּ הֲרֵי כָּאן שְׁנַיִם אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה הָכִי קָאָמַר כׇּל מִצְוֹת הַבֵּן הַמּוּטָּלוֹת עַל הָאָב לַעֲשׂוֹת לִבְנוֹ אֲנָשִׁים חַיָּיבִין וְנָשִׁים פְּטוּרוֹת תְּנֵינָא לְהָא דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן הָאָב חַיָּיב בִּבְנוֹ לְמוּלוֹ וְלִפְדוֹתוֹ וּלְלַמְּדוֹ תּוֹרָה וּלְהַשִּׂיאוֹ אִשָּׁה וּלְלַמְּדוֹ אוּמָּנוּת וְיֵשׁ אוֹמְרִים אַף לַהֲשִׁיטוֹ בַּמַּיִם רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר כֹּל שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְלַמֵּד אֶת בְּנוֹ אוּמָּנוּת מְלַמְּדוֹ לִיסְטוּת לִיסְטוּת סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אֶלָּא כְּאִילּוּ מְלַמְּדוֹ לִיסְטוּת לְמוּלוֹ מְנָלַן דִּכְתִיב וַיָּמׇל אַבְרָהָם אֶת יִצְחָק בְּנוֹ וְהֵיכָא דְּלָא מַהְלֵיהּ אֲבוּהּ מִיחַיְּיבִי בֵּי דִינָא לְמִימְהֲלֵיהּ דִּכְתִיב הִמּוֹל לָכֶם כׇּל זָכָר וְהֵיכָא דְּלָא מַהְלוּהּ בֵּי דִינָא מִיחַיַּיב אִיהוּ לְמִימְהַל נַפְשֵׁיהּ דִּכְתִיב וְעָרֵל זָכָר אֲשֶׁר לֹא יִמּוֹל אֶת בְּשַׂר עׇרְלָתוֹ וְנִכְרְתָה אִיהִי מְנָלַן דְּלָא מִיחַיְּיבָא דִּכְתִיב כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוָּה אֹתוֹ אֱלֹהִים אוֹתוֹ וְלֹא אוֹתָהּ
MISHNA: With regard to all mitzvot of a son with regard to his father, men are obligated to perform them and women are exempt. And with regard to all mitzvot of a father with regard to his son, both men and women are obligated to perform them. The mishna notes an additional difference between the obligations of men and women in the performance of mitzvot: With regard to all positive, time-bound mitzvot, i.e., those which must be performed at specific times, men are obligated to perform them and women are exempt. And with regard to all positive mitzvot that are not time bound, both men and women are obligated to perform them. And with regard to all prohibitions, whether they are time-bound or whether they are not time-bound, both men and women are obligated to observe them, except for the prohibitions of: Do not round the corners of your head, and: Do not destroy the corners of your beard, which are derived from the verse: “You shall not round the corners of your head and you shall not destroy the corners of your beard” (Leviticus 19:27), and a prohibition that concerns only priests: Do not contract ritual impurity from a corpse (see Leviticus 21:1). These mitzvot apply only to men, not women, despite the fact that they are prohibitions. GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase: All mitzvot of a son with regard to his father? If we say that it is referring to all mitzvot that the son is obligated to perform with regard to his father, are women exempt from obligations of this kind? But isn’t it taught in a baraita concerning a verse that deals with the mitzva of honoring one’s father and mother: “A man shall fear [tira’u] his mother and his father” (Leviticus 19:3)? I have derived only that a man is obligated in this mitzva. From where do I derive that a woman is also obligated? When it says in the same verse: “A man shall fear [tira’u] his mother and his father” (Leviticus 19:3), employing the plural form of the verb, this indicates that there are two that are obligated here, both a man and a woman. Rav Yehuda said that this is what the mishna is saying: With regard to all mitzvot of a son that are incumbent upon his father to perform for his son, men are obligated in them and women are exempt. The Gemara comments: According to this interpretation, we learn in this mishna that which the Sages taught in a baraita: A father is obligated with regard to his son to circumcise him, and to redeem him if he is a firstborn son who must be redeemed by payment to a priest, and to teach him Torah, and to marry him to a woman, and to teach him a trade. And some say: A father is also obligated to teach his son to swim. Rabbi Yehuda says: Any father who does not teach his son a trade teaches him banditry [listut]. The Gemara expresses surprise at this statement: Can it enter your mind that he actually teaches him banditry? Rather, the baraita means that it is as though he teaches him banditry. Since the son has no profession with which to support himself, he is likely to turn to theft for a livelihood. This baraita accords with Rav Yehuda’s interpretation of the mishna. § The baraita teaches that a father is obligated to circumcise his son. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? The Gemara answers that this is as it is written: “And Abraham circumcised his son Isaac” (Genesis 21:4). The Gemara comments: And in a case where one’s father did not circumcise him the court is obligated to circumcise him, i.e., if this obligation is not fulfilled by the father it applies to the community as a whole, as it is written: “Every male among you shall be circumcised” (Genesis 17:10), in the form of a general mitzva that does not apply only to the father. And in a case where the court did not circumcise him the son is obligated to circumcise himself when he reaches adulthood, as it is written: “And the uncircumcised male, who is not circumcised in the flesh of his foreskin, that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Genesis 17:14). From where do we derive that his mother is not obligated to circumcise her son? As it is written: “And Abraham circumcised his son Isaac when he was eight days old, as God commanded him” (Genesis 21:4). The verse emphasizes that God commanded him, and not her.
(ז) כָּל מִצְוֹת הַבֵּן עַל הָאָב, אֲנָשִׁים חַיָּבִין וְנָשִׁים פְּטוּרוֹת. וְכָל מִצְוֹת הָאָב עַל הַבֵּן, אֶחָד אֲנָשִׁים וְאֶחָד נָשִׁים חַיָּבִין. וְכָל מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁהַזְּמָן גְּרָמָהּ, אֲנָשִׁים חַיָּבִין וְנָשִׁים פְּטוּרוֹת. וְכָל מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁלֹּא הַזְּמָן גְּרָמָהּ, אֶחָד אֲנָשִׁים וְאֶחָד נָשִׁים חַיָּבִין. וְכָל מִצְוַת לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה, בֵּין שֶׁהַזְּמָן גְּרָמָהּ בֵּין שֶׁלֹּא הַזְּמָן גְּרָמָהּ, אֶחָד אֲנָשִׁים וְאֶחָד נָשִׁים חַיָּבִין, חוּץ מִבַּל תַּשְׁחִית וּבַל תַּקִּיף וּבַל תִּטַּמָּא לְמֵתִים:
(7) With regard to all mitzvot of a son with regard to his father, men are obligated to perform them and women are exempt. And with regard to all mitzvot of a father with regard to his son, both men and women are obligated to perform them. The mishna notes an additional difference between the obligations of men and women in the performance of mitzvot: With regard to all positive, time-bound mitzvot, i.e., those which must be performed at specific times, men are obligated to perform them and women are exempt. And with regard to all positive mitzvot that are not time bound, both men and women are obligated to perform them. And with regard to all prohibitions, whether they are time-bound or whether they are not time-bound, both men and women are obligated to observe them, except for the prohibitions of: Do not round the corners of your head, and: Do not destroy the corners of your beard, which are derived from the verse: “You shall not round the corners of your head and you shall not destroy the corners of your beard” (Leviticus 19:27), and a prohibition that concerns only priests: Do not contract ritual impurity from a corpse (see Leviticus 21:1). These mitzvot apply only to men, not women, despite the fact that they are prohibitions.
כׇּל מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁהַזְּמַן גְּרָמָהּ וְכוּ' תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן אֵיזוֹהִי מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁהַזְּמַן גְּרָמָהּ סוּכָּה וְלוּלָב שׁוֹפָר וְצִיצִית וּתְפִילִּין וְאֵיזוֹהִי מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁלֹּא הַזְּמַן גְּרָמָהּ מְזוּזָה מַעֲקֶה אֲבֵידָה וְשִׁילּוּחַ הַקֵּן וּכְלָלָא הוּא הֲרֵי מַצָּה שִׂמְחָה הַקְהֵל דְּמִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁהַזְּמַן גְּרָמָא וְנָשִׁים חַיָּיבוֹת וְתוּ וַהֲרֵי תַּלְמוּד תּוֹרָה פְּרִיָּה וּרְבִיָּה וּפִדְיוֹן הַבֵּן דְּלָאו מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁהַזְּמַן גְּרָמָהּ הוּא וְנָשִׁים פְּטוּרוֹת אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אֵין לְמֵדִין מִן הַכְּלָלוֹת וַאֲפִילּוּ בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר בּוֹ חוּץ דִּתְנַן בַּכֹּל מְעָרְבִין וּמִשְׁתַּתְּפִין חוּץ מִן הַמַּיִם וּמֶלַח וְתוּ לֵיכָּא וְהָאִיכָּא כְּמֵהִין וּפִטְרִיּוֹת אֶלָּא אֵין לְמֵדִין מִן הַכְּלָלוֹת וַאֲפִילּוּ בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר בּוֹ חוּץ וּמִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁהַזְּמַן גְּרָמָא נָשִׁים פְּטוּרוֹת מְנָלַן גָּמַר מִתְּפִילִּין מַה תְּפִילִּין נָשִׁים פְּטוּרוֹת אַף כׇּל מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁהַזְּמַן גְּרָמָא נָשִׁים פְּטוּרוֹת וּתְפִילִּין גָּמַר לַהּ מִתַּלְמוּד תּוֹרָה מָה תַּלְמוּד תּוֹרָה נָשִׁים פְּטוּרוֹת אַף תְּפִילִּין נָשִׁים פְּטוּרוֹת וְנַקֵּישׁ תְּפִילִּין לִמְזוּזָה תְּפִילִּין לְתַלְמוּד תּוֹרָה אִיתַּקּוּשׁ בֵּין בְּפָרָשָׁה רִאשׁוֹנָה בֵּין בְּפָרָשָׁה שְׁנִיָּה תְּפִילִּין לִמְזוּזָה בְּפָרָשָׁה שְׁנִיָּה לָא אִיתַּקּוּשׁ וְנַקֵּישׁ מְזוּזָה לְתַלְמוּד תּוֹרָה לָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ דִּכְתִיב לְמַעַן יִרְבּוּ יְמֵיכֶם גַּבְרֵי בָּעוּ חַיֵּי נְשֵׁי לָא בָּעוּ חַיֵּי וַהֲרֵי סוּכָּה דְּמִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁהַזְּמַן גְּרָמָהּ דִּכְתִיב בַּסֻּכֹּת תֵּשְׁבוּ שִׁבְעַת יָמִים טַעְמָא דִּכְתַב רַחֲמָנָא הָאֶזְרָח לְהוֹצִיא אֶת הַנָּשִׁים הָא לָאו הָכִי נָשִׁים חַיָּיבוֹת אָמַר אַבָּיֵי אִיצְטְרִיךְ סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא הוֹאִיל דִּכְתִיב בַּסֻּכֹּת תֵּשְׁבוּ תֵּשְׁבוּ כְּעֵין תָּדוּרוּ מָה דִּירָה אִישׁ וְאִשְׁתּוֹ אַף סוּכָּה אִישׁ וְאִשְׁתּוֹ וְרָבָא אָמַר אִיצְטְרִיךְ סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא נֵילַף חֲמִשָּׁה עָשָׂר חֲמִשָּׁה עָשָׂר מֵחַג הַמַּצּוֹת מָה לְהַלָּן נָשִׁים חַיָּיבוֹת אַף כָּאן נָשִׁים חַיָּיבוֹת צְרִיכָא וַהֲרֵי רְאִיָּה דְּמִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁהַזְּמַן גְּרָמָהּ וְטַעְמָא דִּכְתַב רַחֲמָנָא זְכוּרְךָ לְהוֹצִיא הַנָּשִׁים הָא לָאו הָכִי נָשִׁים חַיָּיבוֹת אִיצְטְרִיךְ סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא נֵילַף רְאִיָּה רְאִיָּה מֵהַקְהֵל וְאַדְּיָלְפִינַן מִתְּפִילִּין לִפְטוּרָא נֵילַף מִשִּׂמְחָה לְחִיּוּבָא אָמַר אַבָּיֵי אִשָּׁה בַּעֲלָהּ מְשַׂמְּחָהּ אַלְמָנָה מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר בִּשְׁרוּיָה אֶצְלוֹ וְנֵילַף מֵהַקְהֵל מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵה מַצָּה וְהַקְהֵל שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִים הַבָּאִים כְּאֶחָד וְכׇל שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִים הַבָּאִין כְּאֶחָד אֵין מְלַמְּדִים אִי הָכִי תְּפִילִּין וּרְאִיָּה נָמֵי שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִים הַבָּאִים כְּאֶחָד וְאֵין מְלַמְּדִים צְרִיכִי דְּאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא תְּפִילִּין וְלָא כְּתַב רְאִיָּה הֲוָה אָמֵינָא נֵילַף רְאִיָּה רְאִיָּה מֵהַקְהֵל וְאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא רְאִיָּה וְלָא כְּתַב תְּפִילִּין הֲוָה אָמֵינָא אַקֵּישׁ תְּפִילִּין לִמְזוּזָה צְרִיכָא אִי הָכִי מַצָּה וְהַקְהֵל נָמֵי צְרִיכִי לְמַאי צְרִיכִי בִּשְׁלָמָא אִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא הַקְהֵל וְלָא כְּתַב מַצָּה הֲוָה אָמֵינָא נֵילַף חֲמִשָּׁה עָשָׂר חֲמִשָּׁה עָשָׂר מֵחַג הַסּוּכּוֹת אֶלָּא נִיכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא מַצָּה וְלָא בָּעֵי הַקְהֵל וַאֲנָא אָמֵינָא טְפָלִים חַיָּיבִים נָשִׁים לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן הִילְכָּךְ הָוֵה לְהוּ שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִים הַבָּאִים כְּאֶחָד וְאֵין מְלַמְּדִים הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר אֵין מְלַמְּדִין אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר מְלַמְּדִין מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר וְתוּ מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁלֹּא הַזְּמַן גְּרָמָהּ נָשִׁים חַיָּיבוֹת מְנָלַן דְּיָלֵיף מִמּוֹרָא מָה מוֹרָא נָשִׁים חַיָּיבוֹת אַף כׇּל מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁלֹּא הַזְּמַן גְּרָמָא נָשִׁים חַיָּיבוֹת וְנֵילַף מִתַּלְמוּד תּוֹרָה מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵה לֵיהּ תַּלְמוּד תּוֹרָה וּפְרִיָּה וּרְבִיָּה שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִים הַבָּאִים כְּאֶחָד וְכֹל שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִים הַבָּאִים כְּאֶחָד אֵין מְלַמְּדִים וּלְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן בְּרוֹקָא דְּאָמַר עַל שְׁנֵיהֶם הוּא אוֹמֵר וַיְבָרֶךְ אֹתָם אֱלֹהִים פְּרוּ וּרְבוּ מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵה תַּלְמוּד תּוֹרָה וּפִדְיוֹן הַבֵּן שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִים הַבָּאִים כְּאֶחָד וְכֹל שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִים הַבָּאִים כְּאֶחָד אֵין מְלַמְּדִין וּלְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן בְּרוֹקָא נָמֵי נִיהְווֹ פְּרִיָּה וּרְבִיָּה וּמוֹרָא שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִים הַבָּאִים כְּאֶחָד וְאֵין מְלַמְּדִין צְרִיכִי דְּאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא מוֹרָא וְלָא כְּתַב פְּרִיָּה וּרְבִיָּה הֲוָה אָמֵינָא וְכִבְשֻׁהָ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא אִישׁ דְּדַרְכּוֹ לְכַבֵּשׁ אִין אִשָּׁה דְּאֵין דַּרְכָּהּ לְכַבֵּשׁ לָא וְאִי כְּתַב פְּרִיָּה וּרְבִיָּה וְלֹא כְּתַב מוֹרָא הֲוָה אָמֵינָא אִישׁ דְּסִיפֵּק בְּיָדוֹ לַעֲשׂוֹת אִין אִשָּׁה דְּאֵין סִיפֵּק בְּיָדָהּ לַעֲשׂוֹת לָא וְכֵיוָן דְּאֵין סִיפֵּק בְּיָדָהּ לַעֲשׂוֹת לֹא תִּתְחַיֵּיב כְּלָל צְרִיכָא הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִים הַבָּאִים כְּאֶחָד אֵין מְלַמְּדִין אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר מְלַמְּדִין מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר אָמַר רָבָא פַּפּוּנָאֵי יָדְעִי לַהּ לְטַעְמָא דְּהָא מִילְּתָא וּמַנּוּ רַב אַחָא בַּר יַעֲקֹב אָמַר קְרָא וְהָיָה לְךָ לְאוֹת עַל יָדְךָ וּלְזִכָּרוֹן בֵּין עֵינֶיךָ לְמַעַן תִּהְיֶה תּוֹרַת ה' בְּפִיךָ הוּקְּשָׁה כָּל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ לִתְפִילִּין מָה תְּפִילִּין מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁהַזְּמַן גְּרָמָהּ וְנָשִׁים פְּטוּרוֹת אַף כׇּל מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁהַזְּמַן גְּרָמָהּ נָשִׁים פְּטוּרוֹת וּמִדְּמִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁהַזְּמַן גְּרָמָהּ נָשִׁים פְּטוּרוֹת מִכְּלָל דְּמִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁלֹּא הַזְּמַן גְּרָמָהּ נָשִׁים חַיָּיבוֹת הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר תְּפִילִּין מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁהַזְּמַן גְּרָמָהּ אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר תְּפִילִּין מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁלֹּא הַזְּמַן גְּרָמָהּ מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר מַאן שָׁמְעַתְּ לֵיהּ דְּאָמַר תְּפִילִּין מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁלֹּא הַזְּמַן גְּרָמָהּ רַבִּי מֵאִיר וְסָבַר לַהּ שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִים הַבָּאִים כְּאֶחָד וְכֹל שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִים הַבָּאִים כְּאֶחָד אֵין מְלַמְּדִין וּלְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה דְּאָמַר שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִים הַבָּאִים כְּאֶחָד מְלַמְּדִין וּתְפִילִּין מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁלֹּא הַזְּמַן גְּרָמָהּ מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵאי מַצָּה שִׂמְחָה וְהַקְהֵל שְׁלֹשָׁה כְתוּבִים הַבָּאִים כְּאֶחָד וּשְׁלֹשָׁה כְתוּבִים הַבָּאִים כְּאֶחָד אֵין מְלַמְּדִין
§ The mishna teaches that women are exempt from all positive, time-bound mitzvot. The Sages taught: What is a positive, time-bound mitzva? Examples include residing in a sukka, and taking the lulav, and blowing the shofar on Rosh HaShana, all of which can be performed only at specific times of the year. And another example is donning ritual fringes, as the mitzva applies only during the daytime due to the verse which states: “Fringes, that you may look upon them” (Numbers 15:39), indicating that the fringes should be seen. And the donning of phylacteries (Deuteronomy 6:8), which are not worn at night or on Shabbat and Festivals, is also a positive, time-bound mitzva. And what is a positive mitzva that is not time bound? Examples include the affixing of a mezuza (Deuteronomy 11:20), the construction of a parapet on a roof (Deuteronomy 22:8), returning a lost item (Deuteronomy 22:1–3), and the release of the mother bird from the nest, i.e., the mitzva of sending away a mother bird when one finds it sitting on chicks or eggs (Deuteronomy 22:6–7). The Gemara asks: But is this an established principle? But there are the mitzvot of eating matza on the first night of Passover (Exodus 23:15), of rejoicing on a Festival (Deuteronomy 16:9–11), and assembly on Sukkot following the Sabbatical Year (Deuteronomy 31:10–13). And each of these is a positive, time-bound mitzva, and yet women are obligated in them. And furthermore, one can raise a difficulty as follows: But there are the mitzvot of Torah study (Deuteronomy 6:7), procreation (Genesis 1:28), and redemption of the firstborn (Exodus 13:12–13), each of which is not a positive, time-bound mitzva, and yet women are exempt from them. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One does not learn practical halakhot from general statements, i.e., when a general statement appears in a mishna and uses the term: All, it is not to be understood as an all-inclusive statement without exceptions. This is the case even in a place where it says: Except, to exclude a specific matter. A proof for this is as we learned in a mishna (Eiruvin 26b): One can establish a joining of houses in courtyards [eiruv ḥatzerot] and a joining of Shabbat boundaries [eiruv teḥumin], and similarly, one can merge courtyards to permit carrying in a joint alleyway on Shabbat. This can be done with all types of food except for water and salt. This is stated as a halakha with specific exceptions, and yet one can ask: Is there nothing else that cannot be used for an eiruv? But there are truffles and mushrooms, which also cannot be used for an eiruv, because they do not offer nourishment. Rather, conclude from this that one may not learn from general statements, even in a place where it says: Except. § The Gemara turns to the sources of this principle. From where do we derive that women are exempt from positive, time-bound mitzvot? It is derived by juxtaposition from the mitzva of phylacteries: Just as women are exempt from donning phylacteries, so too, women are exempt from all positive, time-bound mitzvot. And the exemption of women from donning phylacteries is derived from their exemption from Torah study: Just as women are exempt from Torah study, as derived from Deuteronomy 11:19, so too women are exempt from donning phylacteries, as the two issues are juxtaposed in the Torah (Deuteronomy 6:7–8). The Gemara asks: And let us say the opposite and juxtapose phylacteries to mezuza, which is also mentioned in that passage. Mezuza is a mitzva in which women are also obligated. Based on this comparison, women would be obligated in phylacteries as well. The Gemara answers: Phylacteries are juxtaposed to Torah study in both the first paragraph and in the second paragraph of Shema, whereas phylacteries are not juxtaposed to mezuza in the second paragraph. It is therefore preferable to compare phylacteries to Torah study. The Gemara says: But if so, let us juxtapose mezuza to Torah study and say that women are also exempt from the obligation of a mezuza. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: This could not enter your mind, as it is written with regard to the mitzva of mezuza: “That your days may be multiplied” (Deuteronomy 11:21). Can it be said that men need life but women do not need life? Since the reward for the performance of the mitzva of mezuza is extended life, this mitzva applies to women as well. The Gemara further asks: But there is the mitzva of residing in a sukka, which is a positive, time-bound mitzva, as it is written: “In sukkot you shall reside seven days” (Leviticus 23:42), referring to seven specific days of the year. Nevertheless, the reason women are exempt from this mitzva is that the Merciful One writes in the continuation of the verse: “All the homeborn in Israel shall reside in sukkot.” The definite article “the” is an exclusion, and serves to exclude the women from the obligation to reside in a sukka. It may be derived from here that if that was not so, women would be obligated. This indicates that women do not receive a blanket exemption from every positive, time-bound mitzva. Abaye said: In the case of residing in a sukka a special verse was necessary to exempt women, as otherwise it might enter your mind to say that since it is written: “In sukkot you shall reside,” this means that you should reside as you dwell in your permanent home: Just as a man and his wife live together in a residence, so too, a man and his wife are obligated to reside together in a sukka. And Rava said: It is necessary to state this verse for another reason, as it might enter your mind to say: Derive a verbal analogy with regard to Sukkot, where the verse states: “On the fifteenth day of this seventh month is the festival of Sukkot” (Leviticus 23:34), from Passover, where the verse states: “And on the fifteenth day of the same month is the festival of Passover” (Leviticus 23:6). One would then say that just as there women are obligated to eat matza on the first night of Passover, despite the fact that it is a time-bound mitzva, so too here, with regard to the mitzva of residing in the sukka, women are obligated. Therefore it was necessary for the verse to use the term “the homeborn” to exclude women from the obligation to reside in a sukka. The Gemara further asks: But there is the mitzva of appearance, i.e., the obligation to bring a burnt-offering on pilgrimage Festivals, which is a positive, time-bound mitzva. And the reason women are exempt from this obligation is that the Merciful One writes, with regard to this mitzva: “Three times in the year all of your males shall appear before the Lord God” (Exodus 23:17), which serves to exclude women. It may be derived from here that if that were not so, women would be obligated. This indicates that women are not necessarily exempt from every positive, time-bound mitzva. The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the verse to teach the halakha in this case as well, as it might enter your mind to say: Derive a verbal analogy with regard to appearance, where the verse states: Three times in the year all of your males shall appear,” from the appearance stated with regard to the mitzva of assembly, about which the verse states: “When all of Israel come to appear before the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 31:11). One would then say that just as women are obligated in the mitzva of assembly, so too they should be obligated to appear on a pilgrimage Festival. It is therefore necessary for the Torah to state explicitly that women are exempt from the mitzva of appearance on a pilgrimage Festival. With regard to the primary proof for the principle that women are exempt from positive, time-bound mitzvot, the Gemara asks: But before deriving the halakha from phylacteries, to exempt women from all positive, time-bound mitzvot, derive it from the mitzva of rejoicing on a Festival, in which women are obligated, to obligate women in all these mitzvot. Abaye said: The mitzva of rejoicing does not apply directly to women. Rather, a woman is rendered joyful by her husband, i.e., the mitzva is for him to gladden her on a Festival. The Gemara asks: What can be said with regard to a widow, who no longer has a husband but is nevertheless obligated to be joyful on a Festival, as it is written: “And you shall rejoice before the Lord your God, you…and the widow” (Deuteronomy 16:11)? The Gemara answers that the mitzva does not apply directly to a widow; rather, it applies to the men with whom she is present, i.e., they have an obligation to ensure that widows rejoice on the Festivals. The Gemara asks: But why not derive that women are obligated in all positive, time-bound mitzvot from the mitzva of assembly, in which women are explicitly obligated despite the fact that it is a time-bound mitzva. The Gemara answers: One cannot derive in this manner, because the verses concerning matza and assembly are two verses that come as one, i.e., to teach the same matter, that women are obligated in these mitzvot despite the fact that these are positive, time-bound mitzvot. And there is a principle that any two verses that come as one do not teach a precedent that applies to other cases. Rather, the two instances are considered exceptions. The Gemara asks: If so, the verses concerning phylacteries and appearance are also two verses that come as one, as they both indicate that women are exempt from positive, time-bound mitzvot, and therefore the verses do not teach a precedent. The Gemara answers: These are not considered as two verses that come as one, as both are necessary, each for its own reason. As, if the Merciful One had written that women are exempt from donning phylacteries and had not written that they are exempt from the mitzva of appearance, I would say: Derive a verbal analogy to obligate women from the verse stated with regard to appearance from the appearance stated with regard to the mitzva of assembly. Therefore, it is necessary for the Torah to teach that women are exempt from the mitzva of appearance. And if the Merciful One had written that women are exempt from appearance, and had not written that they are exempt from donning phylacteries, I would say: I will compare phylacteries to mezuza, which would mean that women are obligated in the mitzva of phylacteries. Therefore, it is necessary to state this halakha for both phylacteries and appearance, and they are not two verses that come as one. The Gemara asks: If so, the verses concerning matza and assembly are also necessary, each for its own reason, and they are not two verses that come as one either. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: For what purpose are both of them necessary? Granted, if the Merciful One had written that women are obligated in the mitzva of assembly but had not written that they are obligated in eating matza, I would say: Derive a verbal analogy with regard to Passover, where the verse states: “And on the fifteenth day of the same month is the festival of Passover” (Leviticus 23:6), from Sukkot, where the verse states: “On the fifteenth day of this seventh month is the festival of Sukkot” (Leviticus 23:34), teaching that women are exempt from eating matza, just as they are exempt from residing in a sukka. Therefore, it is necessary for a verse to teach that women are obligated in eating matza. But let the Merciful One write that women are obligated in eating matza, and it would not be necessary to state the same halakha with regard to assembly, and I would say on my own: If children are obligated in assembly, as is stated explicitly in the verse “Assemble the people, the men and the women and the children” (Deuteronomy 31:12), are women not all the more so obligated? Therefore, as it is explicitly stated that women are obligated in assembly, the verses concerning matza and assembly are two verses that come as one, and consequently do not teach a precedent. The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says as a principle that two verses that come as one do not teach a precedent. But according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do teach a precedent, what can be said? And furthermore, one can ask: From where do we derive that women are obligated in positive mitzvot that are not time bound? The Gemara answers that one derives this from the mitzva of fearing one’s mother and father: Just as women are obligated in the mitzva of fear (Leviticus 19:3), so too, women are obligated in every positive mitzva that is not time bound. The Gemara asks: But why not derive the opposite from Torah study: Just as women are exempt from Torah study, so too they should be exempt from all positive mitzvot that are not time bound. The Gemara answers: One cannot derive an exemption for women from their exemption from Torah study, because Torah study and procreation are two verses that come as one, as in both cases women are exempt, despite the fact that these are not time-bound mitzvot. And any two verses that come as one do not teach a precedent. The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, who says that with regard to both of them, men and women, the verse states: “And God blessed them, and God said to them: Be fruitful and multiply, replenish the earth and conquer it” (Genesis 1:28), what can be said? According to his opinion, women are exempt from only one positive mitzva that is not time bound, Torah study; why not derive other mitzvot from this case? The Gemara answers: The reason this is not a difficulty is because Torah study and the redemption of the firstborn son, from which women are also exempt, are two verses that come as one, and any two verses that come as one do not teach a precedent. The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka as well, let procreation, which he maintains applies to women, and fear of one’s mother and father be considered two verses that come as one and they should not teach a precedent. The Gemara answers: Both cases are necessary. As, if the Merciful One had written only that women are obligated in fear of their parents, and had not written that they are obligated in procreation, I would say that as the Merciful One states: “Be fruitful and multiply, replenish the earth and conquer it” (Genesis 1:28), this leads to the conclusion that women are exempt from procreation, by the following reasoning: As it is the manner of a man to go to war and to conquer, yes, he is obligated in procreation, but as it is not the manner of a woman to conquer, she is not obligated in procreation. And if the Merciful One had written only that women are obligated in the mitzva of procreation, and had not written that they are obligated to fear their parents, I would say: With regard to a man, as it is in his power to perform this mitzva, yes, he is obligated to fear his mother and father, but with regard to a woman, as it is not in her power to perform this mitzva when she is married, since her obligations to her husband may prevent her from doing so, she is not obligated. And as it is not in her power to perform this mitzva when she is married, perhaps women should not be obligated at all and there should be no difference between a married and an unmarried woman. Therefore, it is necessary for the Torah to state that women are obligated in both procreation and the fear of parents, and these are not considered two verses that come as one. The Gemara notes that the earlier question remains difficult: This works out well according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do not teach a precedent. But according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do teach a precedent, what can be said? According to this opinion it can be derived that women are obligated in positive, time-bound mitzvot from matza and assembly, and that they are exempt from positive mitzvot that are not time bound, from Torah study and the redemption of the firstborn son. Rava said: The Sages of Pafunya know the reason for this matter. The Gemara comments: And who is the scholar called by the nickname: The Sages of Paphunya? It is Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov, who said as follows: The verse states with regard to phylacteries: “And it shall be a sign for you on your arm and for a memorial between your eyes, that the Torah of the Lord may be in your mouth” (Exodus 13:9). In this manner the entire Torah is juxtaposed to phylacteries: Just as donning phylacteries is a positive, time-bound mitzva and women are exempt from it, so too are women exempt from every positive, time-bound mitzva in the Torah. And from the fact that women are exempt from every positive, time-bound mitzva, one can learn by inference that women are obligated in every positive mitzva that is not time bound. The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says that the mitzva of donning phylacteries is a positive, time-bound mitzva. But according to the one who says that donning phylacteries is a positive mitzva that is not time bound, as it is applicable the entire year, day and night, what can be said? The Gemara answers: Who did you hear who said that donning phylacteries is a positive mitzva that is not time bound? It is Rabbi Meir, and he holds that matza and assembly are verses that come as one, and he further maintains that any two verses that come as one do not teach a precedent. The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that two verses that come as one do teach a precedent, and who also says that donning phylacteries is a positive mitzva that is not time bound, what can be said? The Gemara answers: It is not derived from here that women are obligated in positive, time-bound mitzvot because the verses that mention matza, rejoicing, and assembly are three verses that come as one, and everyone agrees three verses that come as one do not teach a precedent.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֲנִי קַרְיָינָא כֵּיוָן שֶׁקָּרָא שְׁלֹשָׁה פְּסוּקִים בְּבֵית הַכְּנֶסֶת הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר עַד שֶׁיִּקְרָא וִיתַרְגֵּם יְתַרְגֵּם מִדַּעְתֵּיהּ וְהָתַנְיָא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר הַמְתַרְגֵּם פָּסוּק כְּצוּרָתוֹ הֲרֵי זֶה בַּדַּאי וְהַמּוֹסִיף עָלָיו הֲרֵי זֶה מְחָרֵף וּמְגַדֵּף אֶלָּא מַאי תַּרְגּוּם תַּרְגּוּם דִּידַן וְהָנֵי מִילֵּי דַּאֲמַר לַהּ קַרְיָינָא אֲבָל אָמַר לַהּ קָרָא אֲנָא עַד דְּקָרֵי אוֹרָיְיתָא נְבִיאֵי וּכְתוּבֵי בְּדִיּוּקָא עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֲנִי שׁוֹנֶה חִזְקִיָּה אָמַר הֲלָכוֹת וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר תּוֹרָה מֵיתִיבִי אֵיזוֹ הִיא מִשְׁנָה רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר הֲלָכוֹת רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר מִדְרָשׁ מַאי תּוֹרָה מִדְרַשׁ תּוֹרָה וְהָנֵי מִילֵּי דַּאֲמַר לַהּ תָּנֵינָא אֲבָל אֲמַר לַהּ תַּנָּא אֲנָא עַד דְּתָנֵי הִילְכְתָא סִפְרָא וְסִיפְרֵי וְתוֹסֶפְתָּא עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֲנִי תַּלְמִיד אֵין אוֹמְרִים כְּשִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן עַזַּאי וּכְשִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן זוֹמָא אֶלָּא כֹּל שֶׁשּׁוֹאֲלִין אוֹתוֹ בְּכׇל מָקוֹם דָּבָר אֶחָד בְּתַלְמוּדוֹ וְאוֹמְרוֹ וַאֲפִילּוּ בְּמַסֶּכְתָּא דְכַלָּה עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֲנִי חָכָם אֵין אוֹמְרִים כְּחַכְמֵי יַבְנֶה כְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא וַחֲבֵירָיו אֶלָּא כֹּל שֶׁשּׁוֹאֲלִים אוֹתוֹ דְּבַר חׇכְמָה בְּכׇל מָקוֹם וְאוֹמְרָהּ
§ The Sages taught: If one said to a woman: Be betrothed to me on the condition that I am literate with regard to the Torah, once he has read three verses in the synagogue she is betrothed. Rabbi Yehuda says that she is not betrothed until he reads and translates the verses. The Gemara asks: Does Rabbi Yehuda mean that one translates according to his own understanding? But isn’t it taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Megilla 3:21) that Rabbi Yehuda says: One who translates a verse literally is a liar, since he distorts the meaning of the text, and conversely, one who adds his own translation is tantamount to one who curses and blasphemes God? Rather, to which translation is Rabbi Yehuda referring? He is referring to our accepted translation. And this statement applies only if he said to her: I am literate, but if he said to her: I am a reader, this indicates that he is an expert in the reading of the Torah, and she is not betrothed unless he knows how to read the Torah, the Prophets, and the Writings with precision. The Gemara discusses a similar case: If one said to a woman: Be betrothed to me on the condition that I study [shoneh], Ḥizkiyya says it means that he studies halakhot, and Rabbi Yoḥanan says it means that he studies Torah, i.e., the written Torah. The Gemara raises an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan from a baraita: What is the meaning of: Mishna? Rabbi Meir says halakhot, Rabbi Yehuda says homiletics. Neither of them, however, says that it refers to the written Torah. What is the meaning of: Torah, that Rabbi Yoḥanan said? It is homiletic interpretation of the Torah. And this statement applies only if he said to her: I study [taneina]. But if he says to her: I am a tanna [tanna ana], she is not betrothed unless he studies halakha, i.e., Mishna, Sifra and Sifrei, and Tosefta. If a man says to a woman: Be betrothed to me on the condition that I am a student of Torah, one does not say that he must be a student who is scholarly like Shimon ben Azzai or like Shimon ben Zoma, who were called students despite their great knowledge, as they were never ordained. Rather, it means anyone who, when he is asked one matter in any topic of his studies, responds appropriately and can say what he has learned, and this suffices even if his statement was in the tractate of Kalla. Similarly, if a man says to a woman: Be betrothed to me on the condition that I am a scholar, one does not say that he must be like the scholars of Yavne, like Rabbi Akiva and his colleagues. Rather, it is referring to anyone who, when he is asked about a matter of wisdom on any topic related to the Torah, responds appropriately and can say what he has learned.