Key Sugyot - Tikkun L'eyl Shavuot 5778

The Gemara raises a question about the mishna: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? It is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, and not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan. The Gemara explains: As it is taught in a baraita: All are judged on Rosh HaShana, and their sentence is sealed on Yom Kippur; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: All are judged on Rosh HaShana, and their sentence is sealed each in its own time: On Passover the sentence is sealed concerning grain; on Shavuot concerning fruits that grow on a tree; on the festival of Sukkot they are judged concerning water; and mankind is judged on Rosh HaShana, and the sentence is sealed on Yom Kippur. Rabbi Yosei says: A person is judged every day, and not just once a year, as it is stated: “You visit him every morning” (Job 7:18), meaning that every morning an accounting is made and a judgment is passed. Rabbi Natan says: A person is judged every hour, as it is stated: “You try him every moment” (Job 7:18). And lest you say that actually, the mishna is taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and when the mishna is taught, it is taught with regard to the sentence, and not the judgments, which are all passed on Rosh HaShana, if so, it is difficult with regard to mankind, as the mishna should have stated that the sentence is sealed on Yom Kippur. Rava said: The tanna of the mishna is a tanna from the school of Rabbi Yishmael, as a tanna from the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: At four times of the year the world is judged: On Passover concerning grain; on Shavuot concerning fruits that grow on a tree; on the festival of Sukkot they are judged concerning water; and mankind is judged on Rosh HaShana and the sentence is sealed on Yom Kippur. And when the mishna is taught, it is taught with regard to the beginning of the judgment process, i.e., the judgment of mankind is initially passed on Rosh HaShana.

(8) Rabbon Simeon hen Gamaliel says, "Never were more joyous festivals in Israel than the 15th of Ab and the day of atonement, for on them the maidens of Jerusalem used to go out dressed in white garments—borrowed ones, in order not to cause shame to those who had them not of their own;—these clothes were also to be previously immersed, and thus they went out and danced in the vineyards, saying, Young men, look and observe well whom you are about to choose [as a spouse]; regard not beauty [alone], but rather look to a virtuous family, for 'Gracefulness is deceitful, and beauty is a vain thing, but the woman that feareth the Lord, she is worthy of praise' (Prov. 31:3); and it is also said (Prov. 31:31), 'Give her of the fruit of her hands, and let her own works praise her in the gates.' And thus is it said [in allusion to this custom], 'Go out, maidens of Jerusalem, and look on King Solomon, and on the crown wherewith his mother has encircled [his head] on the day of his espousals, and on the day of the gladness of his heart' (Cant. iii. 11); 'the day of his espousals,' alludes to the day of the gift of the law, and 'the day of the gladness of his heart,' was that when the building of the Temple was completed." May it soon be rebuilt in our days. Amen!

(4) He washed his hands and feet, undressed, and went down and immersed. He came up, and dried himself. Then they brought him his white garments, and he dressed and washed his hands and feet. He went inside to remove the ladle and coal-pan, washed his hands and feet, undressed, went down, immersed, came up, and dried himself. Then, they brought him his gold garments, he dressed, washed his hands and feet, and went into the sanctuary to burn the afternoon incense and light the lamps. He washed his hands and feet, and undressed. They then brought his personal garments. He got dressed, and they would go with him to his residence. And he would make a feast for those close to him, for having exited the Holy [of Holies] in peace.

The Gemara relates that those same Sages who sat and discussed the issue of hides, sat again and they raised a dilemma: That which we learned in the mishna: The primary categories of labor, which are prohibited by Torah law on Shabbat, are forty-less-one; to what does this number correspond? That is to say, what is the source of this number? Rabbi Ḥanina bar Ḥama said to them: They correspond to the labors in the Tabernacle. All types of labor that were performed in the Tabernacle are enumerated as primary categories of labor with respect to Shabbat. However, other labors, even if they are significant, are not enumerated among the primary categories of labor since they were not performed in the Tabernacle. Rabbi Yonatan, son of Rabbi Elazar, said to them that so said Rabbi Shimon, son of Rabbi Yosei ben Lakonya: They correspond to the instances of the words labor, his labor, and the labor of, that appear in the Torah a total of forty-less-one times. Rav Yosef raised a dilemma: The term his labor is written with regard to Joseph: “And it came to pass about this time, that he came into the house to do his labor; and there was none of the men of the house there within” (Genesis 39:11). Is it included in the count of the thirty-nine instances or not? Abaye said to him: And let us bring a Torah scroll and count the instances of the word labor and thereby determine whether or not there are thirty-nine instances without that one. Didn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say that Rabbi Yoḥanan said in a case of similar uncertainty: They did not move from there until they brought a Torah scroll and counted them? Rav Yosef said to Abaye: I cannot reach a conclusion relying solely on a count because there is another instance of the term labor, whose meaning is not clear to me. The reason I am uncertain is because it is written with regard to the Tabernacle: “For the labor they had was sufficient for all the work to do it, and too much” (Genesis 36:7). The question arises whether or not this mention of labor is included in the count of thirty-nine instances, i.e., whether or not it refers to actual labor. And if it does, that verse with regard to Joseph should be understood in accordance with the opinion of the one who said that the expression, to do his labor, is a euphemism. It means that it was to attend to his needs and engage in relations with Potiphar’s wife that he entered. Or, perhaps, the verse relating to Joseph: “He came into the house to do his labor,” is included in the count, and it refers to actual labor. And this verse: “The labor they had was sufficient,” is saying the following: That they completed the preparatory labor, i.e., they brought all the materials, not that they engaged in the actual labor. Let the uncertainty stand unresolved. With regard to the matter itself, it was taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of the one who said that the thirty-nine labors of Shabbat correspond to the labors performed in the Tabernacle. As it was taught in a baraita: One is only liable for performing a labor to which there was a corresponding labor in the Tabernacle. They sowed in order to grow dyes for the Tabernacle, and therefore you may not sow on Shabbat. They reaped, and therefore you may not reap on Shabbat. They lifted the boards from the ground in the wilderness, which is a public domain, and placed them into the wagon, which is a private domain, and therefore you shall not carry objects in from the public domain to the private domain on Shabbat. They lowered the boards from the wagon to the ground, and therefore you shall not carry objects out from the private domain to the public domain on Shabbat. They took boards and other objects out and passed them from wagon to wagon, i.e., from one private domain to another private domain, and therefore you shall not take objects out from one private domain to another private domain on Shabbat. The Gemara expresses astonishment with regard to the last clause of the baraita: One who takes an object out from one private domain to another private domain, what prohibited labor is he thereby performing? The Gemara answers: It was Abaye and Rava who both said, and some say that it was Rav Adda bar Ahava who said: This is referring to taking an object out from one private domain to another private domain via the public domain, as the space between the two wagons in the wilderness was a public domain.

We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: And one who kneads and one who bakes. Rav Pappa said: Our tanna left out the labor of cooking the spices for dye, which was performed in the Tabernacle, and included the labor of baking, which was not performed in the construction of the Tabernacle. If, as stated above, all the primary categories of labor were derived from the labors in the Tabernacle, why did the tanna omit cooking? The Gemara answers: Our tanna cited the sequence of preparing bread, which was the underlying principle behind his organization of the primary categories of labor. He opened with plowing and concluded with the preparation of bread.

The Sages taught in a baraita: The basic mitzva of Hanukkah is each day to have a light kindled by a person, the head of the household, for himself and his household. And the mehadrin, i.e., those who are meticulous in the performance of mitzvot, kindle a light for each and every one in the household. And the mehadrin min hamehadrin, who are even more meticulous, adjust the number of lights daily. Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree as to the nature of that adjustment. Beit Shammai say: On the first day one kindles eight lights and, from there on, gradually decreases the number of lights until, on the last day of Hanukkah, he kindles one light. And Beit Hillel say: On the first day one kindles one light, and from there on, gradually increases the number of lights until, on the last day, he kindles eight lights. Ulla said: There were two amora’im in the West, Eretz Yisrael, who disagreed with regard to this dispute, Rabbi Yosei bar Avin and Rabbi Yosei bar Zevida. One said that the reason for Beit Shammai’s opinion is that the number of lights corresponds to the incoming days, i.e., the future. On the first day, eight days remain in Hanukkah, one kindles eight lights, and on the second day seven days remain, one kindles seven, etc. The reason for Beit Hillel’s opinion is that the number of lights corresponds to the outgoing days. Each day, the number of lights corresponds to the number of the days of Hanukkah that were already observed. And one said that the reason for Beit Shammai’s opinion is that the number of lights corresponds to the bulls of the festival of Sukkot: Thirteen were sacrificed on the first day and each succeeding day one fewer was sacrificed (Numbers 29:12–31). The reason for Beit Hillel’s opinion is that the number of lights is based on the principle: One elevates to a higher level in matters of sanctity and one does not downgrade. Therefore, if the objective is to have the number of lights correspond to the number of days, there is no alternative to increasing their number with the passing of each day. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: There were two Elders in Sidon, and one of them acted in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, and one of them acted in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. Each provided a reason for his actions: One gave a reason for his actions: The number of lights corresponds to the bulls of the Festival. And one gave a reason for his actions: The number of lights is based on the principle: One elevates to a higher level in matters of sanctity and one does not downgrade. The Sages taught in a baraita: It is a mitzva to place the Hanukkah lamp at the entrance to one’s house on the outside, so that all can see it. If he lived upstairs, he places it at the window adjacent to the public domain. And in a time of danger, when the gentiles issued decrees to prohibit kindling lights, he places it on the table and that is sufficient to fulfill his obligation. Rava said: One must kindle another light in addition to the Hanukkah lights in order to use its light, as it is prohibited to use the light of the Hanukkah lights. And if there is a bonfire, he need not light an additional light, as he can use the light of the bonfire. However, if he is an important person, who is unaccustomed to using the light of a bonfire, even though there is a bonfire, he must kindle another light. The Gemara asks: What is Hanukkah, and why are lights kindled on Hanukkah? The Gemara answers: The Sages taught in Megillat Ta’anit: On the twenty-fifth of Kislev, the days of Hanukkah are eight. One may not eulogize on them and one may not fast on them. What is the reason? When the Greeks entered the Sanctuary they defiled all the oils that were in the Sanctuary by touching them. And when the Hasmonean monarchy overcame them and emerged victorious over them, they searched and found only one cruse of oil that was placed with the seal of the High Priest, undisturbed by the Greeks. And there was sufficient oil there to light the candelabrum for only one day. A miracle occurred and they lit the candelabrum from it eight days. The next year the Sages instituted those days and made them holidays with recitation of hallel and special thanksgiving in prayer and blessings. We learned there in a mishna with regard to damages: In the case of a spark that emerges from under a hammer, and went out of the artisan’s workshop, and caused damage, the one who struck the hammer is liable. Similarly, in the case of a camel that is laden with flax and it passed through the public domain, and its flax entered into a store, and caught fire from the storekeeper’s lamp, and set fire to the building, the camel owner is liable. Since his flax entered into another’s domain, which he had no permission to enter, all the damages were caused due to his negligence. However, if the storekeeper placed his lamp outside the store and it set fire to the flax, the storekeeper is liable, as he placed the lamp outside his domain where he had no right to place it. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the flax was set on fire by the storekeeper’s Hanukkah lamp that he placed outside the entrance to his store, he is not liable, as in that case, it is permitted for the storekeeper to place his lamp outside. Ravina said in the name of Rabba: That is to say that it is a mitzva to place the Hanukkah lamp within ten handbreadths of the ground. As if it should enter your mind to say that he may place it above ten handbreadths, why is the storekeeper exempt? Let the camel owner say to the storekeeper: You should have placed the lamp above the height of a camel and its rider, and then no damage would have been caused. By failing to do so, the storekeeper caused the damage, and the camel owner should not be liable. The Gemara rejects this: And perhaps one is also permitted to place the Hanukkah lamp above ten handbreadths, and the reason Rabbi Yehuda exempted the storekeeper was due to concern for the observance of the mitzva of kindling Hanukkah lights. He held that if you burden one excessively, he will come to refrain from performing the mitzva of kindling Hanukkah lights. Since the storekeeper placed the Hanukkah lamp outside at the behest of the Sages, the storekeeper should not be required to take extra precautions. With regard to the essence of the matter Rav Kahana said that Rav Natan bar Manyumi taught in the name of Rabbi Tanḥum: A Hanukkah lamp that one placed above twenty cubits is invalid, just as a sukka whose roofing is more than twenty cubits high, and just as an alleyway whose beam, its symbolic fourth partition in order to place an eiruv, is more than twenty cubits high, are invalid. The reason is the same in all three cases: People do not usually raise their heads and see objects at a height above twenty cubits. As there is a requirement to see all of these, they are deemed invalid when placed above that height. And the Gemara cites another statement that Rav Kahana said that Rav Natan bar Manyumi taught in the name of Rav Tanḥum: What is the meaning of the verse that is written with regard to Joseph: “And they took him, and cast him into the pit; and the pit was empty, there was no water in it” (Genesis 37:24)? By inference from that which is stated: And the pit was empty, don’t I know that there was no water in it? Rather, why does the verse say: There was no water in it? The verse comes to emphasize and teach that there was no water in it, but there were snakes and scorpions in it. Rabba said: It is a mitzva to place the Hanukkah lamp within the handbreadth adjacent to the entrance. The Gemara asks: And where, on which side, does he place it? There is a difference of opinion: Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said: On the right side of the entrance. Rav Shmuel from Difti said: On the left. And the halakha is to place it on the left so that the Hanukkah lamp will be on the left and the mezuza on the right. One who enters the house will be surrounded by mitzvot (ge’onim). Rav Yehuda said that Rav Asi said that Rav said: It is prohibited to count money opposite a Hanukkah light. Rav Yehuda relates: When I said this halakha before Shmuel, he said to me: Does the Hanukkah light have sanctity that would prohibit one from using its light? Rav Yosef strongly objected to this question: What kind of question is that; does the blood of a slaughtered undomesticated animal or fowl have sanctity? As it was taught in a baraita that the Sages interpreted the verse: “He shall spill its blood and cover it with dust” (Leviticus 17:13): With that which he spilled, he shall cover. Just as a person spills the blood of a slaughtered animal with his hand, so too, he is obligated to cover the blood with this hand and not cover it with his foot. The reason is so that mitzvot will not be contemptible to him. Here too, one should treat the Hanukkah lights as if they were sacred and refrain from utilizing them for other purposes, so that mitzvot will not be contemptible to him. The Gemara relates that they raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi: What is the halakha with regard to using decorations of a sukka all seven days of the festival of Sukkot? He said to them: They already said in a similar vein that it is prohibited to count money opposite the Hanukkah light, which proves that one may not use the object of a mitzva for another purpose. Rav Yosef replied in surprise: Master of Abraham! He makes that which was taught dependent upon that which was not taught. As, with regard to sukka, the prohibition to enjoy use of its decorations was taught in a baraita, and the prohibition to enjoy use of the Hanukkah lights was not taught in a baraita at all. As it was taught in a Tosefta in tractate Sukka: With regard to one who roofed the sukka in accordance with its halakhic requirements, and decorated it with colorful curtains and sheets, and hung in it ornamental nuts, peaches, almonds, and pomegranates, and grape branches [parkilei], and wreaths of stalks of grain, wines, oils, and vessels full of flour, it is prohibited to use them until the conclusion of the last day of the Festival. And, if before he hung the decorations he stipulated with regard to them that he will be permitted to use them even during the Festival, everything is according to his stipulation, and he is permitted to use them. In any case, since the prohibition to benefit from the Hanukkah light is not explicitly taught, a proof should not be cited from there to resolve the dilemma with regard to sukka decorations. Rather, Rav Yosef said: There is no need to bring a proof for the halakhot of sukka from the Hanukkah light. Rather, the paradigm of them all is blood. The verse with regard to the covering of the blood of slaughter is the original source from which the prohibition to treat mitzvot with contempt is derived. It was stated in a dispute between amora’im that Rav said: One may not light from one Hanukkah lamp to another lamp. And Shmuel said: One may light in that manner. The Gemara cites additional disputes between Rav and Shmuel. Rav said: One may not untie ritual fringes from one garment in order to affix them to another garment. And Shmuel said: One may untie them from one garment and affix them to another garment. And Rav said: The halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in the case of dragging, as Rabbi Shimon permitted dragging objects on Shabbat, even if, as a result, a furrow would be dug in the ground, as it was not the person’s intent to dig that hole. Shmuel said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in the case of dragging. Abaye said: In all halakhic matters of the Master, Rabba, he conducted himself in accordance with the opinion of Rav, except these three where he conducted himself in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. He ruled: One may light from one Hanukkah lamp to another lamp, and one may untie ritual fringes from garment to garment, and the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in the case of dragging. As it was taught in a baraita, Rabbi Shimon says: A person may drag a bed, chair, and bench on the ground, as long as he does not intend to make a furrow in the ground. Even if a furrow is formed inadvertently, one need not be concerned. One of the Sages sat before Rav Adda bar Ahava, and he sat and said: The reason for the opinion of Rav, who prohibited lighting from one Hanukkah lamp to another, is due to contempt for the mitzva. Using the light for a purpose other than illumination demeans the mitzva of Hanukkah lights. Rav Adda bar Ahava said to his students: Do not listen to him, as the reason for Rav’s opinion is due to the fact that he thereby weakens the mitzva. By lighting from lamp to lamp he slightly diminishes the oil and wick designated for the purpose of the mitzva. The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between them? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is in a case where he lights directly from lamp to lamp, without using a wood chip or another lamp to light the second lamp. According to the one who said that Rav’s reason is due to contempt for the mitzva, directly from lamp to lamp he may even light ab initio, as, by lighting another Hanukkah lamp, he does not thereby demean the sanctity of the mitzva because the second lamp is also a mitzva. According to the one who said that Rav’s reason is because he weakens the mitzva, lighting directly from lamp to lamp is also prohibited, as ultimately he utilizes the mitzva lamp for a task that he could have accomplished with a non-sacred lamp. Rav Avya raised an objection from that which was taught in a Tosefta: A sela of the second tithe, one may not weigh gold dinars with it in order to determine their precise weight. And doing so is prohibited even if he is weighing the coin in order to redeem other second-tithe produce with it, as one may not derive benefit from tithe money. The Gemara discusses this matter: Granted, if you say that when Rav and Shmuel disagree it is with regard to a case when one lights from lamp to lamp, but with a wood chip, Shmuel prohibits lighting, this will not be a conclusive refutation of Shmuel’s opinion. But if you say that he permits lighting from lamp to lamp with a wood chip as well, this would be a conclusive refutation of his opinion, as the Sages did not permit use of and benefit from a sacred object even for the purpose of a similar sacred need. Rabba said: This is not difficult, as in the case of weighing tithe money the Sages prohibited doing so as a decree lest the weights not be precisely equal. One will discover that the weight of the gold dinars is not equal to the weight of the sela that he used to weigh them, and he will reconsider and render them unsanctified, i.e., they will maintain their original, non-sacred status. In that case, he will have used the tithe money for an unsanctified purpose. However, when one lights even a wood chip for the purpose of Hanukkah lights, it is clear that it is for the purpose of performing a mitzva, and there is no reason to issue a decree. Rav Sheshet raised an objection from that which was taught in a baraita. With regard to the Temple candelabrum, it is stated: “Outside the veil of the testimony, in the Tent of Meeting, shall Aaron order it from evening to morning before the Lord continually; it shall be a statute forever throughout your generations” (Leviticus 24:3). It must be understood: And does God require its light for illumination at night? Didn’t the children of Israel, all forty years that they walked in the wilderness, walk exclusively by His light, the pillar of fire? Rather, the lighting of the candelabrum is testimony to mankind that the Divine Presence rests among Israel. The Gemara asks: What is this testimony? Rav said: That is the westernmost lamp in the candelabrum in which the measure of oil placed was the same measure of oil as was placed in the other lamps, and nevertheless he would light the others from it each day and with it he would conclude, i.e., the westernmost lamp would continue burning throughout the day after all the others were extinguished. The rest of the lamps burned only at night, and each night he would relight the rest of the lamps from the westernmost lamp. But isn’t it true that here, in the Temple, since the lamps were fixed in the candelabrum, it was impossible to light directly from lamp to lamp? There was no alternative to taking a wood chip and lighting the rest of the lamps from the westernmost lamp. Consequently, it is difficult both according to the one who said that one may not light from lamp to lamp due to contempt for the mitzva and according to the one who said that one may not light from lamp to lamp due to weakening the mitzva. Rav Pappa explained that it need not necessarily be understood that way. Rather, there were long wicks in the candelabrum, which made it possible to reach and light directly from one lamp to another. However, ultimately, according to the one who said that one may not light from lamp to lamp due to weakening the mitzva, it is difficult. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, the question remains difficult. In summary, the Gemara asks: What is the halakhic conclusion reached about this matter in terms of lighting from lamp to lamp? Rav Huna, son of Rabbi Yehoshua, said: We see; if the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the one who said that kindling the Hanukkah light accomplishes the mitzva and the rest is secondary, one may light from lamp to lamp. The lighting itself is the essence of the mitzva of Hanukkah lights. And if the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the one who said that placing the lit lamp in a suitable place accomplishes the mitzva, then one may not light from lamp to lamp. According to that opinion, lighting is simply an auxiliary action that facilitates the fulfillment of the essence of the mitzva, which is placing the lamp in a place where its light can be seen by the public. Since lighting is merely a preparatory action, one may not demean the mitzva by lighting from lamp to lamp. After the issue of whether lighting accomplishes the mitzva or placing accomplishes the mitzva was raised in the context of the previous discussion, the Gemara cites the discussion in its entirety. As a dilemma was raised before the Sages: In the case of the Hanukkah light, does lighting accomplish the mitzva, and placing the lit lamp is simply a continuation of that action, or does placing the kindled lamp accomplish the mitzva, and lighting is simply a practical necessity that facilitates placing the lamp? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a solution to this dilemma from that which Rava said: One who was holding a burning Hanukkah lamp in his hand and standing, he did nothing in terms of fulfilling the mitzva. Conclude from this that placing accomplishes the mitzva. Until he sets the lamp down in its appropriate place, he did not fulfill the mitzva. The Gemara rejects this: There, they said that he did not fulfill his obligation for a different reason. One who sees it will say that he is not holding the lamp in order to fulfill the mitzva, but he is holding it for his own needs. Since holding the lamp can mislead onlookers, he does not fulfill the mitzva in that manner. Come and hear another resolution for this dilemma from that which Rava said: One who lights the Hanukkah lamp inside the house and then takes it out and places it at the entrance to his house did nothing in terms of fulfilling the mitzva. Granted, if you say that lighting accomplishes the mitzva it is understandable, as lighting in its place is required. That is why Rava ruled that he did nothing in terms of fulfilling the mitzva. However, if you say that placing accomplishes the mitzva, why did Rava rule that he did nothing? Didn’t he set it down in its appropriate place? The Gemara answers: There too, even though he subsequently brought it outside, one who sees him lighting inside will say to himself that he is lighting the lamp for his own needs and not in fulfillment of the mitzva. Come and hear another resolution from that which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: A lantern that continued to burn the entire day of Shabbat, at the conclusion of Shabbat one extinguishes it and lights it again as a Hanukkah light. Granted, if you say that lighting accomplishes the mitzva, the requirement to extinguish the lantern and relight it in order to fulfill the mitzva of kindling the Hanukkah light works out well. However, if you say that placing accomplishes the mitzva, this statement, which stated that one extinguishes it and lights it, is imprecise. According to this opinion, it needed to say: One extinguishes it and lifts it from its place and sets it down and lights it, as only by placing the lamp in an appropriate place could one fulfill the mitzva of the Hanukkah light. Furthermore, there is additional proof that lighting accomplishes the mitzva. From the fact that we recite the following blessing over the mitzva of kindling the Hanukkah light: Who has made us holy through His commandments and has commanded us to light the Hanukkah light, the Gemara suggests: Conclude from this that lighting accomplishes the mitzva, as it is over lighting that one recites the blessing. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, conclude from this. And, the Gemara remarks, now that we say that lighting accomplishes the mitzva, there are practical ramifications. If a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, all of whom are of limited intellectual capacity and not obligated in mitzvot, kindled the Hanukkah light, he did nothing in terms of fulfilling the mitzva, even if an adult obligated in mitzvot subsequently set it down in its appropriate place. That is because placing a lit lamp does not constitute fulfillment of the mitzva. The lighting must be performed by a person with full intellectual capacity, obligated in mitzvot. However, a woman certainly may light, as Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: Women are obligated in lighting the Hanukkah light, as they too were included in that miracle of being saved from the decree of persecution. Rav Sheshet said: A guest is obligated in lighting the Hanukkah light in the place where he is being hosted. The Gemara relates that Rabbi Zeira said: At first, when I was studying in the yeshiva, I would participate with perutot, copper coins, together with the host [ushpiza], so that I would be a partner in the light that he kindled. After I married my wife, I said: Now I certainly need not do so because they light on my behalf in my house. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: All the oils are suitable for the Hanukkah lamp, and olive oil is the most select of the oils. Abaye said: At first, my Master, Rabba, would seek sesame oil, as he said: The light of sesame oil lasts longer and does not burn as quickly as olive oil. Once he heard that statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, he sought olive oil because he said: Its light is clearer. On a similar note, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: All the oils are suitable for making ink, and olive oil is the most select. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What was Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi’s intention: Did he mean that olive oil is the most select in terms of being the best for use to mix and knead with the soot produced from a fire in manufacturing ink; or did he mean for use to smoke, i.e., burning olive oil to produce smoke is the most select method of producing the soot used in manufacturing ink? Come and hear a resolution to this from that which Rav Shmuel bar Zutrei taught: All oils are suitable for ink, and olive oil is the most select, both to knead and to smoke. Rav Shmuel bar Zutra taught it this way: All types of smoke are good for ink, and olive oil is the most select. Similarly, Rav Huna said: All saps are good for strengthening the ink compound, and balsam sap is the best of all. Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rav said: One who lights a Hanukkah light must recite a blessing. And Rabbi Yirmeya said: One who sees a burning Hanukkah light must recite a blessing because the mitzva is not only to kindle the light but to see the light as well. Therefore, there is room to recite a blessing even when seeing them. Rav Yehuda said: On the first day of Hanukkah, the one who sees burning lights recites two blessings, and the one who lights recites three blessings. From there on, from the second day of Hanukkah, the one who lights recites two blessings, and the one who sees recites one blessing. The Gemara asks: What blessing does he omit on the other days? The Gemara answers: He omits the blessing of time: Who has given us life, sustained us, and brought us to this time. The Gemara asks: And let us omit the blessing of the miracle: Who has performed miracles. The Gemara answers: The miracle is relevant on all of the days, whereas the blessing: Who has given us life, is only pertinent to the first time he performs the mitzva each year. And what blessing does one recite? He recites: Who has made us holy through His commandments and has commanded us to light the Hanukkah light. The Gemara asks: And where did He command us? The mitzva of Hanukkah is not mentioned in the Torah, so how is it possible to say that it was commanded to us by God? The Gemara answers that Rav Avya said: The obligation to recite this blessing is derived from the verse: “You shall not turn aside from the sentence which they shall declare unto you, to the right, nor to the left” (Deuteronomy 17:11). From this verse, the mitzva incumbent upon all of Israel to heed the statements and decrees of the Sages is derived. Therefore, one who fulfills their directives fulfills a divine commandment. Rav Neḥemya said that the mitzva to heed the voice of the Elders of Israel is derived from the verse: “Ask your father, and he will declare unto you, your Elders, and they will tell you” (Deuteronomy 32:7). Rav Amram raised an objection from that which we learned in a mishna: With regard to doubtfully tithed produce [demai], i.e., grain that was acquired from an am ha’aretz about which there is uncertainty whether or not he tithed it; one may use it to establish an eiruv, i.e., joining of courtyards and joining of borders, and to establish the merging of alleys, and one recites a blessing before and after eating it, and one invites a quorum for recitation of Grace after Meals after eating it. Although the Sages said that one is required to separate tithes from demai, they allowed it to be used for specific purposes and in exigent circumstances. And they said that one may separate the tithe from demai when he is naked and at dusk Shabbat eve, a time when separating tithes from actual untithed produce [tevel] is prohibited. And if you say that every action instituted by rabbinic ordinance requires a blessing, as fulfillment of rabbinic ordinances is based on the mitzva: You shall not turn aside, here, when he stands naked, how can he recite a blessing? Don’t we require fulfillment of the mitzva: “Therefore shall your camp be holy; that He see no unseemly thing in you, and turn away from you” (Deuteronomy 23:15)? And the camp is not holy when one recites a blessing in a state of nakedness. Abaye said: There is room to distinguish between the cases: In a case where there is a definite mitzva by rabbinic law, a blessing is required. In a case where there is a rabbinic ordinance instituted due to uncertainty with regard to the circumstances, as in the case of demai, which may or may not have been tithed already, a blessing is not required. The Gemara asks: Isn’t the second day of a Festival in the Diaspora a rabbinic ordinance instituted due to uncertainty whether the first day or the second is the actual Festival, and nevertheless a blessing is required? On the second day of the Festival one recites the same blessings as he does on the first. The Gemara answers: There, in the case of the second day of the Festival, the reason that blessings are required is so that people will not treat it with contempt. If Festival blessings were not required on the second day of the Festival, people would take its sanctity lightly. Rava said another reason: Demai is not considered to be an ordinance instituted by the Sages due to uncertainty. In fact, in most cases, an am ha’aretz tithes. The concern lest they do not tithe is not a full-fledged case of uncertainty. It is merely a case of suspicion for which the Sages did not institute a blessing. That is not the case with regard to the second day of a Festival. Even though it was instituted due to uncertainty, one must recite the Festival blessings. Since it was instituted by the Sages, one is obligated to recite a blessing just as he recites blessings for other rabbinic ordinances.

The Sages taught in a baraita: One recites the benediction of the grooms in the house of the grooms, when the bride enters into the wedding canopy. Rabbi Yehuda said: One recites it even in the house of the betrothal, at the time of the betrothal. Abaye said: And the Sages taught the statement of Rabbi Yehuda in Judea because there the custom was that the groom be secluded with his betrothed, leading to the concern lest he engage in conjugal relations with her. Therefore, the blessing is recited already at that stage. It is taught in another baraita: One recites the benediction of the grooms in the house of the grooms, and the benediction of the betrothal in the house of the betrothal. With regard to the benediction of the betrothal, what formula does one recite? Ravin bar Rav Adda and Rabba bar Rav Adda both said in the name of Rav Yehuda: Blessed are You, Lord our God, King of the universe, Who sanctified us through His mitzvot, and commanded us concerning the forbidden relatives, and prohibited to us those women who are betrothed, and permitted to us those women who are married by means of the wedding canopy and betrothal. Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, concludes the blessing in the name of Rav Yehuda: Blessed are You, Lord, Who sanctifies Israel by means of the wedding canopy and betrothal. One who does not conclude the benediction of the betrothal in accordance with the opinion of Rav Aḥa, but instead recites it without a concluding blessing, deems the formula of this blessing just as the formula is in the blessing recited over fruits and the blessing recited over mitzvot, in which the words: Blessed are You, Lord, appear only at the beginning of the blessing. And one who concludes the benediction of the betrothal in accordance with the opinion of Rav Aḥa, deems the formula of this blessing just as the formula is in the blessing of kiddush, in which the words: Blessed are You, Lord, appears both at the beginning and the conclusion of the blessing. § The Sages taught: One recites the benediction of the grooms in a quorum of ten men all seven days of the wedding celebration. Rav Yehuda said: And that is the case only when new faces who did not previously participate in the festivities came to join the celebration. The Gemara asks: What blessings does one recite? Rav Yehuda said that these are the seven blessings: Blessed are You, Lord our God, King of the universe, Who has created all for His glory. And the second blessing is: Blessed are You…Creator of mankind. And the third blessing is: Blessed are You…Who made humanity in His image, in the image of the likeness of His form, and out of His very self formed a building (see Genesis 2:22) for eternity. Blessed are You, Lord, Creator of mankind. The fourth blessing is: May the barren city of Jerusalem greatly rejoice and delight with the ingathering of her children within her in joy. Blessed are You, Lord, Who gladdens Zion through her children. The fifth blessing is: Bring great joy to these loving friends, as You gave joy to Your creations in Eden in ancient times. Blessed are You, Lord, Who brings joy to the groom and bride. The sixth blessing is: Blessed are You, Lord our God, King of the universe, Who has created joy and gladness, groom and bride, delight, exultation, happiness, jubilation, love and brotherhood, and peace and friendship. Soon, Lord our God, may there be heard in the cities of Judea and in the streets of Jerusalem the sound of joy and the sound of gladness, the sound of the groom and the sound of the bride, the joyous sound of grooms from their wedding canopy and of young people from their feast of song (see Jeremiah 33:11). Blessed are You, Lord, Who makes the groom rejoice with the bride. Together with the blessing over the wine, these are the seven wedding blessings. The Gemara relates: Levi happened to come to the house of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi during the wedding celebration of Rabbi Shimon, his son, and recited five of these blessings. Rav Asi happened to come to the house of Rav Ashi during the wedding celebration of Mar, his son, and recited six of these blessings. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that they disagree about this: One Sage holds: It was one act of creation with which man was created. And one Sage holds: It was two acts of creation with which man was created. The first opinion, that there was one act of creation, is based on the concept that man was created with two sides, one male and one female. There was no additional act of creation. Man and woman were subsequently separated into two independent beings. Therefore, there is no need for the two blessings: Who created mankind, and: Who created mankind in His image. The second opinion is that there were in fact two separate acts of creation. Therefore, it is appropriate to recite two blessings with regard to the creation of mankind. The Gemara rejects that suggestion: No, everyone agrees that it was only one act of creation. However, one Sage holds: It is according to the initial thought that we proceed. And one Sage holds: It is according to the action that we proceed. God’s initial thought was to create man and woman as separate entities. Ultimately, they were created as one entity. That explanation is like the following. Rav Yehuda raises a contradiction. In one verse it is written: “And God created man in His own image” (Genesis 1:27), indicating one act of creation, and in another verse it is written: “Male and female He created them” (Genesis 5:2), indicating two acts. How can this apparent contradiction be resolved? Initially, the thought entered God’s mind to create two, but ultimately only one was actually created. The Gemara relates: Rav Ashi happened to come to the house of Rav Kahana to attend a wedding. The first day he recited all seven blessings. From that point forward, if there were new faces present, he recited all the blessings, and if not, he would say: It is merely an extension of the original celebration, and he would recite the blessing: In Whose dwelling is joy, in the zimmun prior to Grace after Meals, and the sixth blessing after Grace after Meals: Who has created. § Apropos the wedding blessings, the Gemara continues: From seven days after the wedding until the thirtieth day, whether the groom said to the guests that he is inviting them due to the wedding celebration or whether he did not say to them that he is inviting them due to the wedding celebration, he recites the blessing: In Whose dwelling is joy. From this point, thirty days after the wedding, forward, if he said to them that he is inviting them due to the wedding celebration [hillula], he recites the blessing: In Whose dwelling is joy, and if not, he doesn’t. The Gemara asks: And when the groom said to them that he is inviting them due to the wedding celebration, until when is this blessing recited? Rav Pappi said in the name of Rava: Until twelve months of the year have passed since the wedding. Since his legal status remains that of a groom, the blessing: In Whose dwelling is joy, may be recited. The Gemara asks: And initially, prior to the wedding, from when is that blessing recited? Rav Pappa said: From when they cast barley into the mortar to prepare beer for the wedding. The Gemara asks: Is that so? But didn’t Rav Pappa, involve himself in preparations for the wedding of his son, Abba Mar, and begin reciting the blessing from the time of betrothal? Rav Pappa is different, because the wedding preparations had already been prepared for him, and it was merely a matter of waiting for the designated time to arrive. Therefore, the wedding celebration began for him from the time of betrothal. The Gemara relates: Ravina arranged for his son to marry a woman from the house of Rav Ḥaviva and recited the blessing from the time of betrothal. He said: I am certain with regard to them, that they will not retract their commitment and terminate the betrothal, and the wedding will take place on time. Nevertheless, the matter was not to be, and ultimately they retracted their commitment, and the wedding was canceled. The Gemara relates: Rav Taḥlifa, from the West, i.e., Eretz Yisrael, happened to come to Babylonia, and he elaborated on the themes of the wedding blessings and recited six long blessings. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is not in accordance with his opinion. Rather, one must adhere to the formula coined by the Sages.

MISHNA: One may perform all of the needs of the dead on Shabbat. One may smear oil on the body and rinse it with water, and all of this is permitted provided that one does not move any of its limbs, which would constitute a violation of the laws of set-aside objects. When necessary, one may also remove a pillow from beneath it and thereby place it on cold sand in order to delay its decomposition. Similarly, one may tie the jaw of a corpse that is in the process of opening. One may not move it directly so that it will rise back to its original position, but so that it will not continue to open. And similarly, if one has a roof beam that has broken on Shabbat, one may support it with a bench or with long poles from a bed. One may not move it so that the beam will rise back to its original place, but so that it will not continue to fall. GEMARA: The Gemara questions the mishna’s lenient ruling with regard to smearing oil on a corpse: But didn’t Rav Yehuda say that Shmuel said: There was an incident with a student of Rabbi Meir who followed him into the bathhouse on Shabbat. The student wanted to rinse the ground. Rabbi Meir said to him: One may not rinse on Shabbat. The student wanted to smear the ground with oil. Rabbi Meir said to him: One may not smear on Shabbat. This indicates that it is prohibited to rinse or smear anything that may not be moved on Shabbat. The Gemara responds: The ground in one place can be confused with the ground in another place, and the Sages therefore prohibited these activities even on a tiled floor, such as that of a bathhouse, due to a concern that one may come to do so on a dirt floor and smooth it out. However, a corpse cannot be confused with the ground, and it is therefore permitted to rinse a corpse and smear it with oil. We learned in the mishna that one may attend to all the needs of the dead on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: What does the word all include in the mishna’s ruling that one may have thought is not included? The Gemara answers: It is meant to include that which the Sages taught: One may bring cold vessels and metal vessels and place them on the corpse’s stomach so that it does not swell. And one may seal up its orifices so that air will not enter them and cause swelling. And King Solomon also said in his wisdom with regard to old age and death: “Before the silver cord is snapped asunder, and the golden bowl is shattered, and the pitcher is broken at the fountain, and the wheel falls, shattered, into the pit” (Ecclesiastes 12:6), which the Gemara explains as follows: “Before the silver cord is snapped asunder”; this is a reference to the spinal cord. “And the golden bowl [gullat] is shattered”; this is a reference to the member, which is like a spring of water [gulla]. “And the pitcher is broken at the fountain”; this is a reference to the stomach, which looks like a pitcher that swells and ruptures. “And the wheel [galgal] falls, shattered, into the pit”; this is a reference to excrement [gelalim]. And similarly, it says in the verse: “And I will spread dung upon your faces, even the dung of your Festival offerings” (Malachi 2:3). Rav Huna said, and some say that it was Rav Ḥagga who said: This verse is referring to those people who neglect the words of the Torah and turn all of their days into Festivals. Rabbi Levi said that Rav Pappi said that Rabbi Yehoshua said: Three days after death, the stomach of the dead bursts and falls onto his face and says to him: Take what you have put inside me. MISHNA: One may not shut the eyes of the dead on Shabbat because the body is set-aside. And one may not shut the eyes even on a weekday while the soul departs. One must wait until the person has died. And one who shuts the eyes while the soul departs is a murderer because he has hastened the person’s death. GEMARA: The Sages taught: One who shuts a person’s eyes while the soul departs is a murderer. This is analogous to a lamp that is gradually becoming extinguished but could continue to burn a little longer. If a person places his finger on it, it is immediately extinguished. It was taught in a baraita that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: One who wants the eyes of a corpse to close should blow wine up its nose, and place oil between its eyelids, and grab hold of its two big toes, and its eyes will shut by themselves. Incidental to the Gemara’s discussion of corpses, it cites that which was taught in a baraita: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: For a living day-old baby, one desecrates Shabbat to save his life. Yet for the deceased David, king of Israel, one does not desecrate Shabbat. For a day-old baby we desecrate Shabbat because the Torah says: Desecrate one Shabbat for him so that he can observe many Shabbatot. But for the deceased David, king of Israel, one does not desecrate Shabbat, as once a person dies he is idle from mitzvot. And this is what Rabbi Yoḥanan said with regard to the verse: “Set apart among the dead [bametim ḥofshi], like the slain that lie in the grave, whom You remember no more” (Psalms 88:6). Once a person dies, he becomes free [ḥofshi] from the mitzvot. And it was also taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said: It is not necessary to protect a live day-old baby from a weasel or from mice, for they run away from the baby. But if Og, the king of Bashan, is dead, it is necessary to protect even him from a weasel or from mice, as it is stated: “And the fear of you and the dread of you [ḥittekhem] shall be upon every beast of the earth, and upon every bird of the heavens” (Genesis 9:2). The Gemara explains: As long as a person is alive [ḥai], he is feared by the animals. Once he dies, he is no longer feared.

Previously, the Gemara discussed suffering that results from one’s transgressions. The Gemara shifts the focus and discusses suffering that does not result from one’s transgressions and the suffering of the righteous. Rava, and some say Rav Ḥisda, said: If a person sees that suffering has befallen him, he should examine his actions. Generally, suffering comes about as punishment for one’s transgressions, as it is stated: “We will search and examine our ways, and return to God” (Lamentations 3:40). If he examined his ways and found no transgression for which that suffering is appropriate, he may attribute his suffering to dereliction in the study of Torah. God punishes an individual for dereliction in the study of Torah in order to emphasize the gravity of the issue, as it is stated: “Happy is the man whom You punish, Lord, and teach out of Your law” (Psalms 94:12). This verse teaches us that his suffering will cause him to return to Your law. And if he did attribute his suffering to dereliction in the study of Torah, and did not find this to be so, he may be confident that these are afflictions of love, as it is stated: “For whom the Lord loves, He rebukes, as does a father the son in whom he delights” (Proverbs 3:12). So too, Rava said that Rav Seḥora said that Rav Huna said: Anyone in whom the Holy One, Blessed be He, delights, He oppresses him with suffering, as it is stated: “Yet in whom the Lord delights, He oppresses him with disease; to see if his soul would offer itself in guilt, that he might see his children, lengthen his days, and that the desire of the Lord might prosper by his hand” (Isaiah 53:10). This verse illustrates that in whomever God delights, he afflicts with illness. I might have thought that God delights in him even if he does not accept his suffering with love. Therefore the verse teaches: “If his soul would offer itself in guilt.” Just as a guilt-offering is brought knowingly, as it is one of the sacrifices offered willingly, without coercion, so too his suffering must be accepted knowingly. And if one accepts that suffering with love, what is his reward? As the second part of the verse states: “That he might see his children, lengthen his days.” Moreover, in addition to these earthly rewards, his Torah study will endure and his Torah study will be successful, as it is stated: “The purpose of the Lord,” the Torah, the revelation of God’s will, “might prosper by his hand.” With regard to the acceptance of affliction with love and what exactly this entails, Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi and Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina disagree. One of them said: Afflictions of love are any that do not cause dereliction in the study of Torah, i.e., any which do not afflict his body to the extent that he is unable to study Torah, as it is stated: “Happy is the man whom You afflict, Lord, and teach from Your Torah.” Afflictions of love are when You “teach from Your Torah.” And one said: Afflictions of love are any that do not cause dereliction in the recitation of prayer, as it is stated: “Blessed is God Who did not turn away my prayer” (Psalms 66:20). Despite his suffering, the afflicted is still capable of praying to God. Rabbi Abba, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, said: My father, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said as follows: Both, even afflictions that cause dereliction in the study of Torah and those that cause dereliction in the recitation of prayer, are afflictions of love, as with regard to one who suffers without transgression it is stated: “For whom He loves, He rebukes,” and inability to study Torah and to pray are among his afflictions. What then, is the meaning when the verse states: “And teach him from Your Torah”? Do not read and teach to mean and teach him, rather, and teach us. You teach us the value of this affliction from Your Torah. This is taught through an a fortiori inference from the law concerning the tooth and eye of a slave: The tooth and eye are each a single limb of a person and if his master damages either, the slave thereby obtains his freedom; suffering that cleanses a person’s entire body all the more so that one attains freedom, atonement, from his sins. And that is the statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, as Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: The word covenant is used with regard to salt, and the word covenant is used with regard to afflictions. The word covenant is used with regard to salt, as it is written: “The salt of the covenant with your God should not be excluded from your meal-offering; with all your sacrifices you must offer salt” (Leviticus 2:13). And the word covenant is used with regard to afflictions, as it is written: “These are the words of the covenant” (Deuteronomy 28:69). Just as, in the covenant mentioned with regard to salt, the salt sweetens the taste of the meat and renders it edible, so too in the covenant mentioned with regard to suffering, the suffering cleanses a person’s transgressions, purifying him for a more sublime existence. Additionally, it was taught in a baraita with regard to affliction: Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says: The Holy One, Blessed be He, gave Israel three precious gifts, all of which were given only by means of suffering, which purified Israel so that they may merit to receive them. These gifts are: Torah, Eretz Yisrael, and the World-to-Come. From where is it derived that Torah is only acquired by means of suffering? As it is said: “Happy is the man whom You afflict, Lord,” after which it is said: “And teach from Your Torah.” Eretz Yisrael, as it is written: “As a man rebukes his son, so the Lord your God rebukes you” (Deuteronomy 8:5), and it is written thereafter: “For the Lord your God will bring you to a good land.” The World-to-Come, as it is written: “For the mitzva is a lamp, the Torah is light, and the reproofs of instruction are the way of life” (Proverbs 6:23). One may arrive at the lamp of mitzva and the light of Torah that exists in the World-to-Come only by means of the reproofs of instruction in this world. A tanna taught the following baraita before Rabbi Yoḥanan: If one engages in Torah and acts of charity and buries his sons, all his transgressions are forgiven. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: What is your source for this? Granted, if one engages in Torah and acts of charity, his transgressions are forgiven, as it is written: “With mercy and truth, iniquity is expiated” (Proverbs 16:6); mercy refers to acts of charity, as it is stated: “He who pursues charity and mercy finds life, charity and honor” (Proverbs 21:21), mercy and charity are listed together. And truth refers to Torah, as it is stated: “Buy truth and do not sell it; also wisdom, guidance and understanding” (Proverbs 23:23). However, from where is it derived that the transgressions of one who buries his sons are also forgiven? An answer was provided to Rabbi Yoḥanan when a certain elder taught him in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Yoḥai: This conclusion is derived from a verbal analogy between the words iniquity and iniquity. Here, it is written: “With mercy and truth, iniquity is expiated,” and there it is written: “He repays the iniquity of the fathers onto the bosom of their children” (Jeremiah 32:18). Because he “repays the iniquity of the fathers onto the bosom of their children,” the father’s transgressions are forgiven. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Leprosy and suffering due to children are not afflictions of love. The Gemara asks: Is leprosy not an affliction of love? Didn’t we learn in a baraita: If one has any of the four signs of leprosy (Leviticus 13) they are nothing other than an altar of atonement? The Gemara answers: Although the signs of leprosy are an altar of atonement for one’s transgressions, they are not an affliction of love. And if you wish, say instead: This baraita, which says that leprosy is an affliction of love, is for us in Babylonia, because outside of Eretz Yisrael we are not as careful of the laws of ritual impurity, and one afflicted with leprosy may interact with others, mitigating his suffering. And that statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan, that leprosy is not an affliction of love, is for them in Eretz Yisrael, where they are exceedingly careful of the laws of ritual impurity and the suffering of a leper is great because he is banished from society (Rav Hai Gaon). And if you wish, say instead: This baraita, which says that leprosy is an affliction of love, refers to concealed leprosy that only strikes the concealed areas of one’s body. But that statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan refers to visible leprosy that causes those who see it to distance themselves from the leper. The Gemara continues to object: And suffering due to children is not an affliction of love? The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances? If you say that he had children and they died, didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan himself say, while consoling the victim of a catastrophe: This is the bone of my tenth son? Rabbi Yoḥanan experienced the death of ten of his children, and he kept a small bone from his tenth child as a painful memorial. He would show that bone to others in order to console them, and since he showed it to them, the deaths of his children must certainly have been affliction of love. He consoled others by displaying that there is an element of intimacy with God that exists in that suffering (Tosafot). Why, then, would Rabbi Yoḥanan have said that suffering due to children is not afflictions of love? Rather, one must conclude that when Rabbi Yoḥanan said that those afflictions are not afflictions of love, he was speaking with regard to one who has no children, and when one had children who died, this could very well be considered afflictions of love. The Gemara continues to address the issue of suffering and affliction: Rabbi Yoḥanan’s student, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, fell ill. Rabbi Yoḥanan entered to visit him, and said to him: Is your suffering dear to you? Do you desire to be ill and afflicted? Rabbi Ḥiyya said to him: I welcome neither this suffering nor its reward, as one who welcomes this suffering with love is rewarded. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Give me your hand. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba gave him his hand, and Rabbi Yoḥanan stood him up and restored him to health. Similarly, Rabbi Yoḥanan fell ill. Rabbi Ḥanina entered to visit him, and said to him: Is your suffering dear to you? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: I welcome neither this suffering nor its reward. Rabbi Ḥanina said to him: Give me your hand. He gave him his hand, and Rabbi Ḥanina stood him up and restored him to health. The Gemara asks: Why did Rabbi Yoḥanan wait for Rabbi Ḥanina to restore him to health? If he was able to heal his student, let Rabbi Yoḥanan stand himself up. The Gemara answers, they say: A prisoner cannot generally free himself from prison, but depends on others to release him from his shackles. The Gemara relates that Rabbi Elazar, another of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s students, fell ill. Rabbi Yoḥanan entered to visit him, and saw that he was lying in a dark room. Rabbi Yoḥanan exposed his arm, and light radiated from his flesh, filling the house. He saw that Rabbi Elazar was crying, and said to him: Why are you crying? Thinking that his crying was over the suffering that he endured throughout his life, Rabbi Yoḥanan attempted to comfort him: If you are weeping because you did not study as much Torah as you would have liked, we learned: One who brings a substantial sacrifice and one who brings a meager sacrifice have equal merit, as long as he directs his heart toward Heaven. If you are weeping because you lack sustenance and are unable to earn a livelihood, as Rabbi Elazar was, indeed, quite poor, not every person merits to eat off of two tables, one of wealth and one of Torah, so you need not bemoan the fact that you are not wealthy. If you are crying over children who have died, this is the bone of my tenth son, and suffering of that kind afflicts great people, and they are afflictions of love. Rabbi Elazar said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: I am not crying over my misfortune, but rather, over this beauty of yours that will decompose in the earth, as Rabbi Yoḥanan’s beauty caused him to consider human mortality. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Over this, it is certainly appropriate to weep. Both cried over the fleeting nature of beauty in the world and death that eventually overcomes all. Meanwhile, Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Is your suffering dear to you? Rabbi Elazar said to him: I welcome neither this suffering nor its reward. Upon hearing this, Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Give me your hand. Rabbi Elazar gave him his hand, and Rabbi Yoḥanan stood him up and restored him to health. The Gemara relates another story regarding acknowledgement of the justice of divine punishment: Four hundred barrels of Rav Huna’s wine fermented and turned into vinegar, causing him great financial loss.
Rav Yehuda, the brother of Rav Sala the Pious, along with the Sages, and some say Rav Adda bar Ahava, along with the Sages, entered to visit him, and said: The Master should examine his actions, as perhaps he committed a transgression for which he is being punished.
Rav Huna said to them: Am I suspect in your eyes? Have I committed a transgression on account of which you advise me to examine my behavior?
They said to him: Is the Holy One, Blessed be He, suspect that He exacts punishment without justice? Your loss was certainly just, and you must examine your conduct to find out why. The Sages were aware of a flaw in Rav Huna’s conduct, to which they alluded (Tosafot). Rav Huna said to them: If someone has heard something improper that I have done, let him say so. They said to him: We have heard that the Master does not give a share of his grapevines to his tenant farmers. A tenant farmer is entitled to a portion of the crop grown on his landlord’s property, as well as a share of the vines planted during a given year. Rav Huna said to them: Does this tenant farmer leave me anything from the produce that he grows on my property? He steals it all. Consequently, in denying him his share of the grapevines I am simply recouping that which was stolen from me by this tenant farmer. They said to him: That is the meaning of the folk saying: One who steals from a thief has a taste of theft. Despite the fact that the property was stolen to begin with, one nevertheless engages in theft. Although he did not violate a prohibition per se, it is still a form of theft, and one who is held to a higher standard than others will be punished for it.
He said to them: I accept upon myself to give my tenant farmer his portion in the future.
Thereupon, as a result of Rav Huna’s repentance, God restored his loss. Some say his vinegar turned back into wine, and some say that the price of vinegar rose and it was sold at the price of wine.

Mishnah : One is forbidden to cook any kind of flesh in milk except fish and locusts. And one is forbidden to bring [the flesh] up onto the table with cheese, except fish and locusts.

The Sages taught in a baraita: With regard to a convert who was circumcised but did not immerse, Rabbi Eliezer says that this is a convert, as so we found with our forefathers following the exodus from Egypt that they were circumcised but were not immersed. With regard to one who immersed but was not circumcised, Rabbi Yehoshua says that this is a convert, as so we found with our foremothers that they immersed but were not circumcised. And the Rabbis say: Whether he immersed but was not circumcised or whether he was circumcised but did not immerse, he is not a convert until he is circumcised and he immerses. The Gemara questions the opinions in the baraita: But let Rabbi Yehoshua also derive what is required for conversion from our forefathers; why didn’t he do so? And let Rabbi Eliezer also derive the halakha from our foremothers; why didn’t he do so? And if you would say that Rabbi Eliezer did not derive the halakha from our foremothers because he holds one cannot derive the possible from the impossible, i.e., one cannot derive that men do not require circumcision from the halakha that women do not require it, because for women it is a physical impossibility, that claim may be refuted. It would appear that Rabbi Eliezer does not accept that principle, as isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: From where is it derived with regard to the Paschal lamb brought throughout the generations that it may be brought only from non-sacred animals? A Paschal lamb is stated in the Torah in reference to the lamb that the Jewish people brought prior to the exodus from Egypt, and a Paschal lamb is stated in reference to the yearly obligation throughout the generations. The association between them teaches that just as the Paschal lamb stated in reference to Egypt was only brought from non-sacred animals, since prior to the giving of the Torah there was no possibility to consecrate property, so too, with regard to the Paschal lamb stated in reference to the obligation throughout the generations, it may be brought only from non-sacred animals. Rabbi Akiva said to him: But can one derive the possible, i.e., the halakha for the Paschal lamb throughout the generations, where a possibility exists to bring it from consecrated animals, from the impossible, i.e., from the Paschal lamb in Egypt, where it was not a possibility? Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Although it was impossible to bring the Paschal lamb in Egypt from consecrated animals, nevertheless, it is still a great proof, and we may learn from it. It is apparent, then, that Rabbi Eliezer holds that one can derive the possible from the impossible. Therefore the original question stands: Why didn’t Rabbi Eliezer derive from the foremothers that circumcision is not essential for conversion? The Gemara concedes: Rather, the baraita must be reinterpreted as follows: With regard to one who immersed but was not circumcised, everyone, i.e., both Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer, agrees that the halakha is derived from the foremothers that immersion alone is effective. Where they disagree is with regard to one who was circumcised but had not immersed; Rabbi Eliezer derives that it is effective from the forefathers, and Rabbi Yehoshua disagrees because he maintains that in the conversion of the forefathers there was also an immersion. The Gemara asks: From where did he derive this? If we say that he derived it from the fact that it is written that in preparation for the revelation at Sinai, God commanded Moses: “Go unto the people and sanctify them today and tomorrow, and let them wash their garments” (Exodus 19:10), as Rabbi Yehoshua understands that the washing mentioned in this verse is the ritual immersion of clothes, this leads to the following a fortiori inference: Just as in a case where one became impure through contact with some source of impurity, washing, i.e., immersion, of clothes is not required but immersion of one’s body is required, then in a case where washing of clothes is required, as in the preparation for the revelation at Sinai, isn’t it logical that immersion of one’s body should also be required? The Gemara rejects the proof: But perhaps when the verse states that they had to wash their clothes, it was merely for cleanliness and not for the sake of ritual purity. If so, no a fortiori inference can be drawn from it to the case of immersion for ritual purity. Rather, Rabbi Yehoshua derived it from here, where the verse states with regard to the formation of the covenant at Sinai: “And Moses took the blood and sprinkled it upon the people” (Exodus 24:8), and it is learned as a tradition that there is no ritual sprinkling without immersion. Therefore, our forefathers also must have immersed at Sinai, and consequently that is also an essential requirement for all conversions. The Gemara asks: And with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, from where do we derive that also in the case of our foremothers there was immersion? The Gemara answers: It is based on logical reasoning, as, if so, that they did not immerse, then with what were they brought under the wings of the Divine Presence? Therefore, they also must have immersed. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A man is never considered a convert until he is both circumcised and has immersed. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious? In all disputes between an individual Sage and many Sages the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the many Sages; it is therefore obvious that the halakha is in accordance with the Rabbis. The Gemara explains: Who are the Rabbis referred to in the baraita? It is Rabbi Yosei. Since Rabbi Yosei is merely an individual Sage, it was necessarily for Rabbi Yoḥanan to state explicitly that the halakha is ruled in accordance with his opinion. Rabbi Yosei’s opinion is as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to a convert who came and said: I was circumcised for the sake of conversion but I did not immerse, the court should immerse him, as what would be the problem with that; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Since in any case the court immerses him, Rabbi Yehuda does not require proof of the convert’s claim that he was circumcised for the sake of conversion because he holds that it is sufficient to be either circumcised or immersed for the sake of conversion. Rabbi Yosei says: The court does not immerse him. He holds that both circumcision and immersion must be performed specifically for the sake of conversion and are indispensable parts of the conversion process. Therefore, since it is impossible to verify the convert’s claim with regard to his circumcision, there is no benefit to having him immerse. The baraita states a ramification of their dispute: Therefore, the court may immerse a convert who was already circumcised on Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Since he holds that circumcision alone effected conversion, the immersion will not effect any further change in his status, and so it is permitted on Shabbat. And Rabbi Yosei says: The court may not immerse him. Since he holds that both circumcision and immersion are necessary to effect a conversion, the immersion will effect a change in his status by making him Jewish. Therefore it is prohibited to do so on Shabbat by rabbinic decree, because it appears similar to preparing a vessel for use. The Gemara analyzes the latter clause: The Master said in the baraita: Therefore, the court may immerse a convert who was already circumcised on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this an obvious extension of his opinion; since Rabbi Yehuda said that either one of circumcision or immersion is sufficient, where a convert was circumcised in our presence the court may certainly immerse him, even on Shabbat. What, then, is the need for the baraita to include the clause that begins with: Therefore? The Gemara explains: It is necessary to explicitly teach this ramification lest you say that according to Rabbi Yehuda the immersion is in fact the principal act that effects conversion, and when he said in the first clause that a convert who claims to have been circumcised should be immersed since there is no problem with that, his reasoning was that he holds it is only immersion that effects the conversion. And therefore performing the immersion on Shabbat would not be permitted, as it establishes the person with a new status and so would be prohibited by a rabbinic decree because it appears similar to preparing a vessel for use. The latter clause is therefore necessary to teach us that Rabbi Yehuda requires either this or that, i.e., either immersion or circumcision alone is sufficient to effect a conversion. The Gemara analyzes the next statement in the baraita: Rabbi Yosei says: The court may not immerse him. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this an obvious extension of his opinion? As, since Rabbi Yosei requires two acts, both circumcision and immersion, to effect conversion, we may certainly not establish that person with a new status on Shabbat by completing his conversion by immersing him. The Gemara explains: It is necessary to explicitly teach this ramification lest you say that according to Rabbi Yosei circumcision is in fact the principal act that effects conversion, and it is only there, in the first clause of the baraita, where the circumcision was not performed in our presence and so there is no way to verify whether it was done for the sake of conversion, that Rabbi Yosei states that the court should not proceed to immerse him; however, where the circumcision was performed in our presence, one might say that the conversion was already effected by the circumcision, and therefore let us immerse this convert on Shabbat. The latter clause is therefore necessary to teach us that Rabbi Yosei requires two acts, both circumcision and immersion, to effect conversion. Rabba said: There was an incident in the house of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Rabbi, and as Rav Yosef teaches it, Rabbi Oshaya bar Rabbi was also present, and as Rav Safra teaches it, a third Sage, Rabbi Oshaya, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, was also present, in which a convert came before him who was circumcised but had not immersed. He said to the convert: Remain here with us until tomorrow, and then we will immerse you. Rabba said: Learn from this incident three principles: Learn from it that a convert requires a court of three people to preside over the conversion, as Rav Safra taught that the case involved three Sages. And learn from it that one is not considered to be a convert until he has been both circumcised and immersed. And learn from it that the court may not immerse a convert at night, as they instructed him to remain there until the following day. The Gemara suggests: And let us say that one should also learn from it that we require a court of experts to preside over the conversion, as Rav Safra identified that three expert Sages were present. The Gemara rejects this: Perhaps they simply happened to be there, but in fact three laymen would suffice. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A convert requires a court of three to preside over conversion, because “judgment,” is written with regard to him, as the verse states: “And one judgment shall be both for you and for the convert that sojourns with you” (Numbers 15:16), and legal judgments require a court of three judges. The Sages taught in a baraita: With regard to someone who came and said: I am a convert, one might have thought that we should accept him; therefore, the verse states: “And if a convert sojourns with you in your land, you shall not oppress him” (Leviticus 19:33). The emphasis on “with you” suggests that only someone who was already presumed by you to be a valid convert should be accepted as a convert. If he came and brought witnesses to his conversion with him, from where is it derived that he is to be accepted? It is from the beginning of that verse, which states: “And if a convert sojourns with you in your land.” I have derived only that a convert is accepted in Eretz Yisrael; from where do I derive that also outside of Eretz Yisrael he is to be accepted? The verse states “with you,” which indicates that in any place that he is with you, you should accept him. If so, what is the meaning when the verse states: In the land? This indicates that in Eretz Yisrael he needs to bring evidence that he is a convert, but outside of Eretz Yisrael he does not need to bring evidence that he is a convert; rather, his claim is accepted. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And the Rabbis say: Whether he is in Eretz Yisrael or whether he is outside of Eretz Yisrael, he needs to bring evidence. The Gemara analyzes the baraita: In the case when he came and brought witnesses to his conversion with him, why do I need a verse to teach that he is accepted? In all cases, the testimony of witnesses is fully relied upon. Rav Sheshet said: The case is where they say: We heard that he converted in the court of so-and-so, but they did not witness the actual conversion. And it is necessary to teach this because it could enter your mind to say that they should not be relied upon; therefore, the verse teaches us that they are relied upon. As cited above, the latter clause of the baraita states: “With you in your land” (Leviticus 19:33). I have derived only that a convert is accepted in Eretz Yisrael; from where do I derive that also outside of Eretz Yisrael he is to be accepted? The verse states: “With you,” which indicates that in any place that he is with you, you should accept him. The Gemara asks: But didn’t you already expound that phrase in the first clause of the baraita to teach that one doesn’t accept the claims of an individual that he is a valid convert? The Gemara explains: One of these halakhot is derived from the phrase “with you” in the verse cited, and the other one is derived from the phrase “with you” in a subsequent verse (Leviticus 25:35). The baraita states: And the Rabbis say: Whether he is in Eretz Yisrael or whether he is outside of Eretz Yisrael, he needs to bring evidence. The Gemara asks: But isn’t “in your land” written in the verse? How can the Rabbis deny any distinction between the halakha inside and outside of Eretz Yisrael? The Gemara explains: That phrase is necessary to teach that even in Eretz Yisrael, the Jewish people should accept converts, as it could enter your mind to say that it is only for the sake of benefiting from the goodness of Eretz Yisrael, and not for the sake of Heaven, that they are converting, and therefore they should not be accepted. And it could also enter your mind to say that even nowadays, when God’s blessing has ceased and there is no longer the original goodness from which to benefit, one should still suspect their purity of motives because there are the gleanings, the forgotten sheaves, and the corners of fields, and the poor man’s tithe from which they would benefit by converting. Therefore, the verse teaches us that they are accepted even in Eretz Yisrael. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The halakha is that whether a convert is in Eretz Yisrael or whether he is outside of Eretz Yisrael, he needs to bring evidence. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious; in all disputes between an individual Sage and many Sages the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the many Sages. The Gemara explains: It is necessary to state this lest you say that Rabbi Yehuda’s reason is more logical, being that the verse supports him when it states: “In your land.” Therefore, it is necessary for Rabbi Yoḥanan to teach us that the halakha is not in accordance with his opinion. The Sages taught: The verse states that Moses charged the judges of a court: “And judge righteously between a man and his brother, and the convert with him” (Deuteronomy 1:16). From here, based on the mention of a convert in the context of judgment in a court, Rabbi Yehuda said: A potential convert who converts in a court is a valid convert. However, if he converts in private, he is not a convert. The Gemara relates: There was an incident involving one who was presumed to be Jewish who came before Rabbi Yehuda and said to him: I converted in private, and therefore I am not actually Jewish. Rabbi Yehuda said to him: Do you have witnesses to support your claim? He said to him: No. Rabbi Yehuda asked: Do you have children? He said to him: Yes. Rabbi Yehuda said to him: You are deemed credible in order to render yourself unfit to marry a Jewish woman by claiming that you are a gentile, but you are not deemed credible in order to render your children unfit. The Gemara asks: But did Rabbi Yehuda actually say that with regard to his children he is not deemed credible? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: The verse states: “He shall acknowledge [yakir] the firstborn, the son of the hated, by giving him a double portion of all that he has” (Deuteronomy 21:17). The phrase “he shall acknowledge” is apparently superfluous. It is therefore expounded to teach that the father is deemed credible so that he can identify him [yakirenu] to others. From here Rabbi Yehuda said: A man is deemed credible to say: This is my firstborn son, and just as he is deemed credible to say: This is my firstborn son, so too, a priest is deemed credible to say: This son of mine is a son of a divorced woman and myself, or to say: He is a son of a ḥalutza and myself, and therefore he is disqualified due to flawed lineage [ḥalal]. And the Rabbis say: He is not deemed credible. If Rabbi Yehuda holds that a father is deemed credible to render his children unfit, why did he rule otherwise in the case of the convert? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that this is what Rabbi Yehuda said to him: According to your statement you are a gentile, and there is no testimony for a gentile, as a gentile is a disqualified witness. Consequently, you cannot testify about the status of your children and render them unfit. Ravina said that this is what Rabbi Yehuda said to him: Do you have children? He said: Yes. He said to him: Do you have grandchildren? He said: Yes. He said to him: You are deemed credible in order to render your children unfit, based on the phrase “he shall acknowledge,” but you are not deemed credible in order to render your grandchildren unfit, as the verse affords a father credibility only with respect to his children. This opinion of Ravina is also taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says: A man is deemed credible to say about his minor son that he is unfit, but he is not deemed credible to say about his adult son that he is unfit. And in explanation of the baraita, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The reference to a minor son does not mean one who is literally a minor, who has not yet reached majority, and the reference to an adult son does not mean one who is literally an adult, who has reached majority; rather, a minor who has children, this is what the baraita is referring to as an adult, and an adult who does not have children, this is what the baraita is referring to as a minor. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in the baraita in accordance with the opinion of Ravina? If there is a baraita that supports his opinion, the halakha should be in accordance with his opinion. The Gemara explains: That baraita was stated concerning the matter of “he shall acknowledge,” that a father is deemed credible to render his son unfit; however, if one claims he is a gentile, he is not deemed credible to say the same about his son. § The Sages taught in a baraita: With regard to a potential convert who comes to a court in order to convert, at the present time, when the Jews are in exile, the judges of the court say to him: What did you see that motivated you to come to convert? Don’t you know that the Jewish people at the present time are anguished, suppressed, despised, and harassed, and hardships are frequently visited upon them? If he says: I know, and although I am unworthy of joining the Jewish people and sharing in their sorrow, I nevertheless desire to do so, then the court accepts him immediately to begin the conversion process. And the judges of the court inform him of some of the lenient mitzvot and some of the stringent mitzvot, and they inform him of the sin of neglecting the mitzva to allow the poor to take gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and produce in the corner of one’s field, and about the poor man’s tithe. And they inform him of the punishment for transgressing the mitzvot, as follows: They say to him: Be aware that before you came to this status and converted, had you eaten forbidden fat, you would not be punished by karet, and had you profaned Shabbat, you would not be punished by stoning, since these prohibitions do not apply to gentiles. But now, once converted, if you have eaten forbidden fat you are punished by karet, and if you have profaned Shabbat, you are punished by stoning. And just as they inform him about the punishment for transgressing the mitzvot, so too, they inform him about the reward granted for fulfilling them. They say to him: Be aware that the World-to-Come is made only for the righteous, and if you observe the mitzvot you will merit it, and be aware that the Jewish people, at the present time, are unable to receive their full reward in this world; they are not able to receive either an abundance of good nor an abundance of calamities, since the primary place for reward and punishment is in the World-to-Come. And they do not overwhelm him with threats, and they are not exacting with him about the details of the mitzvot. If he accepts upon himself all of these ramifications, then they circumcise him immediately. If there still remain on him shreds of flesh from the foreskin that invalidate the circumcision, they circumcise him again a second time to remove them. When he is healed from the circumcision, they immerse him immediately, and two Torah scholars stand over him at the time of his immersion and inform him of some of the lenient mitzvot and some of the stringent mitzvot. Once he has immersed and emerged, he is like a born Jew in every sense. For the immersion of a woman: Women appointed by the court seat her in the water of the ritual bath up to her neck, and two Torah scholars stand outside the bath house so as not to compromise her modesty, and from there they inform her of some of the lenient mitzvot and some of the stringent mitzvot. The procedure applies for both a convert and an emancipated slave who, upon immersion at the time of his emancipation, becomes a Jew in every sense. And in the same place that a menstruating woman immerses, i.e., in a ritual bath of forty se’a of water, there a convert and an emancipated slave also immerse. And anything that interposes between one’s body and the water of the ritual bath with regard to immersion of a ritually impure person, in a manner that would invalidate the immersion, also interposes and invalidates the immersion for a convert, and for an emancipated slave, and for a menstruating woman. The Gemara analyzes the baraita. The Master said in the baraita: With regard to a potential convert who comes to a court in order to convert, the judges of the court say to him: What did you see that motivated you to come to convert? And they inform him of some of the lenient mitzvot and some of the stringent mitzvot. The Gemara asks: What is the reason to say this to him? It is so that if he is going to withdraw from the conversion process, let him withdraw already at this stage. He should not be convinced to continue, as Rabbi Ḥelbo said: Converts are as harmful to the Jewish people as a leprous scab [sappaḥat] on the skin, as it is written: “And the convert shall join himself with them, and they shall cleave [venispeḥu] to the house of Jacob” (Isaiah 14:1). This alludes to the fact that the cleaving of the convert to the Jewish people is like a scab. The baraita continues: And they inform him of the sin of neglecting the mitzva to allow the poor to take gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and produce in the corner of one’s field, and about the poor man’s tithe. The Gemara asks: What is the reason to specifically mention these mitzvot? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Because a gentile is executed even on account of stealing less than the value of a peruta, since gentiles are particular about even such a small loss, and an item that a gentile steals is not subject to being returned, i.e., he is not obligated to return it to its owner. Since gentiles are unwilling to separate even from items of little value, a potential convert must be made aware that he if converts, he will be required to relinquish some of his property to others. The baraita continues: And they inform him of the sin of neglecting the mitzva to allow the poor to take gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and produce in the corner of one’s field. And they do not overwhelm him with threats, and they are not exacting with him about the details of the mitzvot, i.e., the court should not overly dissuade the convert from converting. Rabbi Elazar said: What is the verse from which this ruling is derived? As it is written: “And when she saw that she was steadfastly minded to go with her, she left off speaking with her” (Ruth 1:18). When Naomi set out to return to Eretz Yisrael, Ruth insisted on joining her. The Gemara understands this to mean that Ruth wished to convert. Naomi attempted to dissuade her, but Ruth persisted. The verse states that once Naomi saw Ruth’s resolve to convert, she desisted from her attempts to dissuade her. The Gemara infers from here that the same approach should be taken by a court in all cases of conversion. The Gemara reconstructs the original dialogue in which Naomi attempted to dissuade Ruth from converting: Naomi said to her: On Shabbat, it is prohibited for us to go beyond the Shabbat limit. Ruth responded: “Where you go, I shall go” (Ruth 1:16), and no further. Naomi said to her: It is forbidden for us to be alone together with a man with whom it is forbidden to engage in relations. Ruth responded: “Where you lodge, I shall lodge” (Ruth 1:16), and in the same manner. Naomi said to her: We are commanded to observe six hundred and thirteen mitzvot. Ruth responded: “Your people are my people” (Ruth 1:16). Naomi said to her: Idolatrous worship is forbidden to us. Ruth responded: “Your God is my God” (Ruth 1:16). Naomi said to her: Four types of capital punishment were handed over to a court with which to punish those who transgress the mitzvot. Ruth responded: “Where you die, I shall die” (Ruth 1:17). Naomi said to her: Two burial grounds were handed over to the court, one for those executed for more severe crimes and another for those executed for less severe crimes. Ruth responded: “And there I shall be buried” (Ruth 1:17). Immediately following this dialogue, the verse states: “And when she saw that she was steadfastly minded she left off speaking with her” (Ruth 1:18). Once Naomi saw Ruth’s resolve to convert, she desisted from her attempts to dissuade her. The baraita continues: If he accepts upon himself all of these ramifications, then they circumcise him immediately. The Gemara asks: What is the reason to act immediately? It is that we do not delay the performance of a mitzva. The baraita continues: If there still remain on him shreds of flesh from the foreskin that invalidate the circumcision, he is circumcised a second time to remove them. The Gemara explains: This is as we learned in a mishna (Shabbat 137a): These are the shreds of flesh that invalidate the circumcision if they are not cut: Any fragments of the flesh that cover the greater part of the corona. If such shreds remain, the child is considered uncircumcised, and he may not partake of teruma. And in explanation of this mishna, Rav Yirmeya bar Abba said that Rav said: This also includes the flesh that covers the greater part of the height of the corona. The baraita continues: When he is healed from the circumcision, they immerse him immediately. The Gemara infers from the precise formulation of the baraita that when he has healed, then yes, he is immersed, but as long as he has not healed, then no, he is not. What is the reason for this? It is because water agitates a wound. The baraita continues: And two Torah scholars stand over him at the time of his immersion. The Gemara asks: But didn’t Rabbi Ḥiyya say that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that a convert requires a court of three to be present at his conversion? The Gemara answers: In fact, Rabbi Yoḥanan said to the tanna reciting the mishna: Do not teach that there are two Torah scholars; rather, teach that there are three. The baraita continues: Once he has immersed and emerged he is a Jew in every sense. The Gemara asks: With regard to what halakha is this said? It is that if he reverts back to behaving as a gentile, he nevertheless remains Jewish, and so if he betroths a Jewish woman, although he is considered to be an apostate Jew, his betrothal is a valid betrothal.

The master [Rebbi] stated in a baraita: Just as your ancestors entered the covenant only through... [circumcision, immersion, and blood on the Altar]. It is understandable regarding circumcision, as it is written, "For all the people that went forth [from Egypt] were circumcised" (Joshua 5:5). You could also say it is derived from, "Then I passed by you and saw you wallowing in your bloods, and I said to you, 'In your blood you shall live'" (Ezekiel 16:6). The acceptance of the blood [is understandable], as it is written, "He [Moses] sent the youth of the Children of Israel and they brought burnt offerings, and they slaughtered bulls as a shelamim offering to God (Exodus 24:5). But where do we learn immersion from? It is written, "And Moses took [half of] the blood...and threw it upon the people" (Exodus 24:6,8). There is no sprinkling without [prior] immersion. But now [if a convert brings a sacrifice as part of the conversion], now that there are no sacrifices should we not accept converts? Rav Acha bar Yaakov said, [the Torah said] "When a convert sojourns with you or one who is among you throughout your generations, as you do so shall he do." (Numbers 15:14) [implying we can accept converts throughout your generations, even when the Temple is not standing.] The Rabbis taught: A convert nowadays must set aside a quarter shekel for his bird pair. Rabbi Shimon said, Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai [and his bet din] already voted on this and annulled it because of the stumbling block [it created]. Rav Idi bar Gershom said in the name of Rav adda bar Ahavah: The law is according to Rabbi Shimon.

Abaye raised a dilemma before Rabba: What is the halakha with regard to whether it is permitted to write a scroll containing only one portion of the Torah for the purpose of enabling a child to study it? The Gemara notes: Let the dilemma be raised according to the one who says that the Torah was given from the outset scroll by scroll, meaning that Moses would teach the Jewish people one portion of the Torah, and then write it down, and then teach them the next portion of the Torah, and then write that down, and continue in this way until he committed the entire Torah to writing. And let the dilemma also be raised according to the one who says that the Torah was given as a complete book, meaning that the Torah was not written down incrementally, but rather, after teaching the Jewish people the entire Torah, Moses committed it to writing all at once. The Gemara explains the two sides of the dilemma according to each opinion: Let the dilemma be raised according to the one who says that the Torah was given scroll by scroll. On the one hand it is possible to say that since the Torah was originally given scroll by scroll, today as well one may write the Torah in separate scrolls. Or on the other hand, perhaps one should say that since it was ultimately joined together to form a single scroll, it was joined together and can no longer be written in separate scrolls. And let the dilemma also be raised according to the one who says that the Torah was given as a complete book. On the one hand it is possible to say that since it was given from the outset as a complete book, one may not write it today in separate scrolls. Or on the other hand, perhaps one could say that since it is not always possible to write a complete Torah, one may write it in separate scrolls. Rabba said to him: One may not write the Torah in separate scrolls. And what is the reason? Because one may not write a scroll that is only part of the Torah. Abaye raised an objection to his opinion from a mishna (Yoma 37b) where it was taught: Queen Helene also fashioned a golden tablet as a gift for the Temple on which the Torah portion discussing a sota was written. When the priest would write the scroll of a sota in the Temple, he would copy this Torah portion from the tablet, so that a Torah scroll need not be taken out for that purpose. This indicates that it is permitted for one to write a single portion of the Torah. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says in the name of Rabbi Yannai: There is no proof from this mishna, as the tablet prepared by Queen Helene was not written in an ordinary manner, but rather it consisted of the letters of the alef-beit, i.e., only the first letter of each word was written on the tablet, and by looking at it the priest writing the sota scroll would remember what to write. The Gemara raised an objection from a baraita that teaches: When the priest writes the sota scroll, he looks at and writes that which is written on the tablet, which indicates that the full text of the passage was written on the tablet. The Gemara rejects this argument: Emend the baraita and say that it should read as follows: He looks at and writes like that which is written on the tablet. The tablet aids the priest in remembering the text that must actually be written. The Gemara raised an objection from a different baraita: When he writes, he looks at the tablet and writes that which is written on the tablet. And what is written on the tablet? “If a man lay with you…and if he did not lay with you” (see Numbers 5:19). Apparently, the full text of the passage was written on the tablet. The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? The tablet fashioned by Queen Helene was written by alternating complete words and initials. The first words of each verse were written there, but the rest of the words in the verse were represented by initials. Therefore, this contribution of Queen Helene does not resolve the question of whether writing a scroll for a child is permitted. The Gemara comments: The question of whether or not writing a scroll for a child is permitted is subject to a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in the following baraita: One may not write a scroll containing only one portion of the Torah for the purpose of enabling a child to study, but if the writer’s intention is to complete the scroll, it is permitted. Rabbi Yehuda says: In the book of Genesis he may write a scroll from the beginning until the generation of the flood. In Torat Kohanim, the book of Leviticus, he may write a scroll from the beginning until “And it came to pass on the eighth day” (Leviticus 9:1). The Gemara returns to discuss the previously mentioned dispute. Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Bana’a: The Torah was given from the outset scroll by scroll, as it is stated: “Then I said, behold, I come with the scroll of the book that is written for me” (Psalms 40:8). King David is saying about himself that there is a section of the Torah, “the scroll of the book,” that alludes to him, i.e., “that is written for me.” This indicates that each portion of the Torah constitutes a separate scroll. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: The Torah was given as a complete book, as it is stated: “Take this scroll of the Torah” (Deuteronomy 31:26), which teaches that from the outset the Torah was given as a complete unit. The Gemara asks: And according to the other Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, as well, isn’t it written “take,” indicating that the Torah scroll was given whole? How does he explain this verse? The Gemara answers: That verse is speaking about the Torah after it was joined together to form a single unit. The Gemara asks: And according to the other Sage, Reish Lakish, as well, isn’t it written: “With the scroll of the book that is written for me,” indicating that the Torah was given scroll by scroll? How does he explain this verse? The Gemara answers: That verse teaches that the entire Torah is called a scroll. This is indicated in another verse as well, as it is written: “And He said to me: What do you see? And I said: I see a flying scroll” (Zechariah 5:2). Alternatively, this verse serves to allude to the sections of the Torah discussed in that statement of Rabbi Levi, as Rabbi Levi says: Eight sections were said on the day that the Tabernacle was erected, on the first of Nisan. They are: The section of the priests (Leviticus 21:1–22:26); the section of the Levites (Numbers 8:5–26); the section of the impure (Leviticus 13:1– 14:57); the section of the sending away of the impure (Numbers 5:1–4); the section beginning with the words “After the death” (Leviticus, chapter 16); the section dealing with priests who have become intoxicated with wine (Leviticus 10:8–11); the section of the lamps (Numbers 8:1–7); and the section of the red heifer (Numbers, chapter 19), as all of these sections are necessary for service in the Tabernacle. § The Gemara continues its discussion concerning the writing of the Torah: Rabbi Elazar says: The majority of the Torah was transmitted in writing, while the minority was transmitted orally, as it is stated: “I wrote for him the greater part of My Torah; they were reckoned a strange thing” (Hosea 8:12), meaning that the majority of the Torah was transmitted in written form. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The majority of the Torah was transmitted orally [al peh], while the minority was transmitted in writing, as it is stated with regard to the giving of the Torah to Moses on Mount Sinai: “For on the basis of [al pi] these matters I have made a covenant with you and with Israel” (Exodus 34:27), which indicates that the greater part of the Sinaitic covenant was taught orally. The Gemara asks: And according to the other Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, as well, isn’t it written: “I wrote for him the greater part of My Torah”? How does he understand this verse? The Gemara answers: This verse is not a statement, but rather a rhetorical question expressing bewilderment: For did I write for him the greater part of My Torah? In that case they, the Jewish people, would be reckoned as strangers, meaning that there would be no difference between them and the nations of the world if everything was written down. Rather, the majority of the Torah must remain an oral tradition. The Gemara asks: And according to the other Sage, Rabbi Elazar, as well, isn’t it written: “For on the basis of these matters I have made a covenant with you and with Israel”? How does he understand this verse? The Gemara answers: That verse, which indicates that the covenant was based on that which was taught by oral tradition, is stated due to the fact that it is more difficult to learn matters transmitted orally, but not because these matters are more numerous than those committed to writing. Rabbi Yehuda bar Naḥmani, the disseminator for Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, expounded as follows: It is written: “Write you these matters” (Exodus 34:27), and it is written later in that same verse: “For on the basis of [al pi] these matters.” How can these texts be reconciled? They mean to teach: Matters that were written you may not express them orally [al peh], and matters that were taught orally you may not express them in writing. The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: The word “these” in the mitzva recorded in the verse “Write you these matters” is used here in an emphatic sense: These matters, i.e., those recorded in the Written Law, you may write, but you may not write halakhot, i.e., the mishnayot and the rest of the Oral Law. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The Holy One, Blessed be He, made a covenant with the Jewish people only for the sake of the matters that were transmitted orally [be’al peh], as it is stated: “For on the basis of [al pi] these matters I have made a covenant with you and with Israel” (Exodus 34:27).

(1) With what may a woman go out and with what may she not go out? A woman may not go out wool ribbons, nor with flax ribbons, nor with straps on her head. Nor can she immerse with them on unless she loosens them. Nor [may she go out] with a frontlet [on her forehead], nor with bangles if they are not fastened to her cap; nor with a cap [under the head-dress] into the public domain. Nor [may she go out] with a golden [ornament in the shape of a] town; nor with a necklace; nor with [nose]-rings; nor with a finger-ring which lacks a seal; nor with a needle that is not pierced. But if she has gone out [with any of these] she is not liable for a Chattat [an offering brought to expiate sin].

(2) A man may not go out with nail-studded sandals, nor with a single [sandal] unless he has a wound on [the other] foot. A [man may not go out] with tefillin; nor with an amulet unless it [was written] by an expert; nor with a cuirass, nor with a helmet, nor with greaves. If one has gone out [with any of these] he is not liable for a Chattat.

(3) A woman may not go out with a needle that has an eye, nor with a ring that has a seal, nor with a diadem‎; nor with a perfume pouch, nor with a balsam-flask. And if [a woman] has gone out [with any of these] she is liable for a Chattat, these are the words of Rabbi Meir; but the Sages exempt her [regarding] a perfume pouch and a balsam-flask.

(4) A man may not go out with a sword, nor with a bow, nor with a shield, nor with a round shield, nor with a spear. If he has gone out [with any of these] he is liable for a Chattat. Rabbi Eliezer says: They are ornaments for him. But the Sages say: They are nothing but an indignity, for it is said, "They shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears unto pruning-hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more" (Isaiah 2:4). A garter is not subject to impurity and one may go out with it on Shabbat; foot-chains are subject to impurity, and one may not go out with them on Shabbat.

(5) A woman may go out with braids of hair whether of her own [hair], or of another woman, or of an animal. [She may go out] with a frontlet [on her forehead], or with bangles if they are sewn [to the cap]; with a cap [under the head-dress] or with a wig into the courtyard; with wool in her ears, or with wool in her shoe, or with wool she has arranged for her menstruation; or with a pepper, or with a grain [of] salt, or with whatever else she [is accustomed to] put in her mouth [to dispel bad breath] provided she does not first put it [into her mouth] on Shabbat. And if she drops it [out of her mouth] she may not replace it. [With regard to a] false tooth or a gold tooth, Rabbi allows [one to go out with it], but the Sages prohibit [it].

(6) A woman may go out with a Sela [a coin worth four Dinar] fastened on a corn [on her foot]; girls may go out with ribbons, and even with chips in their ears; Arabian women may go out in their veils, and Median women in their mantillas. So [indeed] may anyone, but the Sages speak of common custom.

A tanna taught in a baraita: A woman is essentially a flask full of feces, a reference to the digestive system, and her mouth is full of blood, a euphemistic reference to menstruation, yet men are not deterred and they all run after her with desire. The Gemara interprets the continuation of the verse cited above: “For a person goes to his eternal home” (Ecclesiastes 12:5). Rabbi Yitzḥak said: This teaches that each and every righteous person is given a dwelling place in the World-to-Come in accordance with his honor. The Gemara offers a parable in which a king enters a city along with his servants. When they enter, they all enter through a single gate; however, when they sleep, each one is given a dwelling place in accordance with his honor. So too, although everyone dies, not everyone receives the same reward in the World-to-Come.

Rav Yehuda taught Rav Yitzḥak, his son: A man finds calmness of spirit only from his first wife, as it is stated: “Let your fountain be blessed and have joy with the wife of your youth” (Proverbs 5:18). Rav Yitzḥak, his son, said to him: Such as whom? Rav Yehuda said to him: Such as your mother. The Gemara wonders: Is that so? But didn’t Rav Yehuda once read to Rav Yitzḥak, his son, from the verse: “And I find more bitter than death the woman whose heart is snares and nets” (Ecclesiastes 7:26)? And Rav Yitzḥak said to him: Such as whom? And Rav Yehuda said to him: Such as your mother. The Gemara responds: This is not a contradiction. Granted, she is difficult and angry, but afterward she is conciliatory, so she is both more bitter than death and a source of calmness and joy for him, at different times. Rav Shmuel bar Unya says in the name of Rav: A woman is raw material, like a vessel that has not been completed, and makes a covenant, becoming truly connected, only to the one who made her a vessel through her first act of sexual intercourse, as it is stated: “For your Maker is your husband, the Lord of hosts is His name” (Isaiah 54:5).

§ It is taught in the mishna: A minor who knows how to wave the lulav is obligated in the mitzva of lulav. The Sages taught: A minor who knows how to wave the lulav is obligated in the mitzva of lulav; one who knows how to wrap himself in a garment, is obligated in the mitzva of ritual fringes; if he knows to preserve the sanctity of phylacteries in a state of cleanliness, his father buys him phylacteries; if he knows how to speak, his father immediately teaches him Torah and Shema.

(6) Regarding a girl of eleven years and one day, her vows are examined [i.e she is questioned in order to determine if her vows are valid]. At twelve years and one day, her vows stand. And we examine [her vows] for the entire twelfth [year]. Regarding a boy of twelve years and one day, his vows are examined [to determine if they are valid]. At thirteen years and one day, his vows stand. And we examine [his vows] for the entire thirteenth [year]. Prior to this time [i.e. eleven years and one day for a girl and twelve years and one day for a boy], even if they said, "We know in whose name we vowed, and in whose name we sanctified," their vows are not vows and their sanctifications are not sanctified property. After this time, even if they say, "We do not know in whose name we vowed, and in whose name we sanctified," their vows are vows and their sanctifications are santified property.

(7) The Sages analogized women through a parable: an unripe fig, a fig in its early ripening stage, and a fully ripe fig. An unripe fig [refers to] while she is still a child. A fig in its early ripening stage [refers to] while she is in her adolescence. During this and that [stage], her father is entitled to that which she finds, and to her handiwork, and [the right] to the annulment of her vows. A fully ripe fig [refers to] once she matures, her father has no longer any right over her.

(8) What are her signs [which indicate that she has matured]? Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: once the fold appears beneath the breast. Rabbi Akiva says: once the breasts drop. Ben Azzai says: once the areola darkens. Rabbi Yose says: [when the breasts develop] such that if one puts one's hand on the nipple it sinks and gradually returns.

(11) A female child who produced two [pubic] hairs may participate in either in chalitzah or yibum, and she is obligated in all of the commandments stated in the Torah. And similarly, a male child who produced two [pubic] hairs is obligated in all of the commandments stated in the Torah. And he is fit to become a wayward and rebellious son from the time he produces two hairs until his beard encircles; [this refers to] the lower [beard] and not the upper one, but the Sages spoke in a euphemism. A female child who has produced two hairs cannot do mi'un [the refusal of a marriage by a fatherless child married off by her mother or brother, retroactively annulling the marriage]. Rabbi Yehuda says: [she may still do mi'un] until the black [i.e. the hair] increases.

The Gemara asks, is "within the time" [the year preceding age of majority] like the time of minority or the time of majority? Regarding what law is this stated? If it is regarding vows one could say it is neither like before or after. Rather, it was regarding punishment. What is the law?

Rav and Rabbi Chanina both say 'within the time' [i.e. a child that grows 2 pubic hairs in their last year before majority] is like before the time. Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi both say: 'within the time' is like after the time [i.e. s/he is considered an adult].

Rav Nachman gave the following mnemonic: 'And this was [done] before in Israel." (Ruth 4:7)

Rav Hamnuna challenged [this law, from the Mishnah]: After this time, even if they said 'we do not know in whose name we vowed,' or 'in whose name we sanctified,' thier vows are vows and their sanctifications are sanctifications. But within the time is like before the time. [By implication the Mishnah itself is limiting this time.]

Rava said to him: Consider the first part of the Mishnah: 'Even though they said, 'we know in whose name we vowed,' or 'in whose name we sanctified,' their vows are not vows and their sanctifications are not sanctifications. Therefore, 'within the time' is like after the time.

But this is not so. Rava erred, for he thought Rav Hamnuna derived his proof from a redundancy of the Mishnah's wording ["after the time"], derive it from the previous wording ['before this time'].

But that is not correct. Rav Hamnuna derived his proof from the text of the Mishnah [as follows]: This 'after the time', what is it? If the child has not grown two hairs, they are a minor. Rather, the Mishnah refers to one who has grown two hairs. And the reason is that 'after the time' completed the matter. But if [hairs grown] within the time are like before the time.

Rabbi Zeira raised another refutation, 'A man...if he utters a vow." (Numbers 6:2) This teaches "man" to include one who is thirteen years and one day old, that even if he does not know how to state a vow, his vow is valid.

What is the case? If he has not grown two hairs, he is a minor [and his vows are invalid]. Rather it refers to one who has grown two hairs. The reason [his vows are valid] is that he is 13 years and one day, when he is a man. Hairs grown 'within the time' are like those grown 'before the time'. This is a refutation to those that hold hairs make one an adult even if grown before 13.

Rav Nachman said: There is a dispute between Tannaim - A child in his 9th year grew two hairs - it is a mole. From 9 years until 12 years and one day - a mole, but Rabbi Yosi the sone of Rabbi Yehudah says it is a sign of adulthood. From 13 years and 1 day all say it is a sign of adulthood.

There is a contradiction in the baraita itself - You [Rabbis] say from the 9th year until 12 years and 1 day - a mole. This means hair grown in the 13 year are a sign of adulthood. The then the baraita taught - 13 years and a day a sign of adulthood, which means hairs grown in his 13th year are from a mole. Can't we say this is a dispute between Tannaim? One holds hairs grown within the time are like hairs after the time; and the other holds hairs grown within the time are like hairs grown before the time [and attributed to a mole].

No! everyone believes that hairs grown within the time are like hairs before the time. And both refer to a girl. The first clause follows Rebbi [who says a girl matures at 12]; the latter clause is Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar [who says a girl matures at 13].

Alternatively, both clauses refer to a boy. The first follows Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar [who hold a boy matures at 12] and the latter clause follows Rebbi [who holds a boy matures at 13].

Or, you could say, both follow Rebbi. The latter refers to a boy [between 12 and 13] and the first clause refers to a girl [who can become an adult at 13].

Or, you could say, both follow Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar - the former refers to a boy and the latter a girl.

Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Yehudah says: it is a sign. Rabbi Keruspedai the son of Rabbi Shabtai said: This is only if the hairs are still on him [at the age of majority]. This was also taught in a baraita: One who is 9 and 1 day old grew two hairs - it is considered from a mole. From after 9 years until 12 years and 1 day, and they are still upon him at 13 - the Rabbis consider it a mole. Rabbi Yose the son of Rabbi Yehudah says it is a sign of adulthood. Rava said: the halakhah is that hairs grown within the time are treated like hairs grown before the time.

(21) He [Yehudah ben Teima] used to say: Five years [is the age] for [the study of] Scripture, Ten [is the age] for [the study of] Mishnah, Thirteen [is the age] for [observing] commandments, Fifteen [is the age] for [the study of] Talmud, Eighteen [is the age] for the [wedding] canopy, Twenty [is the age] for pursuit, Thirty [is the age] for [full] strength, Forty [is the age] for understanding, Fifty [is the age] for [giving] counsel, Sixty [is the age] for mature age, Seventy [is the age] for a hoary head, Eighty [is the age] for [superadded] strength, Ninety [is the age] for [a] bending [stature], One hundred, is [the age at which one is] as if dead, passed away, and ceased from the world.