אֶלָּא לָאו כִּי הַאי גַוְונָא אֲמַר לֵיהּ וְהָא אַקְרְיוּן בְּחֶלְמָא קָנֶה רָצוּץ מַאי לָאו הָכִי קָאָמְרִי לִי הִנֵּה בָטַחְתָּ לְּךָ עַל מִשְׁעֶנֶת הַקָּנֶה הָרָצוּץ הַזֶּה Rather, is it not referring to a case like this, of one who tithed an entity that was not yet in the world, in honor of Shabbat? Rabbi Yannai said to Rabbi Ḥiyya: But they read before me in a dream these two words: Bruised reed. What, is it not the case that they said to me as follows: “Behold you trust upon the staff of this bruised reed” (II Kings 18:21)? In other words, you rely on an unsubstantiated idea.
לָא הָכִי קָאָמְרִי לָךְ קָנֶה רָצוּץ לֹא יִשְׁבּוֹר וּפִשְׁתָּה כֵהָה לֹא יְכַבֶּנָּה Rabbi Ḥiyya said to him: No; The dream referred to a different verse, one that deals with the Messiah, as they said to you as follows: “A bruised reed he shall not break and the dimly burning wick he shall not quench; according to truth he shall bring forth justice” (Isaiah 42:3). In other words, Rabbi Yannai acted correctly, in accordance with the ways of truth. This exchange shows that both Rabbi Ḥiyya and Rabbi Yannai agree that an entity not in the world can be acquired.
רַבִּי דְּתַנְיָא לֹא תַסְגִּיר עֶבֶד אֶל אֲדוֹנָיו רַבִּי אוֹמֵר בְּלוֹקֵחַ עֶבֶד עַל מְנָת לְשַׁחְרְרוֹ הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר הֵיכִי דָּמֵי אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק דִּכְתַב לֵיהּ לִכְשֶׁאֶקָּחֲךָ הֲרֵי עַצְמְךָ קָנוּי לְךָ מֵעַכְשָׁיו With regard to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, his opinion is as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “You shall not deliver a slave to his master” (Deuteronomy 23:16). Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The verse is speaking of one who buys a slave on the condition to free him. This owner may not keep his acquisition as a slave. The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: It is referring to a case where one wrote to a slave in the document of acquisition: When I acquire you as a slave, you are acquired by yourself from now. In this case, the buyer transfers ownership of an entity not yet in the world, as the slave did not yet belong to him.
רַבִּי מֵאִיר דִּתְנַן הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשָּׁה הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי לְאַחַר שֶׁאֶתְגַּיֵּיר לְאַחַר שֶׁתִּתְגַּיְּירִי לְאַחַר שֶׁאֶשְׁתַּחְרֵר לְאַחַר שֶׁתִּשְׁתַּחְרְרִי לְאַחַר שֶׁיָּמוּת בַּעְלִיךְ לְאַחַר שֶׁתָּמוּת אֲחוֹתִיךְ לְאַחַר שֶׁיַּחְלוֹץ לִיךְ יְבָמִיךְ אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת Rabbi Meir, his opinion is as we learned in a mishna (Bava Metzia 16b): One who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me after I convert; after you convert; after I am freed; after you are freed; after your husband dies; after your sister dies; after your yavam performs ḥalitza with you, she is not betrothed. Rabbi Meir says she is betrothed, as the acquisition of a betrothal applies even to an entity not yet in the world, in this case, a woman available for betrothal.
רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב דְּתַנְיָא יָתֵר עַל כֵּן אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב אֲפִילּוּ אִם אָמַר פֵּירוֹת עֲרוּגָה זוֹ תְּלוּשִׁים יְהוּ תְּרוּמָה עַל פֵּירוֹת עֲרוּגָה מְחוּבָּרִים אוֹ פֵּירוֹת עֲרוּגָה מְחוּבָּרִים עַל פֵּירוֹת זוֹ תְּלוּשִׁין לִכְשֶׁיָּבִיאוּ שְׁלִישׁ וְיִתָּלְשׁוּ וְהֵבִיאוּ שְׁלִישׁ וְנִתְלְשׁוּ דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִין Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, his opinion is as it is taught in a baraita: Moreover, Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov said that even if one said: The detached fruit of this garden bed shall be teruma for the currently attached fruit of this garden bed when its fruit will be detached, or if he said: The attached fruit of this garden bed shall be teruma for the currently detached fruit of this garden bed when the fruit reach a third of their growth, i.e., a third of their ripeness, and are detached, and if they actually reached a third and were detached, then his words are upheld and the teruma takes effect, despite the fact that the stipulation was issued before the attached fruit had ripened and before the obligation of teruma applied to the detached fruit. This halakha shows that one can acquire an entity not yet in the world; in this case he acquires the fruit by applying the sanctity of teruma to it.
רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא דִּתְנַן קוּנָּם שֶׁאֲנִי עוֹשָׂה לְפִיךָ אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לְהָפֵר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר יָפֵר שֶׁמָּא תַּעֲדִיף עָלָיו יֶתֶר מִן הָרָאוּי לוֹ Rabbi Akiva, his opinion is as we learned in the aforementioned mishna, that if a wife says: Konam that I will prepare for your mouth, the husband is not required to nullify the vow. Rabbi Akiva says: He should nullify the vow, lest she exceed more than is fitting for him, as he maintains that the vow applies even to entities not yet in the world.
בְּעוֹ מִינֵּיהּ מֵרַב שֵׁשֶׁת עַד אֶחָד בִּיבָמָה מַהוּ טַעְמָא דְּעֵד אֶחָד מִשּׁוּם דְּמִילְּתָא דַּעֲבִידָא לְאִיגַּלּוֹיֵי לָא מְשַׁקַּר וְהָכָא נָמֵי לָא מְשַׁקַּר אוֹ דִלְמָא טַעְמָא דְּעֵד אֶחָד מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיהִי דָּיְיקָא וּמִינַּסְבָא וְהָכָא כֵּיוָן דְּזִימְנִין דְּרָחֲמָא לֵיהּ לָא דָּיְיקָא וּמִינַּסְבָא § They raised a dilemma before Rav Sheshet: In a case of one witness who testifies that a woman’s husband is dead, with regard to a yevama, what is the halakha? Can the court rely on this witness? The Gemara explains the sides of the dilemma: Is the reason that the testimony of one witness in the case of a missing husband is accepted because one does not lie about something that will be discovered, and here, too, he will not lie, in case the husband later arrives? Or, perhaps the reason for the eligibility of one witness is because the woman herself is exacting in her investigation before she marries again. But here, since she sometimes loves the yavam, as she already knew him beforehand, she is not exacting in her investigation before she marries again.
אֲמַר לְהוּ רַב שֵׁשֶׁת תְּנֵיתוּהָ אָמְרוּ לָהּ מֵת בְּנֵךְ וְאַחַר כָּךְ מֵת בַּעְלִיךְ וְנִתְיַיבְּמָה וְאַחַר כָּךְ אָמְרוּ לָהּ חִילּוּף הַדְּבָרִים תֵּצֵא וְהַוָּלָד רִאשׁוֹן וְאַחֲרוֹן מַמְזֵר הֵיכִי דָמֵי אִילֵּימָא תְּרֵי וּתְרֵי מַאי חָזֵית דְּסָמְכַתְּ אַהָנֵי סְמוֹךְ אַהָנֵי Rav Sheshet said to him: You learned the answer to this question in the mishna: If they said to her: Your child died and afterward your husband died, and she entered into levirate marriage, and afterward they said to her that the matters were reversed, she must leave her husband, and the first child and the last one are each a mamzer. Rav Sheshet analyzes this case: What are the circumstances? If we say they are two and two, i.e., two witnesses came first and said one account, followed by two other witnesses who claimed the reverse, what did you see to make you rely on these second witnesses when you can equally rely on the first pair? The first witnesses do not lose their credibility merely due to the testimony of the second pair, so why should she have to leave the yavam?
וְעוֹד מַמְזֵר סְפֵק מַמְזֵר הוּא וְכִי תֵּימָא לָא דָּק וְהָא מִדְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא הָרִאשׁוֹן מַמְזֵר וְהָאַחֲרוֹן אֵינוֹ מַמְזֵר שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ דַּוְקָא קָתָנֵי And furthermore, why should the child be a definite mamzer? At worst he is an individual whose status as a mamzer is uncertain, as there are two conflicting sets of testimonies. And if you would say that the tanna of the mishna was not precise in his failure to distinguish between a definite mamzer and one of uncertain status, but from the fact that it teaches in the latter clause of the mishna: The first is a mamzer and the last is not a mamzer, one can learn from here that the mishna was taught specifically in this manner, i.e., the mamzer the tanna referred to is a definite mamzer.
אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ חַד וְטַעְמָא דַּאֲתוֹ בֵּי תְרֵי אַכְחֲשׁוּהּ הָא לָאו הָכִי מְהֵימַן Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from here that only one witness testified at first, and the reason for the halakha is that two people came and contradicted him, as the testimony of two witnesses certainly overrules that of a single witness? It may be inferred from this that if it were not so, the lone witness is deemed credible. This shows that the court will accept the testimony of one witness even to allow a woman to enter into levirate marriage.
וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמַר הָא לָא תִּיבְּעֵי לָךְ דַּאֲפִילּוּ אִיהִי נָמֵי מְהֵימְנָא דִּתְנַן הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁאָמְרָה מֵת בַּעְלִי תִּנָּשֵׂא מֵת בַּעְלִי תִּתְיַיבֵּם כִּי תִּיבְּעֵי לָךְ לְמִישְׁרֵי יְבָמָה לְעָלְמָא The Gemara provides an alternative version of the discussion. And some Sages maintain another version that says: Let the dilemma not be raised, as even a wife herself is also deemed credible when she says her husband is dead, as we learned in a mishna (114b): With regard to a woman who said: My husband is dead, she may marry. Likewise, if she claimed: My husband is dead, she should enter into levirate marriage. If so, one witness is certainly deemed credible when he says her husband has died. The case where you could raise the dilemma is with regard to permitting a yevama to all other men, if a witness claims that the yavam is dead.
מַאי טַעְמָא דְּעֵד אֶחָד מִשּׁוּם דְּמִילְּתָא דַּעֲבִידָא לְאִיגַּלּוֹיֵי לָא מְשַׁקַּר הָכָא נָמֵי לָא מְשַׁקַּר אוֹ דִלְמָא טַעְמָא דְּעֵד אֶחָד מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיהִי דָּיְיקָא וּמִינַּסְבָא וְהָא לָא דָּיְיקָא וּמִינַּסְבָא דְּמִיסְנָא הוּא In this case as well, the Gemara clarifies the sides of this dilemma: What is the reason that one witness is deemed credible? Is it because one does not lie about something that will be discovered, and therefore here too he would not lie? Or, perhaps the reason for accepting the testimony of one witness is because the wife is exacting in her investigation before she marries again, but this yevama is not exacting in her investigation before she marries again. Why not? Because she