MISHNA: When punishing conspiring witnesses based on the verse: “As he conspired to do to his brother” (Deuteronomy 19:19), one divides the punishment of money among them, but one does not divide the punishment of lashes among them; each receives thirty-nine lashes. The mishna elaborates: How so? If the witnesses testified about someone that he owes another person two hundred dinars and they were then found to be conspiring witnesses, the witnesses divide the sum among themselves and pay a total of two hundred dinars. But if they testified about someone that he was liable to receive forty lashes and they were then found to be conspiring witnesses, each and every one of the witnesses receives forty lashes. GEMARA: The Gemara asks: From where are these matters, that the witnesses do not divide the punishment of lashes among themselves, derived? Abaye said: “Wicked” (Deuteronomy 25:2), is stated with regard to those liable to receive lashes, and: “Wicked” (Numbers 35:31), is stated with regard to those liable to receive a court-imposed death penalty. Just as there, with regard to those sentenced to be executed, there is no partial death penalty, so too here, with regard to those liable to receive lashes, there is no partial administering of lashes. Rava said: The reason the punishment of lashes is not divided is that we require fulfillment of the verse: “As he conspired to do to his brother” (Deuteronomy 19:19), and were the conspiring witness to receive fewer than thirty-nine lashes, the verse would not be fulfilled. The Gemara asks: If so, in the case of money too, one should not divide the sum between them, as each sought to cause the defendant loss of the entire sum. The Gemara answers: Sums of money paid by the witnesses can combine, as the person against whom they testified receives the entire sum that they sought to cause him to lose, but lashes administered to the witnesses cannot combine. MISHNA: Witnesses are not rendered conspiring witnesses until the witnesses who come to render them conspiring impeach the witnesses themselves and not merely their testimony. How so? A set of witnesses said: We testify with regard to a man called so-and-so that he killed a person, and they attested to the precise time and place that the murder took place. Then, a second set of witnesses came to court and said to them: How can you testify about this event? This person who was killed, or this person who killed, was with us, i.e., with the second set of witnesses, on that day in such and such place, which is not the location identified by the first set of witnesses. In that case, although the second set of witnesses contradicted the testimony of the first set, these first witnesses are not rendered conspiring witnesses. But if the second set of witnesses came to court and said to them: How can you testify about that event? You were with us on that day in such and such place. In this case, these first witnesses are rendered conspiring witnesses, and are executed on the basis of their, i.e., the second set’s, testimony. If other witnesses, i.e., a third set, came and corroborated the testimony of the first set of witnesses, and the second set of witnesses testified that this third set of witnesses were also with them elsewhere that day and rendered them conspiring witnesses, and similarly, if yet other witnesses, i.e., a fourth set, came and corroborated the testimony of the first set of witnesses and the second set rendered them conspiring witnesses, even if one hundred sets of witnesses were all rendered conspiring witnesses by the same second set of witnesses, all of them are executed on the basis of their testimony, as the authority of two witnesses is equivalent to the authority of numerous witnesses. Rabbi Yehuda says: This situation where a set of witnesses renders all the others conspiring witnesses is a conspiracy [istatit], as there is room for suspicion that they simply decided to impeach all witnesses who offer that testimony, and it is only the first set alone that is executed. GEMARA: With regard to the halakha that witnesses are rendered conspiring witnesses only if the second set testifies that the first set was with them elsewhere at that time, and not if they directly contradict the testimony of the first set, the Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rav Adda said: It is derived from a verse, as the verse states with regard to conspiring witnesses: “And the witness is a false witness; he testified falsely against his brother” (Deuteronomy 19:18), indicating that they are not rendered conspiring witnesses until the body of the testimony is rendered false, i.e., the testimony with regard to the actual witnesses was proven wrong, as they were not there at the time of the event in question. The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught a different source for this halakha. It is stated in that passage: “If an unrighteous witness rise up against any man to bear perverted witness against him” (Deuteronomy 19:16), indicating that the witnesses are not rendered conspiring witnesses until the body of the testimony is rendered perverted, but not through contradiction of any aspect of the testimony. § Rava says: Two witnesses came and said: So-and-so killed a person to the east of a building [bira], and two other witnesses came to court and said to the first set: But were you not with us to the west of the building at that time? How can you testify to an incident that transpired on the other side of the building? We see: If, when people are standing to the west of the building they see to the east of the building, these witnesses are not conspiring witnesses. But if it is not possible to see from one side of the building to the other, these witnesses are conspiring witnesses. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? The Gemara answers: Lest you say: Let us be concerned about the possibility that these witnesses have particularly good eyesight and were able to see that far despite a typical person’s being unable to see that far. Therefore, Rava teaches us that one does not take that possibility into account. And Rava says: If two witnesses came and said: So-and-so killed a person in Sura in the morning on Sunday, and two other witnesses came to court and said to the first set: In the evening on Sunday you were with us in Neharde’a, we see: If one is able to travel from Sura to Neharde’a from morning until evening they are not conspiring witnesses, as conceivably they could have witnessed the murder in Sura and traveled to Neharde’a by evening. And if it is not possible to travel that distance in that period of time, they are conspiring witnesses. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? The Gemara answers: Lest you say: Let us be concerned about the possibility that these witnesses traveled on a flying camel, i.e., one that runs so quickly that it enabled them to traverse the distance faster than the typical person. Therefore, Rava teaches us that one need not take that possibility into account. And Rava says: If two witnesses came and said: On Sunday so-and-so killed a person, and two other witnesses came and said: You were with us on Sunday, but on Monday that same so-and-so killed that same person. Moreover, even if the second set of witnesses said: On Shabbat eve so-and-so killed that same person, the first set of witnesses is executed, despite the fact that the person against whom they testified was liable to be executed without their testimony. The reason they are liable is that at the time that they testified, conspiring to have him executed by the court, the man was not yet liable for execution by the court. The Gemara asks: What is Rava teaching us? We learn in a mishna (6b) with regard to two sets of witnesses who testified that one person killed another: Therefore, if one of the sets of witnesses was found to be a set of conspiring witnesses, he, the accused, and they, the conspiring witnesses, are executed by the court, and the second set of witnesses is exempt. The accused is executed because the testimony of the witnesses who were not rendered conspiring witnesses remains unchallenged. The first set of witnesses is executed because they were rendered conspiring witnesses. Clearly, conspiring witnesses may be executed even though they testified against a guilty person who was sentenced to death, provided that their testimony was delivered before he was sentenced. The Gemara answers: It was the latter clause of this halakha, teaching that it is not so with regard to the verdict, that contains a novel element, and therefore it was necessary for Rava to teach it, and in the context of teaching the latter halakha he taught the first case as well. The latter clause is: If two witnesses came on Tuesday and said: On Sunday so-and-so was sentenced to death in a certain court, and two other witnesses came and said: On Sunday you were with us elsewhere and you could not have witnessed the verdict in that court, but on Shabbat eve the same so-and-so was sentenced to death, the first set of witnesses are not executed. Moreover, even if the second set of witnesses said: On Monday the same so-and-so was sentenced to death, the first set of witnesses are not executed, as at the time that they testified against him, on Tuesday, the man was already liable to be executed, and it is as though they conspired to kill a dead man. The Gemara adds: And likewise, the same halakha that applies with regard to witnesses who testify about one who is sentenced to death applies to the matter of payments of a fine. The Gemara explains: If two witnesses came and said: On Sunday this person stole and then slaughtered or sold an ox or a lamb, thereby rendering him liable to pay a fine of four or five times the value of the stolen animal (see Exodus 21:37), and then two other witnesses came and said to the first set of witnesses: On Sunday you were with us elsewhere, but on Monday this same person stole and then slaughtered or sold an ox or a lamb, the first set of witnesses pay the accused four or five times the value of the stolen animal. This is because at the time that according to their testimony he stole the animals, he had not yet stolen. Moreover, even if the second set of witnesses said: It was earlier, on Shabbat eve, that he stole and then slaughtered or sold the animals, the first set of witnesses pay the accused the amount of the fine he would have had to pay, as at the time that they testified the accused man had not yet been found liable for payment by the court, and he could have admitted his guilt and exempted himself from paying the fine. They conspired to render him liable. But if two witnesses came on Tuesday and said: On Sunday this person stole and then slaughtered or sold an ox or a lamb and was sentenced to pay a fine of four or five times the value of the stolen animal, and two other witnesses came and said: On Sunday you were with us, but that person stole and then slaughtered or sold an ox or a lamb, and was sentenced on Shabbat eve, the first set of witnesses are exempt from payment. Moreover, even if the second set of witnesses said: On Sunday he stole and then slaughtered or sold an ox or a lamb, corroborating the testimony of the first set, and on Monday he was sentenced to pay the fine, the first set of witnesses do not pay the accused. This is because at the time that they testified against him, on Tuesday, the man had already been found liable for payment by the court, and therefore they are not conspiring witnesses. § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yehuda says that if a single set of witnesses rendered numerous sets of witnesses, all of whom testified that one person killed another, conspiring witnesses, this situation is a conspiracy, and only the first set of conspiring witnesses is executed.