Jewish Sources on Abortion

A woman who was having trouble giving birth, they abort the fetus inside her and take it out limb by limb, because her life comes before its life. If most of he had come out already they do not touch it because we do not push off one life for another.

Rav Ḥisda raised an objection to Rav Huna from a baraita: If a woman was giving birth and her life was being endangered by the fetus, the life of the fetus may be sacrificed in order to save the mother. But once his head has emerged during the birthing process, he may not be harmed in order to save the mother, because one life may not be pushed aside to save another life. If one is permitted to save the pursued party by killing the minor who is pursuing him, why is this so? The fetus is a pursuer who is endangering his mother’s life. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as it is different there, with regard to the woman giving birth, since she is being pursued by Heaven. Since the fetus is not acting of his own volition and endangering his mother of his own will, his life may not be taken in order to save his mother.

(22) When men fight, and one of them pushes a pregnant woman and a miscarriage results, but no other damage ensues, the one responsible shall be fined according as the woman’s husband may exact from him, the payment to be based on reckoning.

(23) But if other damage ensues, the penalty shall be life for life, (24) eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, (25) burn for burn, wound for wound, bruise for bruise.

(9) This, indeed, is one of the negative mitzvot - not to take pity on the life of a rodef. On this basis, our Sages ruled that when complications arise and a pregnant woman cannot give birth, it is permitted to abort the fetus in her womb, whether physically or with drugs. For the fetus is considered a rodef of its mother. If the head of the fetus emerges, it should not be touched, because one life should not be sacrificed for another. Although the mother may die, this is the nature of the world.

Therefore, in a case of a pregnant woman who is having difficulty in childbirth--it is permissible to abort the fetus inside her either with drugs or physically since the fetus is considered to be a rodef (pursuer) chasing her in order to kill her. Yet, if his head has breached then we do not harm him since we do not save one life by ending another. This is the nature of the world.

And Antoninos said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: From when is the soul placed in a person? Is it from the moment of conception or from the moment of the formation of the embryo, forty days after conception? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: It is from the moment of the formation of the embryo. Antoninos said to him: That is inconceivable. Is it possible that a piece of meat could stand for even three days without salt as a preservative and would not rot? The embryo could not exist for forty days without a soul. Rather, the soul is placed in man from the moment of conception. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: Antoninos taught me this matter, and there is a verse that supports him, as it is stated: “And Your Providence [pekudatekha] has preserved my spirit” (Job 10:12) indicating that it is from the moment of conception [pekida] that the soul is preserved within a person.

Mar, son of Rav Yosef, said a different explanation of the mishna’s ruling in the name of Rava: The mishna teaches that a one-day-old baby inherits in order to say that such a child reduces the portion of the firstborn. A firstborn is entitled to a double portion of the inheritance, which is calculated by taking into account the portion due to his dead brother. And Mar, son of Rav Yosef, further said in the name of Rava: A son who was born after his father’s death does not reduce the portion of the firstborn. Therefore, the halakha in the mishna does not apply to a fetus. What is the reason for this? We require fulfillment of the verse: “If a man has two wives, the one beloved, and the other hated, and they bore him children” (Deuteronomy 21:15), and this does not apply to a fetus not yet born at the time of the father’s death.

The Gemara notes: In Sura they taught Mar’s statement that way, whereas in Pumbedita they taught it this way: Mar, son of Rav Yosef, said in the name of Rava: A firstborn who was born after his father’s death does not receive a double portion. What is the reason for this? We require fulfillment of the verse: “But he shall acknowledge the firstborn…by giving him a double portion” (Deuteronomy 21:17), and in this case the father is not there to acknowledge him.

The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is in accordance with all these versions of the statement of Mar, son of Rav Yosef, in the name of Rava, i.e., a one-day-old baby reduces the portion of the firstborn, a son born after his father’s death does not reduce the portion of the firstborn, and a firstborn born after his father’s death does not receive a double portion.

§ The mishna teaches: And one who kills a one-day-old baby is liable for his murder. The Gemara explains that the reason for this is as it is written: “And he who smites any man mortally shall be put to death” (Leviticus 24:17), where the phrase “any man” indicates that this verse applies in any case, even in the case of a one-day-old baby.

It is stated in that book of Aggadot that the Sages said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: A descendant of Noah is executed even for killing fetuses. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael? The Gemara answers: It is derived from that which is written: “One who sheds the blood of a person, by a person [ba’adam] his blood shall be shed” (Genesis 9:6). The word ba’adam literally means: In a person, and is interpreted homiletically: What is a person that is in a person? You must say: This is a fetus that is in its mother’s womb. Accordingly, a descendant of Noah is liable for killing a fetus.

The Gemara elaborates on the last dilemma: According to the one who says that a fetus is considered as its mother’s thigh, i.e., a part of its mother, you should not raise the dilemma, as it is clear that the thief, by retaining the fetus, has withheld part of the animal. When you should raise the dilemma, it is according to the opinion of the one who says that a fetus is not considered as its mother’s thigh, i.e., it has the status of an independent being. What is the halakha in this case? Do we say that since it is in fact attached to the mother, if the thief keeps the fetus for himself it is considered a significant withholding? Or perhaps, since it stands to become detached from the mother it is not considered a significant withholding?

A man is forbidden to injure himself or another. Not only one who inflicts a wound, but anyone who strikes a worthy Jew, whether an adult or a minor, whether a man or a woman, breaks a prohibitive law, as it is written: "He must not lash him excessively" (Deuteronomy 25:3). If the Torah has warned against excess in lashing an offender, how much more should this apply to striking an innocent man.

MISHNA: A woman who discharges on the fortieth day since she immersed herself and engaged in intercourse with her husband need not be concerned that it might have been an offspring and she became impure with its miscarriage, as the formation of the offspring in the womb occurs only forty days after conception. But in the case of a woman who discharges on the forty-first day after immersion, there is concern that perhaps it was an offspring. Since its sex is unknown, she shall observe the period of impurity for a woman who gave birth to a male and for a woman who gave birth to a female; and for any blood that she sees, she observes the halakhot of a menstruating woman.