The Oral Talmud with Benay Lappe and Dan Libenson Episode 33

Rava said: And although delays caused by circumstances beyond his control exempt the groom from providing support to his betrothed at the time originally designated for the wedding, with regard to bills of divorce that is not so. Apparently, Rava maintains that unavoidable circumstances have no legal standing with regard to bills of divorce. If one stipulated that the bill of divorce will take effect only with the fulfillment of a condition, even if that condition was fulfilled due to circumstances beyond his control, the bill of divorce takes effect. The Gemara asks: From where does Rava learn this principle?

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Rather, proof may be cited from this case, where a certain man who said to the agents with whom he entrusted the bill of divorce: If I do not return from now until after thirty days have passed, let this be a bill of divorce. He came at the end of thirty days, before the deadline passed, but was prevented from crossing the river by the ferry that was located on the other side of the river, so he did not come within the designated time. He said to the people across the river: See that I have come, see that I have come. Shmuel said: This is not considered to be a return. Apparently, even if the condition was fulfilled due to circumstances beyond his control, the condition is considered fulfilled. The Gemara rejects that proof: And perhaps unavoidable circumstances that are common and could be anticipated, e.g., the ferry is located at the other side of the river, are different, since he should have stipulated that exception when establishing the condition, and he did not stipulate it, he brought the failure to arrive upon himself. Although he regrets it now, at the time his intent was that even if the condition were fulfilled due to that circumstance, the divorce would take effect. In contrast, however, if the condition is fulfilled due to an uncommon circumstance that could not have been anticipated, the divorce would not take effect. Rather, Rava is stating a halakha based on his own reasoning. Circumstances beyond one’s control are not a factor in determining whether or not a condition is fulfilled, and this is due to virtuous women and due to licentious women. The Gemara articulates: There is concern due to virtuous women is, as, if you said: Let it not be a bill of divorce, if the reason that the condition was not fulfilled was due to circumstances beyond his control,

then sometimes, where he was not detained unavoidably but he fulfilled the condition willingly to effect the divorce, and the wife thinks that he was detained unavoidably, she will sit deserted, forever unable to remarry. And the concern due to licentious women is, as, if you said: Let it not be a bill of divorce, then sometimes, when he was detained unavoidably and she thinks that he was not detained unavoidably, she goes and remarries. And the result will be that the bill of divorce is void, and her children from the second marriage will be mamzerim, products of an adulterous relationship. The Gemara questions the following premise: By Torah law, a condition that is unfulfilled due to circumstances beyond one’s control is considered fulfilled, and it is merely by rabbinic ordinance that it is deemed unfulfilled: And is there a matter where by Torah law it is not a bill of divorce, but due to virtuous women and due to licentious women we permit a married woman to others? The Gemara answers: Yes, it is within the authority of the Sages to institute an ordinance freeing the woman from the marriage, as anyone who betroths a woman, betroths her contingent upon the agreement of the Sages, and in certain cases, such as those mentioned above, the Sages invalidated his betrothal retroactively.