(5) A woman must not put on man’s apparel, nor shall a man wear woman’s clothing; for whoever does these things is abhorrent to the LORD your G-d.
Below, I have collected as many interpretations of this text as I could find. Any bolding is done myself for emphasis. I refer to this verse as the "crossdressing prohibition" although (as I discuss) this is not necessarily accurate.
לא יהיה כלי גבר על אשה לפי שהוא גנאי ופריצות ולכך לא נטלה יעל חרב או חנית אלא המקבת והיתד למחץ רקת סיסרא ונסמכה פרשה זו כאן לפי שדבר למעלה בעניני מלחמה ואשה לא נבראת רק להקים זרע ואם תצא למלחמה תרגיל את עצמה לידי זנות וכן אם ילבש גבר שמלת אשה.
לא יהיה כלי גבר על אשה, “a woman must not wear men’s clothing;” it is an act of disgrace and sexual provocation;”Having taken note of this law, Yael, the Kenite woman who killed Sisera, the general who had commanded the army of the Canaanite King Jabin of Chatzor, did not use weapons used by male soldiers, such as arrows or a sword when doing so, but took a tent pin. (Judges, 4,21) This paragraph has been written immediately after those dealing with women and warfare, in order to remind us that warfare is something reserved for men, not women. When men go out to war they are likely to encounter situations making promiscuity a great temptation. They are therefore warned not to add to such temptation by dressing up as women. (Ibn Ezra)
My original notes for this section had some swearing.
Ibn Ezra has some unique takes on this section, but the story of a woman killing with a tent peg (so as not to violate the prohibition against women taking up men's weapons) recurs in many commentaries.
I read this to my mother, who is not Jewish. She assumed this text referred to homosexual activity among soldiers, rather than the kidnapping of women as described in the same parashat - this didn't occur to me but seems like a valid interpretation. If it is an unspoken assumption among the commenters in this sheet that soldiers have sex with each other (i.e., "gay for the stay"), it would go further to explain why woman soldiers would be associated with promiscuity.
A WOMAN SHALL NOT WEAR THAT WHICH PERTAINETH UNTO A MAN. This law was stated here because Scripture deals with going out to war. Women were created only to have children. If a woman joins men in going to war she will come to engage in illicit sexual relations on the way. The law that states neither shall a man put on a woman’s garment is similar. The reason for this law is as follows. If a male who does not have a full beard mixes with women, then he and they will have sexual relations without anyone knowing. This law indicates that the custom of Israel was for the garments of men to be unlike the garments of women. There was a definite difference between the garments. This is also the practice in most countries. Some say that our verse speaks of unnatural intercourse. However, there is no need for this interpretation. The fact is that [G_d] abominates the one who changes the works of the Lord.
Translator's notes for Ibn Ezra's stale "women are only good for making babies" take here clarify that:
Women who march off to war with men will have relations with them and produce illegitimate children
The purpose of the law is to prevent illicit sexual intercourse
Full beard is not to be taken literally. It means enough facial hair to indicate that the person is a male
A male dressing as a female has access to women. Rashi has a similar explanation.
["unnatural intercourse" refers to] homosexuality
[One who changes the works of the Lord] Which cross dressing does, for one is then unable to distinguish between male and female.
The assumptions made are baffling to me but are not unique to Ibn Ezra. (I am not addressing the obvious offensive sexism and homophobia present in this commentary because there is no point to refuting them here.)
Firstly: that crossdressing is primarily meant to encourage adultery and/or for women to go to war and have sex there, at the war.
Secondly: that most secondary sexual characteristics are not enough to distinguish male from female. Clothing is needed to clarify gender presentation.
Thirdly: that crossdressing is malum in se, as it confuses a boundary that G_d has created for G_d's own reference. Put a pin in this idea.
לא יהיה כלי גבר על אשה, “male apparel shall not be on a woman.” The principal concern of our verse is to deny the woman the right to bear arms (Sifri 227, Nazir 59). She is not to go to war and become a cause for immorality rampant during war. Similar considerations, i.e. the prevention of creating opportunities for sexual promiscuity- are the reason males are forbidden to wear women’s garments. Both of these apparent role reversals of the sexes are an abomination to the Lord.
Our sages in Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 6,1 understand this wording to mean that “garments which will result in, or lead to abominations being perpetrated are forbidden” (compare Yoreh Deyah 156,2). Jewelry which is associated specifically with women is forbidden to be worn by men, as are mannerisms practiced especially by women, such as looking in the mirror. Seeing that they were one of three things which the rabbis had to give a special dispensation to for the household of Rabbi Yehudah Hanassi, it is clear that generally speaking male Jews are not supposed to admire themselves in a mirror. If a barber, in order to trim the client’s hair, needs to look into the mirror to better see the hairs he is looking for, this is in order. If a person was sick and he wishes to reassure himself that he is on the way to recovery by consulting a mirror and confirming that he looks healthier, this too is in order. The last mentioned examples are not uses for the enhancement of one’s exterior, for “dolling oneself up.” Our sages in Shabbat 94 also stated that if one picks a single white hair out of the black hairs in one’s beard one is guilty of violating the basic prohibition not to wear women’s clothing. A further illustration of this subject is found in Yalkut Shimoni on Judges item 56, that the reason Yael slew Siserah with a nail instead of with a knife was that she did not want to violate the commandment of using implements reserved for males.
This commentary reiterates the previously-established concepts that women soldiers will, by definition, have tons of scandalous sex all the time; and then men who crossdress are so irresistibly sexy that it's downright sinful.
Hopefully you can see as well as I can how strange the tone of the commentary is becoming.
The fetishization of crossdressers is nothing new but it is almost always paired with the fetishization of women soldiers in order to create a gender binary of the warrior sex and the desirable sex.
This is reinforced by the new prohibitions detailed in this commentary. There are many prohibitions against men shaving or anything else that could be considered self-beautification, including the use of a mirror. Men are not supposed to be sexually desirable, according to many ancient rabbis. Unfortunately, men are very attractive unless they specifically guard against looking desirable.
I'm not intentionally reading any specific rabbi as homosexual, and I have no explanation for why this is so commonly repeated in commentaries, but the homoerotic undertones of these prohibitions are too obvious to ignore.
לא יהיה כלי גבר על אשה, in order to walk among males and seduce them.
Another definition of crossdressing that only considers sexual promiscuity.
Some sages consider this as a rule against men looking feminine, while others talk about women looking masculine. Rarely are any other sexes brought into the discussion (although we will get to that) - and some sages focus only on one gender, as Rashbam does here.
ולא ילבש גבר שמלת אשה NEITHER SHALL A MAN PUT ON A WOMAN’S GARMENT in order to go and stay unnoticed amongst women. Another explanation of the second part of the text is: it implies that a man should not remove the hair of the genitals and the hair beneath the arm-pit (Nazir 59a).
לא יהיה כלי גבר על אשה THE APPAREL OF A MAN SHALL NOT BE ON A WOMAN — so that she look like a man, in order to consort with men, for this can only be for the purpose of adultery (unchastity) (cf. Sifrei Devarim 226:1; Nazir 59a).
Rashi repeats the ideas in the commentaries above.
Note that, according to many of these scholars, this part of Torah only exists because there is no such thing as "passing" as male or female. Clothes are the arbiter of the way your gender is perceived, although activities (either warfare or shaving) can also influence the way your gender is perceived in public.
כי תועבת FOR [ALL THAT DO SO ARE] AN ABOMINATION [UNTO THE LORD THY {G_D}] — This implies that the Torah forbids only the wearing of a garb that leads to abomination (unchastity) (cf. Sifrei Devarim 226:1).
Put a tent pin in this notion as well.
§ Rav said: A person who is not a nazirite may lighten his burden by removing all the hair of his body with a razor. One who feels he has too much hair may shave all of it off with a razor, apart from his beard and the corners of his head. The Gemara raises an objection against this from a baraita: A man who removes the hair of the armpit or the pubic hair is flogged for transgressing the prohibition: “A man shall not put on a woman’s garment” (Deuteronomy 22:5), as this behavior is the manner of women.
I have not included all Talmud citations here. See the rest of this section of Talmud, and also Makkot 20b:5, Shabbat 94b:9, which all elaborate on the prohibition against men shaving for beautification.
The rabbinical interpretations here are heavily leaning on the concept of shaving (and other prohibited acts) being considered a gender marker of society. Put a tent pin in that concept as well.
The Gemara asks: And what does the first tanna, who holds that the prohibition is by rabbinic law, learn from this verse: “A man shall not put on a woman’s garment”? The Gemara answers: He requires it for that which is taught in the baraita, where it states: “A woman shall not wear that which pertains to a man, and a man shall not put on a woman’s garment, for whoever does these things is an abomination to the Lord your [G_d]” (Deuteronomy 22:5). What is the meaning when the verse states this? If it teaches only that a man may not put on a woman’s garment, and a woman may not wear a man’s garment, it is already stated in explanation of this prohibition that “it is an abomination to the Lord your [G_d],” and there is no abomination here in the mere act of wearing a garment.
WOAH!
Read that one over a little slower! Wow!
First of all, we get that fun nitpicky version of Torah interpretation: Any "if/then" statement is to be interpreted "if and only if/then."
For example: Let's do a little blasphemy and pretend the Torah says, "No one may eat at McDonald's on a Tuesday. The LORD hates Tuesday McNuggets. Anyone who does this will be banished to live in the dumpster."
A normal interpretation of that text would say: Okay, got it. No eating at McDonald's on Tuesdays.
But the Talmud instead says: My cousin ate at McDonald's last Tuesday and did not get banished to a dumpster. G_d doesn't lie, so my cousin must not have broken this rule. So the rule can't actually mean that you are not allowed to go to McDonald's on Tuesdays. Technically it says you can go to McDonald's, you just can't eat there. But Rabbi Akiva totally went to McDonald's on a Tuesday and ate an ice cream. This must only be a prohibition against eating meals at McDonald's, but you can eat snacks there. Except Rabbi Akiva, just to spite everyone, went back to McDonald's the next Tuesday and ate an entire Happy Meal. Perhaps the Torah only requires that we not eat McNuggets on Tuesday. But it is the custom in another town for the local synagogue to celebrate Tuesday McNugget Parties in order to fundraise for the synagogue. This isn't difficult. In the rest of Torah, G_d states that we should give funds to the priests, and the leaders of the synagogue are basically priests, and in any case, this is minhag, and it overrides the prohibition against Tuesday McNugget Parties.
In any case, the Gemara whittles this prohibition down - crossdressing is only prohibited if it leads to abominations.
Spectacular!
Rather, it means that a man may not wear a woman’s garment and thereby go and sit among the women; and a woman may not wear a man’s garment and sit among the men. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: From where is it derived that a woman may not go out with weapons to war? The verse states: “A woman shall not wear that which pertains to a man, and a man shall not put on a woman’s garment,” which indicates that a man may not adorn himself with the cosmetics and ornaments of a woman, and similarly a woman may not go out with weapons to war, as those are for the use of males. Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling follows this opinion.
Did you think we were done with Nazir 59?
Nope! The Gemara continues, defining the abomination. It's not homosexuality (@Ibn Ezra!) but is rather "the intentional falsehood of presenting your gender incorrectly."
Can you guess where we're going? Toot toot! We're on a one-way train to the Interpretation Station!
That is, a transphobic person would interpret that to mean: You cannot present your gender differently than your "real" sex.
And a non-transphobic person would say: You cannot present your gender falsely, regardless of your assigned gender at birth.
Uh-oh... Does that mean that even a trans-friendly reading of the Torah would require people to out themselves? Hm...
Mar Zutra holds in accordance with that which was taught in a baraita: A person may scrape off dried excrement crusts and scabs of a wound that are on his flesh because of the pain that they are causing him. However, if he does so in order to clean and beautify himself, it is prohibited. According to the tanna of this baraita, it is prohibited to adorn or beautify oneself, as the verse: “Neither shall a man put on a woman’s garment” (Deuteronomy 22:5) prohibits dressing or conducting oneself in the manner of women.
Nasty. Also not especially good medical advice, but I'm no doctor/rabbi.
This is a fun and funky interpretation of law because it is exclusively intentions-based (see the barber mention in Rabbeinu Bahya, Devarim 22:5:1 above). Again we have the prohibition against men being sexy. But we clarify: You may look sexy if you have to because of the pain you're in. Good to know...
(Devarim 22:5) "A man's vestment shall not be upon a woman": What does Scripture come to teach us? If that she should not wear colored clothing, is it not written (Ibid.) "for the abomination, etc."? And this is not an abomination. It means, rather, that a woman should not wear what a man wears and go among the men (for licentious purposes), and a man should not wear colored clothing and go among the women.
Further reinforcement of the "lying about your gender" definition of "abomination," with the clarification that this is specifically in regards to lying about your gender in order to secretly and illicitly sleep with other people.
This obviously brings to mind the modern transphobic argument against trans people using the appropriate public restroom (due to the assumption that trans people are predators and transition for the sole purpose of attacking people in restrooms). However, it does give us some extra information - it may not be an abomination to lie about your gender for any reason other than having sneaky secret sex.
Rabbi Meir Amsel (Ha-Ma'or, Kislev-Tevet 5733) notes that yet another prohibition is also applicable to sex-change procedures, a consideration which may extend as well to hormone treatment for purposes of sex-change. The commandment "A woman shall not wear that which pertains to a man, nor shall a man put on a woman's garment" (Deut. 22:5) is not limited to the wearing of apparel associated with the opposite sex but encompasses any action uniquely identified with the opposite sex, proscribing, for example, shaving of armpits or dyeing of hair by a male. A procedure designed to transform sexual characteristics violates the very essence of this prohibition.
"This isn't transphobic enough!" "Why aren't we explicitly hating trans people?" Rabbi Meir Amsel has heard your complaints and has just the halakhah for you!
It's a valid plain-text reading of the Torah. Unfortunately, that's not what we do here in the LGBT Apologetics on Sefaria Sheets.
The Rabbi goes on to detail the probably-valid halakhic issues that arise from gender-affirming medical interventions (surgery and otherwise). The main concern is marriage and reproduction, but the Rabbi discusses minutiae of various procedures in a well-informed way (surprising to me, based on how they started off and how they concluded that being trans is a "tragic condition" caused by an endocrine imbalance - published in the 1970s, predating the DSM-III classification and subsequent "whoopsie! we did a human rights no-no" of the DSM-5) - including circumcision as it relates to bottom growth and the infamous gendered morning prayer.
None of those have anything to do with Ki Teitzei. Thank you. Next!
[...]Plastic surgery undertaken solely for cosmetic or esthetic purposes differs significantly from other corrective procedures. [...] A third question is posed by cosmetic surgery performed upon male patients. The prohibition "a man shall not put on a woman's garment" (Deut. 22:5) extends not only to the wearing of female clothing by a male but also to the application of cosmetics or to any act of beautification usually associated with women. Dyeing of the hair and removal of armpit or pubic hair are specifically enumerated acts of this nature. Are such forms of plastic surgery as facelifting, nasoplasty, etc., so widely associated with women as to constitute a form of "female dress," or may men avail themselves of such methods for purposes of improving their appearance?
Rabbi Breish cites evidence showing that "wounding" is permissible not only for purposes of curing a physiological disorder but also for purposes of alleviating pain.[...] Rabbi Breish concludes that alleviation of pain is included in the pronouncement "and he shall cause him to be thoroughly healed" and hence excluded from the prohibition against "wounding."
The halakhic definition of pain is significantly expanded by Tosafot, Shabbat 50b. Tosafot states that a state of mind which prevents a person from mingling with people constitutes "pain" within the halakhic definition of that term. Accordingly, both Rabbi Breish and Rabbi Klein conclude that if an individual shuns normal social intercourse as a result of a deformity or other disfigurement, the condition causing distress may be corrected by means of plastic surgery.
[...]
Rabbi Breish and Rabbi Klein both rule that cosmetic surgery, when permissible, is permissible not only for women but for men as well. As has been indicated, cometic surgery is not permitted simply for purposes of beautification but is sanctioned only in order to alleviate psychological anguish. Tosafot, Shabbat 50b, states that males are permitted to use cosmetics if such cosmetics are applied for purposes of alleviating pain. It follows, therefore, that other forms of beautification commonly associated with women are also permitted to males, provided they are designed primarily for purposes of alleviating pain. Rabbi Klein further notes that in the United States cosmetic surgery is not a uniquely feminine form of beautification but is widely practiced by males as well and, accordingly, does not constitute an infraction of the prohibition against the wearing of female garments.
A fresh modern take on Torah's toxic masculinity!
The discussion here is extensive and valuable. There are dissenting opinions to the ones I listed here (please read them if you have the time) but notable to me are the following ideas:
Surgery is of course normally allowed despite the prohibition against cutting flesh due to its life-saving potential, but when else is surgery justified? If someone wants surgical intervention for something that doesn't cause physical pain but causes social distress, it may be allowed. (Again, the halakhah includes dissenting opinions.)
Additionally, this may not even relate to the prohibition against crossdressing because, in the United States at least, cosmetic surgery is not exclusively feminine.
That is, according to some modern rabbinic interpretation, what is feminine/masculine (as it relates to law) is defined in relation to society.
[...]Does the wearing of such attire involve a transgression of the biblical prohibition "A woman shall not wear men's apparel" (Deuteronomy 22:5)? [...] Rabbi Weisz and Rabbi Waldenberg both espouse a totally nonpermissive position with regard to this question. These authorities assert that [a woman wearing slacks] violates laws of modesty and, moreover, constitutes male attire, even though women's slacks are cut differently from men's trousers and are somewhat distinctive in appearance. In discussing a similar question with regard to a form of headgear fashionable in his time, Avnei Ẓedek, Yoreh De'ah, no. 72, asserts that minor differences in style do not change the masculine nature of a garmet [sic]. In support of his contention, he points to the fact that the same noun was used both for the garment worn by men and for the garment worn by women.
Rabbi Weisz marshals evidence demonstrating that donning attire associated with the opposite sex is forbidden not only in public but in private as well. [...]Rabbi Weisz further asserts that not only one who himself or herself dresses in the garb of the opposite sex but even one who dresses another person in the garb of the opposite sex is guilty of a transgression. For this reason, according to Rabbi Weisz, it is not permissible to dress even small girls in such garments.
Not cited by Rabbi Weisz is Avnei Ẓedek's statement with regard to the type of pants or trousers which were in vogue for women during his day. Avnei Ẓedek declared that such garb was distinctively feminine in nature and, accordingly, permitted women to continue wearing the garment in question. It would appear that insofar as present day styles are concerned at least some types of pantsuits and the like should be deemed equally distinctive and feminine in nature and hence not forbidden as male attire.
[...Many rule that ]it is forbidden for women to wear even a single item of male apparel. This position is based upon the statement of R. Eliezer ben Ya'akov, Nazir 59a, forbidding women to bear arms because armor and weapons are deemed to be male garb. Since women are forbidden to bear arms even though they are otherwise dressed in female attire, it is argued that women may not don even a single article of male clothing. [...]
Citing Ohalei Ya'akov, no. 70, Rabbi Yosef avers that the wearing of unisex garments, i.e., garments worn by both men and women alike, does not constitute a violation of the prohibition against wearing garb of the opposite sex. [...] Hence, it would seem that as long as slacks are viewed as improper attire by significant segments of the Jewish community, the wearing of such garb by those charged with bearing the banner of Torah should not be sanctioned.
A lot of scholarly opinions in this one and almost all of them are pretty bad!
It does bring up an interesting idea - if what clothes are allowable is defined by social custom, then the first women to wear pants were violating Torah. But they also made society change its ideas. Because of these women, the US no longer sees pants-wearing as exclusively masculine. Therefore, women who wear pants now are probably not violating Torah. (I am not a rabbi etc etc disclaimer; this is only my opinion; you know the drill.)
But Torah is outside of time and space - how could an action that is neutral today be wrong 50 years ago? Does local custom really change the law that much?
Women have many reasons to wear pants - well, okay, no, only one reason, and now that we're working from home, even that's not true anymore - so it's reasonable to acknowledge that women in the US were going to keep wearing pants. The women who violated halakhah very publicly were the reason that other women who performed the same action were not violating halakhah. So now we're skewing into some weird "the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few" "with great power comes great responsibility" stuff that is interesting but, once again, is not related to the parashah in question. But let's keep in mind the apparently relative nature of clothing's gender.
The Gemara further relates: Rabbi Yehuda’s wife went out to the market, collected wool, and made a thick [hutevei] cloak. When she would go out to the market she would cover herself with it, and when Rabbi Yehuda would go out to pray he would cover himself with the cloak and pray. And when he would cover himself with it he would recite the blessing: Blessed is He who wrapped me in a coat, as he took much pleasure in it. On one occasion Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, the Nasi, decreed a fast. Rabbi Yehuda did not come to the house of the fast, where everyone gathered. The people said to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel: Rabbi Yehuda does not have a dignified garment to cover himself with, and therefore he shies away from public events. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel sent him a cloak of his own, but Rabbi Yehuda did not accept this gift.
I have included this story due to the previous halakhah citing it as an example of unisex clothing or an allowable instance of crossdressing. The story itself does not mention the gender of the cloak in question (yes, we are at the point where we are assigning cloaks as male or female, somehow) - instead, it is more of a diss track about Rabbi Yehuda's bad cloak.
Rav Breisch then expands the definition of pain for which a doctor may injure. His source is the Gemara’s (Shabbat 50b) permission for a man to remove scabs from his body to eliminate pain, but not merely to beautify himself. Rashi (ad. loc. s.v. Mishum L’yafot) explains that removing scabs for beautification purposes is forbidden for a male because it is regarded as feminine behavior. Tosafot, however, (ad. loc. s.v. Bishvil) qualify the Gemara’s statement: “If the only pain that he suffers is that he is embarrassed to walk among people then it is permissible, because there is no greater pain than this.” Thus, Tosafot extend the definition of pain to include psychological distress.[...]
This opinion is in agreement with the opinion on cosmetic surgery included above. Not only is psychological pain a consideration, but it is the worst kind of pain.
That a man shall not wear the attire of a woman, as it is said, “Neither shall a man put on a woman’s garment” (ibid.); for this was the custom of idolaters, as is explained in books treating of idolatrous worship.
That He prohibited us from men adorning themselves with women's ornaments. And that is His saying, "nor may a man wear a woman’s garment" (Deuteronomy 22:5). And any man who adorns himself like this or wears what is well-known in that city to be an ornament specific to women - is lashed. And you should know that this procedure - meaning that the women adorn themselves with men's ornaments and the men adorn themselves with women's ornaments - is done to arouse the drive for promiscuity, as is explained in the books written about this. And it is often placed in the stipulations for the making of some talismans and said, "If a man is occupied with it, he should wear women's garments and adorn himself with gold and pearls and that which is similar to them; but if it was a woman, she should wear armor and arm herself with swords." And this is very famous among those of this opinion. (See Parashat Ki Tetzei; Mishneh Torah, Foreign Worship and Customs of the Nations 11.)
[...]I think that this precept has also another reason; namely, that the interchange of dress creates lust and leads to immorality.
Maimonides has a habit of making up anthropological theories and previously-unheard-of groups of pagans with hyper-specific rituals in order to explain Torah.
In this interpretation, crossdressing is not actually wrong; it just makes you look like one of those nonspecified groups we hate. Again we talk about local custom being a deciding factor for what is or isn't crossdressing. And again we have a reminder that crossdressers are extremely sexy.
The laws of the commandment: That which they, may their memory be blessed, said (Makkot 20b) that the prohibition and lashes are not only for clothing, but the same is true about their grooming; as anyone who grooms himself with the adornments that are unique to women is obligated in [getting] lashes - for example, one who plucks out white hairs from among the black ones from his head or from his beard; and so [too] one who dyes his hair in the way that women dye theirs. And so did Onkelos translate, "and a man should not groom with the adornments of a woman." And that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (see Mishneh Torah, Foreign Worship and Customs of the Nations 12:10) that a toomtoom and an androginus (two categories of people the sex of which is in doubt) should, like a woman, not wrap their head; and should, like a man, not shave their head; and [that] if they do so they are not lashed. And so [too,] in every place, we give them the stringencies of men and of women; but if they transgressed, they are not lashed, because they [represent] a doubt. But if they transgressed a prohibition that a man and a woman are equal in, it is not necessary to say about this that they are lashed for it. And its other details are elucidated in Tractate Nazir [in the] chapter [entitled] Shnei Nizirim (Nazir 59a).
We finally come to our first mention of intersex people (the tumtum and androgynos). It may be possible to interpret this as referring to nonbinary gender, although the vocabulary normally refers only to people with nonbinary physical sex.
Normally it seems that, in terms of mitzvot, the Torah cares about sex but not gender, due to the Torah's focus on procreation. If so, though, why is crossdressing an issue of discussion at all? If the text already supports the existence of people who do not present as men or women, why are there such strong opinions in favor of enforcing gender binaries for clothing specifically?
A woman may wear tzitzit in private or under her outer clothes, for then there is no suspicion that she wishes to appear like a man. Were that the case we would apply Targum Yonatan's dictum in Devarim 22:5 that a woman wearing tzitzit violates the prohibition of wearing men's clothing, and see Resp. Maharam Shick, Yoreh De'ah, no. 176. [Targum Yonatan on the Chumash dates from Gaonic times.][...]
Oh! Hang on a sec. Unlike the halakhah we read earlier, this responsa about tzitzit defines the crossdressing prohibition as related only to outward appearances with no regard for personal intent or the actual article of clothing being worn.
שלא ילבש גבר שמלת אשה ולא יהיה כלי גבר על אשה (דברים כב, ה). זה לשון הרב הנ"ל, טעם מצות אלו, כדי שלא יבאו לידי ניאוף, כי הלבוש יעוררוהו על ההרהור שקשה מעבירה, אם ידבק בניאוף יענש בשלמת אשה, במדה שמדד בה מודדים לו. ומצאתי כתוב, כשהולד יוצא לאויר העולם אם המילדת תקבל זכר בלבוש נקבה, יהיה זנאי ביותר. ואם הנקבה בלבוש הזכר, תהיה זונה אלא בלבוש חדש, שהלבוש יביא כח האיש באשה, וכח האשה באיש. נמי רמז שאין ראוי בענין יראת יהוה שילבש הגבר חולשת האשה ולמשוך ידו מלהשתדל מפני רכות הלב, עד כאן לשונו:
לא יהיה כלי גבר על אשה ולא ילבש גבר שמלת אשה . Rabbi Menachem HaBavli claims that this prohibition is designed to prevent opportunities for marital infidelity. The wearing of clothes of the opposite sex leads to sexual arousal and makes it more difficult to resist such temptation. I have found it written somewhere that if a midwife wraps a newborn baby boy in clothes once worn by a girl, that boy will grow up and become a womanizer. If the reverse occurs the girl is likely to become a prostitute. It is essential therefore to wrap a baby in a new garment, one that does not yet exude the residue of either a male or female who has worn it. This teaches that garments have a "personality" of their own. Garments worn by women transfer some femininity to a male who wears them and vice versa. In addition to this it is unseemly for a man who has been created by G–d as a member of the "stronger" sex to don garments of the "weaker" sex and thus indicate dissatisfaction with G–d's decision to put his soul in the body of a male.
Another odd take, this one from kabbalah. Instead of discussing whether clothes literally have a spiritual gender (and whether this is a form of animism or only sexism), I put this here based on the specific interpretations of the crossdressing prohibition that it reiterates and amplifies:
That crossdressing causes infidelity/adultery, with little or no agency on the part of the people who have sex;
That clothing actually is gendered in a spiritual sense;
And that transgender people are mentioned - Rabbi HaBavli acknowledges that some people assigned male at birth will choose to wear women's clothing specifically because the person believes herself to be a woman who should have a woman's body. At the time, there may not have been any way to present oneself as transgender except by crossdressing.
Rabbi HaBavli calls crossdressing "unseemly" and so, in context of the Rabbi's discussion of this prohibition, crossdressing is prohibited because:
- It leads to adultery
- MtF transition specifically is a step down, as women are not as good as men
- The sin is not only the crossdressing itself, but the sin of being transgender
Also notable? Rabbi HaBavli finds it necessary to explain why some women and men are gender-nonconforming and chooses to blame it on the way they are treated as infants. It sounds nearly Freudian. In this sense though, both genders will (supposedly) become non-monogamous as a consequence of being gender nonconforming. Maybe this was a common stereotype in Rabbi HaBavli's time but I have no further evidence of this and it is unrelated to the topic at hand.
But what is "feminine" and what is "masculine" are not defined here as opposites. If they were opposites, then the male raised "feminine" would be very sexually active while the woman raised "masculine" would be sexually inexperienced (or vice versa).
Rather, "male" or "female" are two (arbitrary?) separate categories of people. If any overlap occurs, as when a masculine person has a feminine side, then the person will not be monogamous. Rabbi HaBavli treats this as fact.
(כד) וכן רמוז בפסוק (דברים כב, ה) לא יהיה כלי גבר על אשה ולא ילבש גבר שמלת אשה. ואף כי הענין רומז שלא ישנה סדרי בראשית, כי האיש הלובש שמלת אשה עושה מן המשפיע מקבל:[...]
[T]he regulations about men not wearing women's clothing and vice versa evidently are meant to underscore that we are not to upset the divisions made by G–d when He created the world and decided who should be the משפיע and who should be the מקבל, [...]
Another Kabbalah interpretation of the prohibition. I have trimmed off the mysticism (please read at the source if you are interested). Here, the law is widely assumed to be a ruling against transgressing boundaries G_d has set in place.
[...]As to the custom of wearing 'faces' on Purim, and men who wear women's dresses and women wearing men's attire - this is not forbidden, for they have no intention other than pure pleasure. [...]
We approach the exception to the crossdressing prohibition - crossdressing for the celebration of Purim. How is this justified? After all, how often do you get to break a law just for the heck of it? But the fact that the crossdressing is only for fun is exactly what makes it allowable.
- Crossdressing
- For no reason (Rabbeinu Bahya Devarim 22:5:1
- Because you are transgender (Shenei Luchot HaBerit; Contemporary Halakhic Problems Vol I)
- To attract the opposite sex
- At any time
- Illicitly/adulterously (Chizkuni; Ibn Ezra; Rabbeinu Bahya; Rashbam; Rashi; Nazir 69a; Sifrei Devarim 226:1; Maimonides, above; Shenei Luchot HaBerit, Torah Shebikhtav, Ki Teitzei, Derekh Chayim 4;)
- With anyone, even in a non-adulterous context (Contemporary Halakhic Problems Vol II)
- Only on the battlefield (Nazir 59a, Rabbeinu Bahya Devarim 22:5:1
- At any time
- To attract the same sex (Ibn Ezra)
- Dressing a baby in the incorrect garment, thereby cursing the baby (Shenei Luchot HaBeri)
- Faking your gender
- For no reason (Rabbeinu Bahya Devarim 22:5:1)
- Because you are transgender (Shenei Luchot HaBeri)
- To trick the same sex
- For a man to sleep with women without men noticing (Sifrei Devarim 226:1)
- To trick the opposite sex
- For a man to get into women’s spaces (Rashi, Nazir 59a, Sifrei Devarim 226:1)
- For a woman to consort with men (Rashbam, Rashi
- To cross boundaries G-D has set in place / lying to G-D (Shenei Luchot HaBerit, Rabbeinu Bahya Devarim 22:5:1)
- Women in war
- Because they will have illicit sex (Rabbeinu Bahya)
- Men becoming more attractive
- By looking in a mirror (Rabbeinu Bahya)
- By cleaning up their facial hair (Rabbeinu Bahya)
- By shaving
- Face (Ibn Ezra, Rabbeinu Bahya, Nazir 58b)
- Armpit (Rashi, Nazir 58b)
- Genitals (Rashi, Nazir 58b, Contemporary Halakhic Problems Vol I)
- Cutting off scabs (Shabbat 50b)
- Following practices of idolaters
- Wearing the wrong gender of clothing, according to their local city (Maimonides)
- Men acting like women in any way
- Including but not limited to beautification practices (Nazir 58b, Nazir 59a, Shabbat 50b)
-
You are intersex (Sefer HaChinukh 543:3)
-
You are not trying to have illicit sex (Shulchan Arukh Orach Chayim 696:8, Sifrei Devarim 226:1)
-
It is Purim (Sulchan Arukh Orach Chayim 696:8)
-
You are crossdressing for fun only (Sulchan Arukh Orach Chayim 696:8)
- You feel embarrassed if you don’t crossdress (Grey Matter III)
- You experience pain or distress if you don't crossdress (Shabbat 50b)
- You shave with a razor (Nazir 58b)
- You are not trying to trick anyone about your gender (Sifrei Devarim 226:1)
- You are a rabbi with a bad cloak (Nedarim 49b)
- You are wearing unisex clothing (Contemporary Halakhic Problems Vol II, Nedarim 49b)
- You crossdress in private but not public (Responsa Benei Banim Volume II 3:4)
If this is a prohibition against adultery only, then it is not a prohibition against crossdressing and is only a repetition of other laws in the Torah. The law would then have nothing to do with one's gender. Since I have the understanding that the Torah is not written arbitrarily, I have removed arguments that define crossdressing as a form of adultery. After all, as discussed above, there are other reasons that people crossdress besides sexual promiscuity - Purim is the obvious counterexample - and any interpretation of these mitzvot must account for these.
Additionally, as per the Gemara above, there is "no abomination here in the mere act of wearing a garment." Therefore, crossdressing is not itself abominable - the intentions or the consequences of crossdressing are what is addressed in this prohibition. As quoted above, this is solely about "garments which will result in, or lead to abominations being perpetrated." We are defining what that abomination may be.
With that said, we remove the claims that interpret 22:5 as being solely about illicit sex or about crossdressing with no secondary goal:
- Crossdressing
- Because you are transgender
- To attract the opposite sex
- At any time
- With anyone, even in a non-adulterous context
- At any time
- To attract the same sex
- Faking your gender
- Because you are transgender
- To cross boundaries G-D has set in place / lying to G-D
- Men becoming more attractive
- By looking in a mirror
- By cleaning up their facial hair
- By shaving
- Face
- Armpit
- Genitals
- Cutting off scabs
- Due to a plain-text reading, this is a prohibition against transgender people presenting as their true gender.
- As per rabbinical interpretation, this is a prohibition against crossing the gender binary (to attract someone sexually in a non-illicit context, for men to beautify themselves, or anything else that feminizes a man or masculinizes a woman). This is normally defined by minhag/local custom.
- As per rabbinical interpretation, this is a prohibition against presenting oneself to G-D duplicitously.
Pikuach Nefesh. No commandment can put anyone's life in danger.
The suicide risk for trans+ people are well known and a constant threat. (Maybe I will pull a Maimonides and say: Google it.) To speak plainly - if a community is transphobic, this violates Pikuach Nefesh. If a trans+ person coming out of the closet is dangerous, this violates Pikuach Nefesh. If staying in the closet and not expressing their identity puts the trans+ person at risk of suicide, this violates Pikuach Nefesh.
Therefore, this law cannot exist if it applies to trans+ people whose lives may be at risk if they do not dress as their authentic selves.
And Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Yosei: A single regret or pang of guilt in one’s heart is preferable to many lashes administered by others that cause only physical pain, as it is stated: “And she chases her lovers, but she does not overtake them; she seeks them, but she will not find them; and she will say ‘I will go and return to my first husband; for it was better for me then than now’” (Hosea 2:9). Remorse is more effective than any externally imposed punishment listed in the verses that follow (Hosea 2:11–19). And Reish Lakish said that in the Bible, it seems that such remorse is preferable to one hundred lashes, as it is stated: “A rebuke enters deeper into a man of understanding than a hundred lashes to a fool” (Proverbs 17:10).
If a life is not at stake, a transgender person is still permitted to transition, as "A single regret or pang of guilt in one’s heart is preferable to many lashes."
See above as well - “If the only pain that he suffers is that he is embarrassed to walk among people then it is permissible, because there is no greater pain than this."
Regardless of pain or danger or steps to transition, the Torah reiterates that this cannot be a prohibition against a transgender person's existence. It is impossible for a prohibition to rule against a person's identity or existence. As stated above, every mitzvah that a person is expected to follow is something that they are able to follow. No instruction is beyond reach.
Nothing about a trans+ person (their outward transition, their inward experiences, or their existence as a trans+ person) can be addressed by the prohibition, so the first interpretation of this prohibition cannot be true.
The gender binary is regularly crossed by tumtums and androgynos (Sefer HaChinukh 543:3, above), so this prohibition cannot apply to people who are intersex.
For the reasons above, this prohibition does not apply to the social presentation of transgender people either.
For non-intersex, cisgender men and women who crossdress for fun, as in drag shows, then this may apply to them. However, this situation is explicitly permitted (Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chayim 696).
Therefore, this interpretation of the mitzvot is also not accurate.
G-D cannot actually be tricked into a misunderstanding about one's sex at birth. If this were a prohibition against tricking G-D, this would not be valid.
Arguably the prohibition refers to lying to G-D about one's gender, as distinct from one's sex at birth.
If so, this prohibition would require a closeted trans+ person to modify their inward prayers to match their true gender as soon as they discovered their gender identity.
Why inward prayers and not outward prayers? This prohibition cannot require someone to put themselves in danger (Pikuach Nefesh, Berakhot 7a, above).
The prohibition also does not refer to anybody's social presentation - rather, the Torah specifically states that this prohibition exists only in relation to what is "abhorrent to the LORD your G-d." To emphasize this point, the Torah also states:
Concealed acts concern the LORD our G-d; but with overt acts, it is for us and our children ever to apply all the provisions of this Teaching.
In silent prayer, no one may knowingly and intentionally refer to themself as the wrong gender, for concealing one's true self in silent prayer is an abomination to G-D.
