It was stated: If the witnesses to the abduction and the witnesses to the sale of a person were rendered conspiring witnesses, Ḥizkiyya says: The typical sentence of conspiring witnesses is not implemented and they are not executed. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: They are executed. The Gemara elaborates: It is Ḥizkiyya who said his statement in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who said one derives from the verse: “On the basis of two witnesses…shall a matter be established” (Deuteronomy 19:15), that the testimony of witnesses is valid only when they attest to an entire matter, but not to half a matter. Since each pair of witnesses provides testimony concerning only half the transgression for which the perpetrator would be liable, i.e., they each testify to only the abduction or the sale, the testimony of each pair is not valid. Therefore, when they are deemed conspiring witnesses, they are not executed. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says his statement in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who said that one derives from the verse that the testimony is valid when they testify with regard to an entire matter, and even when they testify with regard to half a matter. Since the testimony of the two pairs of witnesses together constitutes a complete testimony, if they are rendered conspiring witnesses, they are executed. The Gemara notes: And Ḥizkiyya concedes with regard to the final witnesses of a stubborn and rebellious son who were rendered conspiring witnesses that they are executed. A stubborn and rebellious son is executed only if witnesses testified that he engaged in gluttonous and drunken conduct and he was flogged, and then a second pair of witnesses testifies that he again engaged in gluttonous and drunken conduct. His death sentence is based solely on the testimony of the second pair, as the first witnesses could say: It is in order to flog him, not to execute him, that we came to court. And these other witnesses, through their testimony, are the ones who did this to him, i.e., they are responsible for the entire matter of his execution, and are therefore liable to be executed for giving conspiring testimony. Rav Pappa objects to this: If so, and Ḥizkiyya concedes to Rabbi Yoḥanan in the case of the final testimony of the stubborn and rebellious son, let them also execute the witnesses to the sale of one who was abducted, as the witnesses to the abduction could say: It is in order to flog the abductor, not to execute him, that we came to court. And if you would say that Ḥizkiyya holds that one who abducts another and does not sell him is not flogged, that is difficult. But wasn’t it stated: With regard to witnesses to the abduction who were rendered conspiring witnesses prior to the testimony of the witnesses to the sale, Ḥizkiyya and Rabbi Yoḥanan disagree. One says: They are flogged, and one says: They are not flogged. And we say: It may be concluded that it is Ḥizkiyya who said that they are flogged, from the fact that Ḥizkiyya said: They are not executed. Since if one were to suggest that it is Rabbi Yoḥanan who said that they are flogged, that cannot be. Since he says that conspiring witnesses are executed in this case, it is a prohibition that is given as a warning of liability for a court-imposed death penalty, and the principle is: With regard to any prohibition that is given as a warning of liability for a court-imposed death penalty, one is not flogged for its violation, even in a case where the transgressor is not executed. The abductor is not flogged. How then could the conspiring witnesses be flogged for testifying against them, as the punishment for conspiring witnesses is identical to the punishment of the one against whom they testified? Rather, it is certain that Ḥizkiyya holds that the conspiring witnesses to the abduction are flogged, and therefore everyone agrees that the conspiring witnesses to the sale are executed. Rather, Rav Pappa says: The previous explanation is rejected, and instead the dispute must be explained as follows: With regard to the witnesses to the sale of the abductee, it is clear that everyone agrees that they are executed, as theirs is testimony concerning an entire matter and would have led to his execution. When they disagree, it is with regard to the witnesses to the abduction. Ḥizkiyya says: They are not executed, as he holds that abduction stands discrete as an independent prohibition punishable by lashes, and the sale stands discrete as an independent prohibition punishable by strangulation. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: They are executed, as the abduction is the beginning of the process that culminates with the sale. The witnesses testifying to the abduction are testifying to a transgression that will culminate with the sale of the abductee. The Gemara notes: And Rabbi Yoḥanan concedes with regard to the initial witnesses concerning a stubborn and rebellious son who testified that he engaged in gluttonous and drunken conduct and who were rendered conspiring witnesses that they are not executed, as they could say: It is in order to flog him for past conduct, not to execute him for actions that he might perform in the future, that we came to court. Therefore, there is no connection between their testimony and punishment for future actions. Abaye said in summary: All concede in the case of a stubborn and rebellious son, and all concede in the case of a stubborn and rebellious son, and there is a dispute with regard to a stubborn and rebellious son. The Gemara elaborates: With regard to the initial witnesses, all, even Rabbi Yoḥanan, concede in the case of a stubborn and rebellious son that they are not executed if they are rendered conspiring witnesses, as they could say: It is in order to flog him for past conduct, not to execute him, that we came to court. And with regard to the final witnesses, all, even Ḥizkiyya, concede in the case of a stubborn and rebellious son that they are executed if they are rendered conspiring witnesses, due to the fact that the initial witnesses could say: It is in order to flog him for past conduct that we came to court, and these final witnesses are the ones who did this to him, i.e., they are responsible for the entire matter of his execution and are therefore liable to be executed. And there is a dispute with regard to a stubborn and rebellious son in a case where two of the final witnesses, who testify after the son was already flogged for engaging in gluttonous and drunken conduct, say: He stole in our presence, and two other witnesses say: He ate in our presence. The dispute is whether the testimony of these two pairs of witnesses is testimony concerning an entire matter or testimony concerning half a matter. Rav Asi says: The witnesses to the sale of a person who were rendered conspiring witnesses are not executed, due to the fact that the one against whom they testified could say: Although they testified that I sold an individual, it was my slave that I sold. In that case, the witnesses are not testifying that he violated a capital transgression, as they cannot attest to the fact that the individual he sold was first abducted. Rav Yosef says: In accordance with whose opinion is that halakha of Rav Asi? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says: The testimony of witnesses is valid only when they attest to an entire matter and not to half a matter. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: According to your explanation, it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as, if it were in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold: The testimony is valid when they testify to an entire matter and even when they testify to half a matter, are the conspiring witnesses executed? Doesn’t Rav Asi say that they are not executed due to the fact that the one against whom they testified could say: Although they testified that I sold an individual, it was my slave that I sold? According to that reasoning, even the Rabbis would concede that they are not executed. Rather, you may even say that Rav Asi’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and it is concerning a case where only witnesses to the sale came to testify and witnesses to the abduction did not come to testify. In that case the accused can avoid punishment; therefore, the conspiring witnesses are not executed. The Gemara asks: If so, what is the purpose of stating that halakha? Obviously, in that case they are not executed, as there is no way to determine that the one he sold is not a slave. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to teach that they are not executed even if witnesses to the abduction ultimately came after the witnesses to the sale had testified and testified that he sold a freeman, not his slave. The Gemara asks: But still, what is the purpose of stating that halakha? When the witnesses to the sale testified, their testimony was not sufficient to execute the accused. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to teach the halakha in a case where they are not executed even where the first and second pairs of witnesses gesture to one another, ostensibly indicating that the conspiring witnesses to the sale were aware that the witnesses to the abduction would follow and that therefore the initial witnesses are part of the conspiracy to testify and execute the accused. And consequently, it is necessary to teach this halakha lest you say: Gesturing is a significant matter, and the legal status of the two testimonies is that of a single testimony. Therefore, Rav Asi teaches us that gesturing is nothing of significance.
