דף צ"א

עמוד א

קושייה א

שנינו במשנה: מַתְנִי׳ 1אדם הַמַּצְנִיעַ (לְ)זֶרַע בעבור להראות כ(וּלְ)דוּגְמָא או (וְ)לִרְפוּאָה וְהוֹצִיאוֹ מרשות לרשות בְּשַׁבָּת — חַיָּיב בְּכׇל שיעור שֶׁהוּא. 2וְכׇל אָדָם המוציא מרשות לרשות כרגיל (מבלי להצניע) — אֵין חַיָּיב עָלָיו אֶלָּא כְּשִׁיעוּרוֹ של אותו דבר שהוציא. 3 אדם שהצניע והוציא (1), אבל אחר כך חָזַר (התחרט) וְהִכְנִיסוֹ לביתו— אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא כְּשִׁיעוּרוֹ (כמו הדין שב2).

MISHNA: One who stores a seed for sowing, or as a sample, or for medicinal purposes and carried it out on Shabbat is liable for carrying out any amount. By storing that measure, he indicates that it is significant to him. Therefore, he is liable for carrying it, despite the fact that what he carried out is less than the halakhic measure that determines liability for that item. And any other person is only liable for carrying it out on Shabbat if he carries out its measure for liability. If one stored the seed, carried it out, and then brought it back in, with no intention to utilize it for the specific purpose for which he stored it, he is only liable if he brought in its measure for liability (Rav Shmuel Strashun).

רש"י פירש:

(3)חזר והכניסו - זה שהצניע פחות מכשיעור והוציאו. אם חזר ונמלך שלא לזורעו והכניסו:

כלומר, אף על פי שהוציא בהצנעה. אם התחרט והחזיר אותו לביתו, הוא חייב עליו כשיעור (כמו הדין על אדם שהוציא בהוצאה "רגילה").

אבל מה יקרה אם אותו אדם כן התחרט על ההוצאה, אך השאירו בחוץ (על מעקה) בכדי שיזריעו לאחר צאת שבת?


קושייה ב

שנינו בגמרא: גְּמָ׳ לְמָה לֵיהּ לְמִיתְנֵי למה שנו במשנה ״הַמַּצְנִיעַ״? לִיתְנֵי שישנו: הַמּוֹצִיא לְזֶרַע וּלְדוּגְמָא וְלִרְפוּאָה — חַיָּיב בְּכׇל שֶׁהוּא (שבגלל שאדם מוציא כמות קטנה מכשיעור, בכך הוא מראה שדבר זה חשוב לו)! אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן, כְּגוֹן שֶׁאדם הִצְנִיעוֹ וְשָׁכַח לָמָּה הִצְנִיעוֹ, וְהַשְׁתָּא קָא מַפֵּיק לֵיהּ סְתָמָא וסתם הוציא אותו.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Why does the mishna teach: One who stores a seed for a specific purpose and carried it out? Let the mishna simply teach: One who carries out a seed for planting, or as a sample, or for medicinal purposes is liable for carrying out any amount. One is not liable for storing the seed. He is liable for carrying out less than the measure that determines liability because he attributed significance to that measure. Abaye said: With what we are dealing here? We are dealing with a case where one stored it for a specific purpose and forgot why he stored it, and now he carries it out for no specific purpose.

אם לפי שיטת חכמים נסתמך, מדוע צריך בכלל שיעור להוצאה? שישנו בכל החפצים שיעור של "כל שהוא"!

כי בין אם הוא מוציא מעל לשיעור - מתחייב.

ובין אם מוציא מתחת לשיעור - מראה את חשיבותו להוצאת החפץ, ומתחייב גם כן.

ואם לפי שיטת אביי נסתמך, מדוע צריכים אנו לחזור על הלכה זו? הרי שנינו:

אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: ................ כְּלָל אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר: כׇּל שֶׁאֵינוֹ כָּשֵׁר לְהַצְנִיעַ, וְאֵין מַצְנִיעִין כָּמוֹהוּ, וְהוּכְשַׁר לָזֶה וְהִצְנִיעוֹ, וּבָא אדם אַחֵר וְהוֹצִיאוֹ — נִתְחַיֵּיב זֶה (האדם המוציא) בְּמַחְשָׁבָה שֶׁל זֶה (האדם המצניע).

וכמו שמדובר באנשים שונים, גם פה: אם אותו אדם הצניע, שכח מדוע הצניע והוציא - הרי הוא כ2 אנשים (כיוון ששכח). ולכן בזמן פעולת ההוצאה שלו, הוא מתחייב על ההצנעה.

Rabbi Elazar said: This is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, as it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar stated a principle: Anything that is not fit to be stored and people do not typically store items like it, but it was deemed fit to be stored by this person and he stored it, and another person came and carried out the object that was stored, that person who carried it out is rendered liable by the thought of this person who stored it. Once one person deemed it significant by means of thought and action, it is considered significant for all people. According to our mishna, however, only the person who stored the object is liable for carrying it out.

עמוד ב

קושייה ג

שנינו במשנה: תְנִי׳ אדם הַמּוֹצִיא אוֹכָלִין וּנְתָנָן עַל הָאַסְקוּפָּה, בֵּין שֶׁחָזַר לביתו ואז חזר לאסקופה וְהוֹצִיאָן, או בֵּין שֶׁהוֹצִיאָן אדם אַחֵר — פָּטוּר, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁלֹּא עָשָׂה מְלַאכְתּוֹ בְּבַת אַחַת. בנוסף, קוּפָּה שֶׁהִיא מְלֵיאָה פֵּירוֹת וּנְתָנָהּ עַל אַסְקוּפָּה הַחִיצוֹנָה, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁרוֹב פֵּירוֹת מִבַּחוּץ — פָּטוּר, עַד שֶׁיּוֹצִיא אֶת כָּל הַקּוּפָּה - ואז חייב. למדנו על משנה זו בגמרא: גְּמָ׳ הַאי אַסְקוּפָּה, מַאי? 1אִילֵימָא אַסְקוּפָּה רְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים — פָּטוּר? הָא קָא מַפֵּיק מֵרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים! 2אֶלָּא אַסְקוּפָּה רְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד. בֵּין שֶׁחָזַר וְהוֹצִיאָן, בֵּין שֶׁהוֹצִיאָן אַחֵר — פָּטוּר? הָא קָא מַפֵּיק מֵרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים! 3אֶלָּא אַסְקוּפָּה כַּרְמְלִית, וְהָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: טַעְמָא דְּנָח בְּכַרְמְלִית, הָא לָא נָח בְּכַרְמְלִית — מִיחַיַּיב.

MISHNA: One who carries out food from his house on Shabbat and placed it on the threshold of the door, whether he then carried it out from the threshold into the public domain or another person carried it out, he is exempt because he did not perform his prohibited labor of carrying from domain to domain all at once. Similarly, if one placed a basket that is full of fruit on the outer threshold, which is in the public domain, and part of the basket remained inside, even though most of the fruit is outside in the public domain, he is exempt until he carries out the entire basket. GEMARA: The Gemara begins by asking: What is the nature of this threshold in terms of Shabbat? If you say that it is a threshold that has the legal status of the public domain, in that it does not extend above nine handbreadths, and its area is four by four handbreadths, and it is suitable for use by the multitudes, why is he exempt? Didn’t he carry out food from the private domain to the public domain? Rather, say that it is a threshold that has the legal status of the private domain, in that it extends above ten handbreadths, and its area is four by four handbreadths. In that case, why does the mishna say: Whether he then carried it out from the threshold into the public domain or another person carried it out, he is exempt? Why should he be exempt? Didn’t he carry out food from the private domain to the public domain? Rather, the mishna is referring to a threshold that is a karmelit. And it teaches us the following: The reason that he is exempt is due to the fact that the object came to rest in a karmelit. However, if the object did not come to rest in a karmelit, he is liable even if it passed through a karmelit. This comes to teach that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of ben Azzai, as it was taught in a baraita: One who carries out an object from a store, which is a private domain, to a plaza, which is a public domain, via a colonnade, which is a karmelit, is liable because he lifted the object in a private domain and placed it in a public domain. And ben Azzai deems him exempt because, in his opinion, an exempt domain separates between the private and public domains.

ולפי מה שחכמים לימדונו בגמרא זו, האסקופה היא אסקופה כרמלית.

הבאתי ממסכת שבת גמרא נוספת שייתכן וסותרת גישה זו:

אָמַר מָר: אָדָם עוֹמֵד עַל הָאִסְקוּפָּה, נוֹטֵל מִבַּעַל הַבַּיִת וְנוֹתֵן לוֹ, נוֹטֵל מֵעָנִי וְנוֹתֵן לוֹ. הַאי אִסְקוּפָּה מַאי? 1אִילֵּימָא אִסְקוּפַּת רְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים — נוֹטֵל מִבַּעַל הַבַּיִת? הָא מַפֵּיק מֵרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים! 2וְאֶלָּא אִסְקוּפַּת רְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד — נוֹטֵל מִן הֶעָנִי? הָא קָא מְעַיֵּיל מֵרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים לִרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד! 3אֶלָּא אִסְקוּפַּת כַּרְמְלִית — נוֹטֵל וְנוֹתֵן לְכַתְּחִלָּה, סוֹף סוֹף אִיסּוּרָא מִיהָא אִיתָא!

The Master said: A person standing on the threshold may take an object from the homeowner standing in the private domain and may give an object to him. Similarly, while standing there, he may take an object from a poor person standing in the public domain and may give an object to him because there is no element of prohibition or liability in carrying in and carrying out in an exempt domain on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: This threshold, what is it; to what type of threshold is it referring? Different thresholds have different halakhic status. If you say that it is referring to a threshold that is the public domain, i.e., the threshold of an alleyway that is fewer than three handbreadths off the ground and is not covered, and the post that demarcates the parameters of the alleyway is situated between the public domain and the alleyway, how can the Tosefta say that he may take an object from the homeowner? Isn’t he carrying out from the private domain to the public domain? Rather, say that the Tosefta is referring to a threshold that is the private domain, in a case where it is covered, or it is situated between the post that demarcates the parameters of the alleyway and the private domain, or it is ten handbreadths high and its area is at least four by four handbreadths. How then can the Tosefta say that he may take an object from a poor person? Isn’t he carrying in from the public domain to the private domain? Rather, say that the Tosefta is referring to a threshold that is a karmelit, i.e., it is not ten handbreadths high and it is four by four handbreadths; how can the Tosefta say that he may take and give even ab initio? Ultimately, in this case, there is nevertheless a prohibition. Even though a karmelit does not engender liability by Torah law, carrying from it is prohibited by rabbinic law and is certainly not permitted ab initio. Rather, say that the Tosefta is referring to a threshold that is merely an exempt domain, and therefore there is no prohibition at all. In what circumstances is it an exempt domain? In a case where it does not have an area of four by four handbreadths, and it is therefore not considered a domain with regard to liability on Shabbat. And that halakha is similar to that statement made when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia and he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A place that does not have an area of four by four handbreadths and is set apart, it is permissible for both the people of the private domain and for the people of the public domain to adjust the burden on their shoulders upon it on Shabbat, as long as they do not exchange objects between them from one domain to the other domain.

ולפי גמרא זו גישת ההלכה כלפי הוצאה/הכנסה מ/אל הכרמלית, היא שאין האדם חייב עליה מדין תורה (פטור). אך עם זאת מלכתחילה אין לאדם לעשות כן, כאמור: "אֶלָּא אִסְקוּפַּת כַּרְמְלִית — נוֹטֵל וְנוֹתֵן לְכַתְּחִלָּה, סוֹף סוֹף אִיסּוּרָא מִיהָא אִיתָא בכל זאת יש לכך איסור לעשות כן (מלכתחילה)!"

אלא, התשובה לקושייה זו היא דווקא באסקופה של מקום פטור. כאמור:

4אֶלָּא אִסְקוּפָּה מְקוֹם פָּטוּר בְּעָלְמָא הוּא — כְּגוֹן דְּלֵית בֵּיהּ אַרְבָּעָה עַל אַרְבָּעָה. וְכִי הָא דְּכִי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מָקוֹם שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ אַרְבָּעָה עַל אַרְבָּעָה טְפָחִים — מוּתָּר לִבְנֵי רְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד וְלִבְנֵי רְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים לְכַתֵּף עָלָיו, וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יַחֲלִיפוּ.

- ובמקרה שלנו אין "החלפה" כיוון שאדם קודם מניח את הפירות באסקופה, ואחר כך אדם אחר בא ולוקח. ואין בכך איסור אף לכתחילה!

Rather, say that the Tosefta is referring to a threshold that is merely an exempt domain, and therefore there is no prohibition at all. In what circumstances is it an exempt domain? In a case where it does not have an area of four by four handbreadths, and it is therefore not considered a domain with regard to liability on Shabbat. And that halakha is similar to that statement made when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia and he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A place that does not have an area of four by four handbreadths and is set apart, it is permissible for both the people of the private domain and for the people of the public domain to adjust the burden on their shoulders upon it on Shabbat, as long as they do not exchange objects between them from one domain to the other domain.