Free to Lead: Law and Opportunity Shavuot 2018

I. Background: What is the purpose of law?

(יג) וַיְהִי֙ מִֽמָּחֳרָ֔ת וַיֵּ֥שֶׁב מֹשֶׁ֖ה לִשְׁפֹּ֣ט אֶת־הָעָ֑ם וַיַּעֲמֹ֤ד הָעָם֙ עַל־מֹשֶׁ֔ה מִן־הַבֹּ֖קֶר עַד־הָעָֽרֶב׃ (יד) וַיַּרְא֙ חֹתֵ֣ן מֹשֶׁ֔ה אֵ֛ת כָּל־אֲשֶׁר־ה֥וּא עֹשֶׂ֖ה לָעָ֑ם וַיֹּ֗אמֶר מָֽה־הַדָּבָ֤ר הַזֶּה֙ אֲשֶׁ֨ר אַתָּ֤ה עֹשֶׂה֙ לָעָ֔ם מַדּ֗וּעַ אַתָּ֤ה יוֹשֵׁב֙ לְבַדֶּ֔ךָ וְכָל־הָעָ֛ם נִצָּ֥ב עָלֶ֖יךָ מִן־בֹּ֥קֶר עַד־עָֽרֶב׃ (טו) וַיֹּ֥אמֶר מֹשֶׁ֖ה לְחֹתְנ֑וֹ כִּֽי־יָבֹ֥א אֵלַ֛י הָעָ֖ם לִדְרֹ֥שׁ אֱלֹקִֽים׃ (טז) כִּֽי־יִהְיֶ֨ה לָהֶ֤ם דָּבָר֙ בָּ֣א אֵלַ֔י וְשָׁ֣פַטְתִּ֔י בֵּ֥ין אִ֖ישׁ וּבֵ֣ין רֵעֵ֑הוּ וְהוֹדַעְתִּ֛י אֶת־חֻקֵּ֥י הָאֱלֹקִ֖ים וְאֶת־תּוֹרֹתָֽיו׃ (יז) וַיֹּ֛אמֶר חֹתֵ֥ן מֹשֶׁ֖ה אֵלָ֑יו לֹא־טוֹב֙ הַדָּבָ֔ר אֲשֶׁ֥ר אַתָּ֖ה עֹשֶֽׂה׃ (יח) נָבֹ֣ל תִּבֹּ֔ל גַּם־אַתָּ֕ה גַּם־הָעָ֥ם הַזֶּ֖ה אֲשֶׁ֣ר עִמָּ֑ךְ כִּֽי־כָבֵ֤ד מִמְּךָ֙ הַדָּבָ֔ר לֹא־תוּכַ֥ל עֲשֹׂ֖הוּ לְבַדֶּֽךָ׃ (יט) עַתָּ֞ה שְׁמַ֤ע בְּקֹלִי֙ אִיעָ֣צְךָ֔ וִיהִ֥י אֱלֹקִ֖ים עִמָּ֑ךְ הֱיֵ֧ה אַתָּ֣ה לָעָ֗ם מ֚וּל הָֽאֱלֹקִ֔ים וְהֵבֵאתָ֥ אַתָּ֛ה אֶת־הַדְּבָרִ֖ים אֶל־הָאֱלֹקִֽים׃ (כ) וְהִזְהַרְתָּ֣ה אֶתְהֶ֔ם אֶת־הַחֻקִּ֖ים וְאֶת־הַתּוֹרֹ֑ת וְהוֹדַעְתָּ֣ לָהֶ֗ם אֶת־הַדֶּ֙רֶךְ֙ יֵ֣לְכוּ בָ֔הּ וְאֶת־הַֽמַּעֲשֶׂ֖ה אֲשֶׁ֥ר יַעֲשֽׂוּן׃ (כא) וְאַתָּ֣ה תֶחֱזֶ֣ה מִכָּל־הָ֠עָם אַנְשֵׁי־חַ֜יִל יִרְאֵ֧י אֱלֹקִ֛ים אַנְשֵׁ֥י אֱמֶ֖ת שֹׂ֣נְאֵי בָ֑צַע וְשַׂמְתָּ֣ עֲלֵהֶ֗ם שָׂרֵ֤י אֲלָפִים֙ שָׂרֵ֣י מֵא֔וֹת שָׂרֵ֥י חֲמִשִּׁ֖ים וְשָׂרֵ֥י עֲשָׂרֹֽת׃ (כב) וְשָׁפְט֣וּ אֶת־הָעָם֮ בְּכָל־עֵת֒ וְהָיָ֞ה כָּל־הַדָּבָ֤ר הַגָּדֹל֙ יָבִ֣יאוּ אֵלֶ֔יךָ וְכָל־הַדָּבָ֥ר הַקָּטֹ֖ן יִשְׁפְּטוּ־הֵ֑ם וְהָקֵל֙ מֵֽעָלֶ֔יךָ וְנָשְׂא֖וּ אִתָּֽךְ׃ (כג) אִ֣ם אֶת־הַדָּבָ֤ר הַזֶּה֙ תַּעֲשֶׂ֔ה וְצִוְּךָ֣ אֱלֹקִ֔ים וְיָֽכָלְתָּ֖ עֲמֹ֑ד וְגַם֙ כָּל־הָעָ֣ם הַזֶּ֔ה עַל־מְקֹמ֖וֹ יָבֹ֥א בְשָׁלֽוֹם׃ (כד) וַיִּשְׁמַ֥ע מֹשֶׁ֖ה לְק֣וֹל חֹתְנ֑וֹ וַיַּ֕עַשׂ כֹּ֖ל אֲשֶׁ֥ר אָמָֽר׃

(13) Next day, Moses sat as magistrate among the people, while the people stood about Moses from morning until evening. (14) But when Moses’ father-in-law saw how much he had to do for the people, he said, “What is this thing that you are doing to the people? Why do you act alone, while all the people stand about you from morning until evening?” (15) Moses replied to his father-in-law, “It is because the people come to me to inquire of God. (16) When they have a dispute, it comes before me, and I decide between one person and another, and I make known the laws and teachings of God.” (17) But Moses’ father-in-law said to him, “The thing you are doing is not right; (18) you will surely wear yourself out, and these people as well. For the task is too heavy for you; you cannot do it alone. (19) Now listen to me. I will give you counsel, and God be with you! You represent the people before God: you bring the disputes before God, (20) and enjoin upon them the laws and the teachings, and make known to them the way they are to go and the practices they are to follow. (21) You shall also seek out from among all the people capable men who fear God, trustworthy men who spurn ill-gotten gain. Set these over them as chiefs of thousands, hundreds, fifties, and tens, (22) and let them judge the people at all times. Have them bring every major dispute to you, but let them decide every minor dispute themselves. Make it easier for yourself by letting them share the burden with you. (23) If you do this—and God so commands you—you will be able to bear up; and all these people too will go home unwearied.” (24) Moses heeded his father-in-law and did just as he had said.

(א) על מקומו יבא בשלום אחר שיתברר הדין בכל כך בתי דינין, ידע כל בעל דין שפסק הדין היה אמתי ולא יוסיף לריב, כאמרם ז''ל דאזיל דיין דינא שקילי גלימיה, ליזיל ולזמר בארחא:

(1) על מקומו יבא בשלום, seeing that the knowledge of the law will be widespread in so many lower courts, every litigant will know that the judgment he received was true and impartial. They will therefore not continue to constantly appeal such judgments.

(א) יבא בשלום. ההוא דהוי קאמר ואזיל, דאזיל מבי דינא דשקלי גלימי׳, ליזמר זמר וליזל באורחא מבמי שנטלו ב"ד טליתו בדין ילך ויזמר לפי שדנו דין אמת ולא הפסידוהו כלום אלא הוציאו גזילה מתחת ידו. , אמר ליה שמואל לרב יהודה, קרא כתיב, וגם כל העם הזה על מקומו יבא בשלום מגמלשון כל מדייק, דמשמע בין זכאי בין חייב, ואפילו החייב יצא מן הדין בשלום ובאהבה. .
(שם ז׳ א׳)

ההוא דהוה קאמר ואזיל דאזיל מבי דינא שקל גלימא ליזמר זמר וליזיל באורחא א"ל שמואל לרב יהודה קרא כתיב (שמות יח, כג) וגם כל העם הזה על מקומו יבא בשלום

There was a certain man who was saying as he walked: With regard to one who goes from the court, and his cloak has been taken from him in the course of the proceedings, i.e., he lost all his money due to a ruling against him, let him sing a song and go happily on the way. Although he lost the case, he has benefited from justice being served. Shmuel said to Rav Yehuda: A verse is written with regard to Yitro’s advice for judiciary reforms that conveys the message of this aphorism: “And all these people shall also go to their place in peace” (Exodus 18:23). If justice is served, all the litigants, not only those who emerge victorious, can leave in peace.

(ח) יְהוּדָה בֶן טַבַּאי וְשִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן שָׁטָח קִבְּלוּ מֵהֶם. יְהוּדָה בֶן טַבַּאי אוֹמֵר, אַל תַּעַשׂ עַצְמְךָ כְעוֹרְכֵי הַדַּיָּנִין. וּכְשֶׁיִּהְיוּ בַעֲלֵי דִינִין עוֹמְדִים לְפָנֶיךָ, יִהְיוּ בְעֵינֶיךָ כִרְשָׁעִים. וּכְשֶׁנִּפְטָרִים מִלְּפָנֶיךָ, יִהְיוּ בְעֵינֶיךָ כְזַכָּאִין, כְּשֶׁקִּבְּלוּ עֲלֵיהֶם אֶת הַדִּין:

(8) Yehuda ben Tabai and Shimon ben Shetach received from them. Yehuda ben Tabai says, "Do not make yourself like the judges' advisers; and when the litigants are before you, they should be like evildoers in your eyes; and when they are excused from before you, they should be meritorious in your eyes - when they have accepted the judgment."

בעלי תשובה דרכן להיות שפלים וענוים ביותר אם חרפו אותן הכסילים במעשיהם הראשונים ואמרו להן אמש היית עושה כך וכך ואמש היית אומר כך וכך אל ירגישו להן אלא שומעין ושמחים ויודעין שזו זכות להם שכל זמן שהם בושים ממעשיהם שעברו ונכלמים מהן זכותם מרובה ומעלתם מתגדלת וחטא גמור הוא לומר לבעל תשובה זכור מעשיך הראשונים או להזכירן לפניו כדי לביישו או להזכיר דברים וענינים הדומין להם כדי להזכירו מה עשה הכל אסור ומוזהר עליו בכלל הוניית דברים שהזהירה תורה עליה שנאמר ולא תונו איש את עמיתו.

It is the custom of the penitent to be exceedingly lowly and humble. If fools insult them by reminding them of their former conduct, saying: "But yesterday you did thus and such; yesterday you said thus and such", it is best to have no feelings against them, for this very insult is meritorious for the penitent. Indeed, as long as they feel the shame of their past conduct, and the reproach thereof, their virtue increases and their degree grows. But it is, nevertheless, a grievous sin to say to the penitent: "Remember your erstwhile conduct", or to remind them in his presence so as to put him to shame, or to mention things and subjects similar to them so as to remind him of what he did. All such is forbidden, and comes under the general law of deceiving one with words, concerning which the Torah did give warning, even as it is said: "And ye shall not deceive one another" (Lev. 25.17).

II. Law During Exile

DINA DE-MALKHUTA DINA (Aram. דִּינָא דְּמַלְכוּתָא דִּינָא), the halakhic rule that the law of the country is binding, and, in certain cases, is to be preferred to Jewish law.

-Encyclopedia Judaica (“EJ”)

(ח) וַיֹּ֤אמֶר הָמָן֙ לַמֶּ֣לֶךְ אֲחַשְׁוֵר֔וֹשׁ יֶשְׁנ֣וֹ עַם־אֶחָ֗ד מְפֻזָּ֤ר וּמְפֹרָד֙ בֵּ֣ין הָֽעַמִּ֔ים בְּכֹ֖ל מְדִינ֣וֹת מַלְכוּתֶ֑ךָ וְדָתֵיהֶ֞ם שֹׁנ֣וֹת מִכָּל־עָ֗ם וְאֶת־דָּתֵ֤י הַמֶּ֙לֶךְ֙ אֵינָ֣ם עֹשִׂ֔ים וְלַמֶּ֥לֶךְ אֵין־שֹׁוֶ֖ה לְהַנִּיחָֽם׃
(8) Haman then said to King Ahasuerus, “There is a certain people, scattered and dispersed among the other peoples in all the provinces of your realm, whose laws are different from those of any other people and who do not obey the king’s laws; and it is not in Your Majesty’s interest to tolerate them.

Rabbi Shmuel

226 C.E.: Ardashir I, king of the Sassanids conquers Babylon and ends political and religious autonomy of the Jews

241 C.E.: Shapur I, son ofArdashir I, succeeds to the throne and grants minorities cultural and religious authority; Shmuel, leader of the Jews at the time, befriends Shapurand recognizes his rule as possessing good and equitable laws which Jews were bound to obey (EJ citing Neusner, Babylonia, vol. 69, 95)

B. Talmudic Sources

  1. There are certain limits for when the law of the kingdom applies. What are they? When the law of the land does not apply, what does that allow you to do?

מתני׳ אין פורטין לא מתיבת המוכסין ולא מכיס של גבאין ואין נוטלין מהם צדקה אבל נוטל הוא מתוך ביתו או מן השוק:גמ׳ תנא אבל נותן לו דינר ונותן לו את השאר: ומוכסין והאמר שמואל דינא דמלכותא דינא אמר רב חנינא בר כהנא אמר שמואל במוכס שאין לו קצבה דבי ר' ינאי אמרי במוכס העומד מאליו

MISHNA: One may not exchange larger coins for smaller ones from the trunk of customs collectors nor from the purse of tax collectors, and one may not take charity from them, as they are assumed to have obtained their funds illegally. But one may take money from the collector’s house or from money he has with him in the market that he did not take from his collection trunk or purse.

GEMARA: It was taught in a baraita with regard to the prohibition against exchanging money from the trunk of a customs collector: But one may give the customs collector a dinar as payment for a debt that amounts to less than a dinar, and when the collector gives him change, he may accept it. It was taught in the mishna that one may not exchange money from the trunks of customs collectors, which are assumed to include stolen funds. The Gemara questions this ruling: But doesn’t Shmuel say that the law of the kingdom is the law, i.e., halakha requires Jews to obey the laws of the state in which they live. Accordingly, the customs are collected legally and it should be permitted to make use of the funds. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Ḥanina bar Kahana said that Shmuel says: The mishna is discussing a customs collector who does not have a limitation placed by the governor on the amount he may collect, and he collects as he pleases. Alternatively, the Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai said: The mishna is discussing a customs collector who stands on his own, i.e., he was not appointed by the government but, on his own, he forces people to give him money.

מתני׳ נודרין להרגין ולחרמין ולמוכסין שהיא תרומה אף על פי שאינו תרומה שהן של בית המלך אף על פי שאינן של בית המלך בית שמאי אומרים בכל נודרין חוץ מבשבועה ובית הלל אומרים אף בשבועה בית שמאי אומרים לא יפתח לו בנדר ובית הלל אומרים אף יפתח לו בית שמאי אומרים במה שהוא מדירו ובית הלל אומרים אף במה שאינו מדירו כיצד אמר לו אמור קונם אשתי נהנית לי ואמר קונם אשתי ובני נהנין לי בית שמאי אומרים אשתו מותרת ובניו אסורין ובית הלל אומרים אלו ואלו מותרין: גמ׳ והאמר שמואל דינא דמלכותא דינא אמר רב חיננא אמר רב כהנא אמר שמואל במוכס שאין לו קצבה דבי ר' ינאי אמר במוכס העומד מאליו:

MISHNA: One may take a vow to murderers, i.e., people suspected of killing others over monetary matters; or to robbers [ḥaramin]; or to tax collectors who wish to collect tax, that the produce in his possession is teruma although it is not teruma. One may also take a vow to them that the produce in his possession belongs to the house of the king, although it does not belong to the house of the king. One may take a false vow to save himself or his possessions, as a statement of this sort does not have the status of a vow. Beit Shammai say: One may vow in such a case, although he has no intention that his words be true, using every means of taking a vow or making a prohibition in order to mislead those people, except for by taking of an oath, due to its more stringent nature. And Beit Hillel say: One may mislead them even by taking an oath. Beit Shammai say: When negotiating with a robber, one should not initiate by taking a vow for him unless the robber does not believe his claim, in which case he may take a vow to reinforce his words. And Beit Hillel say: He may even initiate by taking a vow to him. Beit Shammai say: One may take a vow only about that which the robber compels him to take a vow but may not add to it. And Beit Hillel say: One may take a vow even about that which he does not compel him to take a vow. The mishna explains the previous statement: How so? If the extortionist said to him that he should say: Benefiting from me is konam for my wife if the vow is not true, and he said: Benefiting from me is konam for my wife and my children, Beit Shammai say: His wife is permitted to benefit from him, since the extortionist demanded that he take that vow, but his children, whom he added of his own accord, are prohibited from benefiting from their father. And Beit Hillel say: Both these and those are permitted to benefit from him. GEMARA: The Gemara asks, concerning the mishna’s statement that one may take a vow to tax collectors: But didn’t Shmuel say: The law of the kingdom is the law, i.e., there is a halakhic principle that Jews must obey the laws of the state in which they live? Since one must pay the tax determined by the kingdom, how did the Sages permit one to lie in order to avoid paying? Rav Ḥinnana said that Rav Kahana said that Shmuel said: The mishna is referring to a tax collector who has no fixed amount for collection established by the kingdom, but rather collects the tax arbitrarily. Therefore, this case is not included in the law of the kingdom. A Sage of the school of Rabbi Yannai said: The mishna is referring to a tax collector who establishes himself as such independently and was not appointed by the kingdom.

2. What purpose is the Law of the Land serving in this case? In other words, what problem might this scenario be addressing?

מתני׳ כל השטרות העולים בערכאות של עובדי כוכבים אע"פ שחותמיהם עובדי כוכבים כשירים חוץ מגיטי נשים ושחרורי עבדים ר"ש אומר אף אלו כשירין לא הוזכרו אלא בזמן שנעשו בהדיוט: גמ׳ קא פסיק ותני לא שנא מכר ל"ש מתנה בשלמא מכר מכי יהיב זוזי קמייהו הוא דקנה ושטרא ראיה בעלמא הוא דאי לא יהיב זוזי קמייהו לא הוו מרעי נפשייהו וכתבין ליה שטרא אלא מתנה במאי קא קני לאו בהאי שטרא והאי שטרא חספא בעלמא הוא אמר שמואל דינא דמלכותא דינא ואב"א תני חוץ מכגיטי נשים:

MISHNA: With regard to all documents produced in gentile courts, even though their signatures are those of gentiles they are all valid, except for bills of divorce and bills of manumission. Rabbi Shimon says: Even these are valid, as these two types of documents are mentioned only when they are prepared by a common person, not in court. GEMARA: With regard to the ruling of the mishna that all documents written in gentile courts are valid, the Gemara comments: The tanna categorically teaches a general halakha in the mishna, and it is no different if it is a document concerning a sale and it is no different if it is a document concerning a gift, the document is valid in both cases. The Gemara asks: Granted, in the case of a sale this is reasonable, as from when the buyer gave money to the seller in the presence of the gentile judges he has acquired the property, since he has performed an act of acquisition. And the document is merely a proof for the acquisition. It must be that he already acquired the property in question, as if he had not given money in their presence the court would not act to its own detriment and write a document for him, as the document detailing the sale would not be accurate, and writing such a document would reflect poorly on them. Therefore, the document clearly serves as proof that the acquisition was performed in the correct manner. However, with regard to a gift, by what means does the one who receives the gift acquire it from the giver? Is it not via this document? And yet this document is merely a shard, as a document written by gentiles is not considered a legal document according to halakha. Shmuel said: The law of the kingdom is the law, i.e., Jews must obey the laws of the state in which they live. Consequently, every form of property transfer accepted by local law is valid according to halakha as well. And if you wish, say that one should emend the text of the mishna, and teach: They are all valid except for documents that are like bills of divorce. In other words, the distinction is between different types of documents: Documents that are meant to serve only as proof are valid even if they were produced in gentile courts, whereas documents that effect a legal act, such as bills of divorce, are invalid if they were written in a gentile court.

3. Why wouldn’t the Jews be allowed to travel on the bridges if not for the law of the land? What makes this justified?

גופא אמר שמואל דינא דמלכותא דינא אמר רבא תדע דקטלי דיקלי וגשרי גישרי ועברינן עלייהו א"ל אביי ודלמא משום דאייאוש להו מינייהו מרייהו אמר ליה אי לא דינא דמלכותא דינא היכי מייאשי והא לא קא עבדי כדאמר מלכא מלכא אמר זילו וקטלו מכל באגי ואינהו אזלו וקטלו מחד באגא שלוחא דמלכא כמלכא ולא טרח ואינהו אפסיד אנפשייהו דאיבעי להו דאינקוט מכוליה באגי ומשקל דמי
§ The Gemara relates to the matter of civil law itself. Shmuel says: The law of the kingdom is the law, and the halakhic principle is that Jews must obey the laws of the state in which they reside. Rava said: Know that this principle is true from the fact that the municipal authorities cut down palm trees without the consent of their owners and construct bridges from them, and yet we cross over them. Evidently, the wood is not considered stolen property, which one is prohibited from using, because the law of the kingdom is the law. Abaye said to Rava: Perhaps the reason the bridges may be used is because their owners despaired of retrieving them and not because the law of the kingdom is the law. Rava said to Abaye: If not for the fact that the law of the kingdom is the law, how would the despair of the owners of the trees allow us to use the bridges? The fact that the owners have despaired of retrieving their wood does not effect a transfer of property, and it therefore still belongs to them. The Gemara questions Rava’s understanding: But the municipal authorities do not act as the king said. The king said: Go and cut down a bit of wood from all the valleys in the area so that each individual loses only a small amount of wood. They, however, disobey the king and go and cut down all the wood needed for the bridge from one valley. Therefore, even if the law of the kingdom is the law, this cannot be the reason that the halakha permits Jews to cross over such bridges, as the authorities are not enforcing the law of the kingdom, but rather their own unlawful inclinations. The Gemara answers: An agent of a king is like the king himself, and he is not expected to trouble himself to collect wood proportionally from each valley. They, the owners of the land where the wood is cut, cause themselves a loss, as they should collect compensation from all the other residents of the valleys and take money from them for this purpose. Since the land owners whose wood was used have permission to collect compensation from all the residents in the area, the authorities are acting within their rights by confiscating wood from a single location.

4. Final Source in the Talmud. What do these scenarios have in common with one another?

אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל נכסי עובד כוכבים הרי הן כמדבר כל המחזיק בהן זכה בהן מאי טעמא עובד כוכבים מכי מטו זוזי לידיה אסתלק ליה ישראל לא קני עד דמטי שטרא לידיה הלכך הרי הן כמדבר וכל המחזיק בהן זכה בהן א"ל אביי לרב יוסף מי אמר שמואל הכי והאמר שמואל דינא דמלכותא דינא ומלכא אמר לא ליקני ארעא אלא באיגרתא אמר ליה אנא לא ידענא עובדא הוה בדורא דרעותא בישראל דזבן ארעא מעובד כוכבי' ואתא ישראל אחרינא רפיק בה פורתא אתא לקמיה דרב יהודה אוקמה בידא דשני אמר ליה דורא דרעותא קאמרת התם באגי מטמרי הוו דאינהו גופייהו לא הוו יהבי טסקא למלכא ומלכא אמר מאן דיהיב טסקא ליכול ארעא

§ Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: With regard to the property of a gentile that was sold to a Jew for money, it is ownerless like a desert until the purchaser performs an act of acquisition; anyone who takes possession of it in the interim has acquired it. What is the reason for this? The gentile relinquishes ownership of it from the moment when the money reaches his hand, while the Jew who purchased it does not acquire it until the deed reaches his hand. Therefore, in the period of time between the giving of the money and the receiving of the deed, the property is like a desert, and anyone who takes possession of it has acquired it. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Did Shmuel actually say this? But doesn’t Shmuel say that the law of the kingdom is the law, i.e., the halakha obligates Jews to observe the laws of the locale in which they reside, and the king said that land may not be acquired without a document? Therefore, taking possession should not be effective for acquisition. Rav Yosef said to him: I do not know how to reconcile this contradiction, but there was an incident in the village of Dura that was founded by shepherds, where there was a Jew who purchased land from a gentile by giving money, and in the interim another Jew came and plowed it a bit. The two Jews came before Rav Yehuda for a ruling, and he established the property in the possession of the second individual. This accords with the ruling of Shmuel that the property is ownerless until a Jew performs an act of acquisition. Abaye said to him: Are you saying that the incident occurred in Dura that was founded by shepherds? Proof cannot be brought from that case, as there the fields were concealed, since the owners of fields would not pay the land tax [taska] to the king, and the king says that one who pays land tax may profit from the field. Therefore, in that case, the gentile who sold the property did not actually own it, and consequently by the laws of the kingdom could not sell it. The one who took possession of the property acquired it in accordance with the law of the kingdom, as he committed to pay the land tax.

C. Post-Talmudic Type of Law Requirements

Some justifications:

Social order: Rashi (1040-1105): Commandment obligating non-jews to enact laws to preserve social order

The contractual approach: Rambam (1135-1204): Contractual agreement between the King and his servants, sovereignty demonstrated by circulation of coins as currency; Rabbi Nissim of Gerondi (1310-75): King owns the land, so Jews are required to obey the conditions he establishes for residence thereon; Sovereignty through conquest

Information contained in this table is taken from A Restatement of Rabbinic Civil Law, Volume 9, by Emanuel B. Quint, an English restatement of the Shulchan Aruch: Hoshen HaMishpat.

Ramban and R. Menachem Solomon (France, 1249-1306)

R. Yom Tov (Spain, second half of the 14th century)

R. Menachem b. Solomon (1963), R. Moses Isserles (Poland; 1520-72), R. Moses Jacobovitz (Germany, United States 1820-1899) and R. Azriel Hildesheimer (Germany 1820-99)

Rishonim

Law has been in existence for some time (a new law is the law of the king, not the law of the kingdom)

Court made law does not qualify as dina dmalchuta dina

Government must have financial interest

Well-known to the country’s population

Well-known to the country’s population

Found on the statute books of the kingdom

Found on the statute books of the kingdom

Applied to all of the citizens of the kingdom[1]

Applied to all of the citizens of the kingdom

Additionally:

(1) Ritual law is excluded from the purview of Dina d’malchuta dina.

(2) The secular government has authority over criminal law:

Solomon ben Abraham Adret (Rashba) in a Responsum quoted by the Beit Yosef commentary on Tur (ḤM 308/12): Gentile authorities requested the Jewish community to investigate whether a certain Jew had committed a felony so that he may be punished. Rashba, relying on the principle of dina demalchuta dina, ruled that when a Jewish court was acting by license of the authorities, there was no need to observe the usual requirements of admissible evidence by Jewish law such as forewarning, competent witnesses etc. – even in capital cases because "if we do not say this, but insist on adherence to Biblical law in procedural law, the world would become a wasteland and murderers and their cronies would proliferate …" (ibid. according to the version published by Kaufmann in: JQR, 8 (1896), 228, 235–6; p. 90 in Aloni judgment). EJ citing decision of Israeli Supreme Court in Aloni v. Ministry of Justice.

What is the purpose of limiting the reach of the law of the land? What is the fear? Have we been successful in protecting our own legal systems during exile?


[1] R. Asher (Germany, Spain; 1250-1327): taxies levied on one state but not others is not part of dina d’malchuta dina; R. Yosef Kolon (France, Italy, 1410-1480) held that taxes levied on one industry but not others is still part of Dina D’Malchuta Dina. (Note that this is disputed by R. Elijah of Vilna (Lithuania; 1720-1797). What does this tell us about how these rabbis viewed arbitrary imposition of law?

Frankfurt in 1603, Heads of various German Jewish Communities, From Gil Graff, Separation of Church and State, Dina de-Malkhuta Dina in Jewish Law, 1750-1848

It is a common offense among the people of our generation to refuse to obey Jewish law and even to compel opposing litigants to present themselves before secular courts. The result is that the Holy Name is profaned and that the Government and the Judges are provoked at us. We have therefore decided that anyone who sues his neighbor in secular courts shall be compelled to free him from all the charges made against him, even though the courts decided in favor of the plaintiff. A person guilty of taking a case to Gentile courts shall be separated from the community of Israel, shall not be called to the Torah, and shall not be permitted to marry until he repents and frees his fellow from the power of the Gentile courts.

IV. Modern Era: Out with the Old, In with the State

Austrian Jewry 1783, Kaiser Joseph II promulgates Ehepatent, regulating the marriages of all inhabitants of the empire.

Johann David Michaelis, professor of Oriental languages at the University of Gottingen: "As long as the Jews continue to observe the Mosaic Laws...they will never become fully integrated..."

Jacob Sapir, Jewish traveler, writing in response to Napoleon's reforms:

"In his [Napoleon's] days, the faces of Israel shone with physical freedom, but their eyes were dimmed by the subjugation of the soul, and the Torah donned sackcloth, for her glory was ended… Napoleon gave the Jews liberty, freedom, and equal rights of citizenship, without national distinction, but he took from them their standing in Torah and their religion…leaving to their Judaism naught but the worship of G-d… and there is no longer a court of law (beit din) which will assemble and judge the nation of G-d by the laws of the holy Torah.”

Additional Source: Gil Graff, Separation of Church and State, Dina de-Malkhuta Dina in Jewish Law, 1750-1848

IV. Conclusion: Opportunity

Bodie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375 (1971)

Perhaps no characteristic of an organized and cohesive society is more fundamental than its erection and enforcement of a system of rules defining the various rights and duties of its members, enabling them to govern their affairs and definitively settle their difference in an orderly, predictable manner. Without such a ‘legal system,’ social organization and cohesion are virtually impossibility…it is the injection of the rule of law that allows society to reap the benefits of rejecting what political theorists call the “state of nature.

Yosef Kanefsky, Redemption, Israel, and African Migrants, April 2, 2018

And throughout our exiles, even as we continued to practice our ritual laws, we recognized that we were again in a state of unredemption – not simply because we had lost our land, but more so because we had lost our sovereignty, and with it our capacity to actualize an economy, a government, an army, a foreign policy entirely built on the foundations of – and forged in the furnace of – tzedek umishpat. We were living in unredemption because our law was in exile...

...The Halachic and spiritual value of self-preservation is being weighed against the halachic and spiritual value of not oppressing the stranger. The halachic and spiritual value of giving priority to your own poor, is being weighed against the value of supporting the poor more broadly, consistent with the “ways of peace”. Our historical uber-value of maintaining a Jewish majority in the State, is being weighed against our historical uber-value, obtained through our blood and tears, of shielding and taking in the refugee. And all sides in the debate are now openly acknowledging the fact that unfortunately Israel never established a proper process for Refugee Status Determination, that thousands of the asylum requests have not been reviewed, and that as a consequence no one really knows how many are economic migrants and how many are true refugees. This conversation –and may it lead soon to a proper and worthy resolution – is the conversation of a redeemed people. A conversation worthy of the “first flowering of our Redemption”

(ה) כִּ֤י אִם־הֵיטֵיב֙ תֵּיטִ֔יבוּ אֶת־דַּרְכֵיכֶ֖ם וְאֶת־מַֽעַלְלֵיכֶ֑ם אִם־עָשׂ֤וֹ תַֽעֲשׂוּ֙ מִשְׁפָּ֔ט בֵּ֥ין אִ֖ישׁ וּבֵ֥ין רֵעֵֽהוּ׃ (ו) גֵּ֣ר יָת֤וֹם וְאַלְמָנָה֙ לֹ֣א תַֽעֲשֹׁ֔קוּ וְדָ֣ם נָקִ֔י אַֽל־תִּשְׁפְּכ֖וּ בַּמָּק֣וֹם הַזֶּ֑ה וְאַחֲרֵ֨י אֱלֹקִ֧ים אֲחֵרִ֛ים לֹ֥א תֵלְכ֖וּ לְרַ֥ע לָכֶֽם׃ (ז) וְשִׁכַּנְתִּ֤י אֶתְכֶם֙ בַּמָּק֣וֹם הַזֶּ֔ה בָּאָ֕רֶץ אֲשֶׁ֥ר נָתַ֖תִּי לַאֲבֽוֹתֵיכֶ֑ם לְמִן־עוֹלָ֖ם וְעַד־עוֹלָֽם׃

(5) No, if you really mend your ways and your actions; if you execute justice between one man and another; (6) if you do not oppress the stranger, the orphan, and the widow; if you do not shed the blood of the innocent in this place; if you do not follow other gods, to your own hurt— (7) then only will I let you dwell in this place, in the land that I gave to your fathers for all time.