Shabbat 7aשבת ז׳ א
The William Davidson Talmudתלמוד מהדורת ויליאם דוידסון
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7aז׳ א
1 א

כְּגוֹן דְּאִית לַהּ מְחִיצּוֹת. וְכִי הָא דְּאָמַר עוּלָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: קַרְפֵּף יוֹתֵר מִבֵּית סָאתַיִם שֶׁלֹּא הוּקַּף לְדִירָה, וַאֲפִילּוּ כּוֹר וַאֲפִילּוּ כּוֹרַיִים, הַזּוֹרֵק לְתוֹכוֹ חַיָּיב. מַאי טַעְמָא? — מְחִיצָה הִיא, אֶלָּא שֶׁמְחוּסֶּרֶת דָּיוֹרִין.

The valley discussed in the mishna in Teharot is unusual, as it refers to a case where it has partitions that are ten handbreadths high surrounding it. And in accordance with that which Ulla said that Rav Yoḥanan said: An enclosure [karpef], a large courtyard that is not contiguous with the house and does not serve a direct purpose for the house, that is greater than a field that produces a crop of two se’a, that was not originally surrounded by a fence for the purpose of residence, but with a partition to protect his belongings, and even if it is as large as a field that produces a crop of one kor, thirty times the size of a se’a, and even two kor, it is still considered a private domain. And, consequently, one who throws an object into it from the public domain on Shabbat is liable. What is the reason for this? It is a partition that surrounds the enclosure and its legal status is like that of a partition in every sense, except that it is lacking residents. Even though the Rabbis were stringent with regard to this enclosure because of the lack of residents and prohibited carrying in it as if it were a karmelit, that does not negate its primary legal status; by Torah law it is a full-fledged private domain. The same is true with regard to the aforementioned valley. The valley is a large area surrounded by partitions erected for the purpose of protection and thereby assumes private domain status.

2 ב

בִּשְׁלָמָא רַב אָשֵׁי לָא אָמַר כִּדְעוּלָּא, אֶלָּא עוּלָּא מַאי טַעְמָא לָא אָמַר כִּשְׁמַעְתֵּיהּ? אָמַר לָךְ: אִי דְּאִית לַהּ מְחִיצּוֹת ״בִּקְעָה״ קָרֵי לַהּ?! קַרְפֵּף הִיא! וְרַב אָשֵׁי ״רְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד״ קָתָנֵי.

The Gemara asks: Granted, in explanation of the mishna, Rav Ashi did not say in accordance with the opinion of Ulla, as he provided a reason for it. However, what is the reason that Ulla did not say in accordance with his own halakha that he cited in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan? The Gemara answers: Ulla could have said to you: If the mishna is referring to a case where it has partitions, would it call that place a valley? It is an enclosure. The implication of the word valley is that there are no partitions at all. And Rav Ashi defends his opinion by saying: The language taught in the mishna is: The private domain and not a karmelit. Therefore, his explanation more closely approximates the language of the mishna.

3 ג

וְהַכַּרְמְלִית. אַטּוּ כּוּלְּהוּ נָמֵי לָאו כַּרְמְלִית נִינְהוּ? כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי אֲמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: לֹא נִצְרְכָה אֶלָּא לְקֶרֶן זָוִית הַסְּמוּכָה לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים. דְּאַף עַל גַּב דְּזִימְנִין דְּדָחֲקִי בֵּיהּ רַבִּים וְעָיְילִי לְגַוַּהּ, כֵּיוָן דְּלָא נִיחָא תַּשְׁמִישְׁתֵּיהּ, כִּי כַרְמְלִית דָּמֵי.

In the Tosefta, the list of places whose legal status is that of a karmelit also includes karmelit. The Gemara asks: Aren’t they, all the other places listed there, i.e., a sea, a valley, and a colonnade, a karmelit too? If so, what is this karmelit that is prominently mentioned here? The Gemara answers: When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This addition of karmelit was only necessary in order to teach the case of a corner adjacent to the public domain, where, although at times the multitudes push their way in and enter it, since its use is inconvenient it is considered a karmelit.

4 ד

כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: בֵּין הָעַמּוּדִין נִידּוֹן כְּכַרְמְלִית. מַאי טַעְמָא? אַף עַל גַּב דְּדָרְסִי בַּהּ רַבִּים, כֵּיוָן דְּלָא מִסְתַּגִּי לְהוּ בְּהֶדְיָא — כְּכַרְמְלִית דָּמְיָא. אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: אִיצְטְבָא שֶׁלִּפְנֵי הָעַמּוּדִים נִידּוֹן כְּכַרְמְלִית.

Similarly, when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Between the pillars alongside the public domain is judged like a karmelit. What is the reason for this? Although the multitudes stride there, since they cannot walk in it in a direct manner, uninterrupted, it is considered like a karmelit. Rabbi Zeira said that Rav Yehuda said: The same is true for the bench that is before the pillars upon which the merchants place their wares; it is judged to be like a karmelit.

5 ה

לְמַאן דְּאָמַר בֵּין הָעַמּוּדִים, כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן אִיצְטְבָא. לְמַאן דְּאָמַר אִיצְטְבָא — אִיצְטְבָא הוּא דְּלָא נִיחָא תַּשְׁמִישְׁתֵּיהּ, אֲבָל בֵּין הָעַמּוּדִים דְּנִיחָא תַּשְׁמִישְׁתֵּיהּ — לָא. לִישָּׁנָא אַחֲרִינָא: אֲבָל בֵּין הָעַמּוּדִין דְּזִימְנִין דְּדָרְסִי לֵיהּ רַבִּים, כִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים דָּמְיָא.

The Gemara comments: According to the one who said that between the pillars is considered like a karmelit, all the more so a bench is considered a karmelit. However, according to the one who said that a bench is a karmelit, one could say that that is so specifically with regard to a bench because its use is inconvenient. However, the space between the pillars, whose use is convenient, would not be considered a karmelit. Another version of that statement: However, between the pillars where, at times, the multitudes stride there is considered like the public domain.

6 ו

אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר שֵׁילָא אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: לְבֵינָה זְקוּפָה בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים וְזָרַק וְטָח בְּפָנֶיהָ — חַיָּיב. עַל גַּבָּהּ — פָּטוּר.

With regard to the question to what degree does the use of the multitudes determine whether a specific place is considered a public domain, the Gemara cites the halakha that Rabba bar Sheila said that Rav Ḥisda said: If an upright brick was placed in the public domain and one threw an object from a distance of four cubits and he stuck the object to its side, he is liable for throwing in the public domain. But if the object landed atop the brick, he is not liable. Because the multitudes do not step on the brick, it is not a full-fledged public domain.

7 ז

אַבָּיֵי וְרָבָא דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: וְהוּא שֶׁגְּבוֹהָה שְׁלֹשָׁה, דְּלָא דָּרְסִי לַהּ רַבִּים. אֲבָל הִיזְמֵי וְהִיגֵי, אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא גְּבִיהֵי שְׁלֹשָׁה. וְחִיָּיא בַּר רַב אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ הִיזְמֵי וְהִיגֵי, אֲבָל צוֹאָה לָא. וְרַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ צוֹאָה.

It was Abaye and Rava, who both said: And that is specifically when that brick is at least three handbreadths high, as then the multitudes do not step on it, and, therefore, even though the brick is standing in the public domain, it is considered an independent domain. However, thorns and shrubs, even though they are not three handbreadths high, are not considered part of the public domain. Since people do not walk on thorns, those areas cannot be considered part of the public domain. And Ḥiyya bar Rav said: Even the place where there are thorns and shrubs in the public domain, if they were low, the place is considered part of the public domain. However, a place in the public domain where there are feces is not considered part of the public domain, as people do not walk there. And Rav Ashi said: Even a place in the public domain where there are feces is considered part of the public domain, since ultimately people who are rushing to work do not take care to avoid it and will step on it.

8 ח

אָמַר רַבָּה דְּבֵי רַב שֵׁילָא: כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אֵין כַּרְמְלִית פְּחוּתָה מֵאַרְבָּעָה. וְאָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: וְתוֹפֶסֶת עַד עֲשָׂרָה. מַאי ״וְתוֹפֶסֶת עַד עֲשָׂרָה״? אִילֵּימָא דְּאִי אִיכָּא מְחִיצָה עֲשָׂרָה הוּא דְּהָוֵי כַּרְמְלִית, וְאִי לָא — לָא הָוֵי כַּרְמְלִית, וְלָא? וְהָאָמַר רַב גִּידֵּל אָמַר רַב חִיָּיא בַּר יוֹסֵף אָמַר רַב: בַּיִת שֶׁאֵין בְּתוֹכוֹ עֲשָׂרָה וְקֵרוּיוֹ מַשְׁלִימוֹ לַעֲשָׂרָה, עַל גַּגּוֹ — מוּתָּר לְטַלְטֵל בְּכוּלּוֹ, בְּתוֹכוֹ — אֵין מִטַּלְטְלִין בּוֹ אֶלָּא אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת!

Rabba from the school of Rav Sheila said: When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: There is no karmelit less than four handbreadths. And Rav Sheshet added and said: And the karmelit extends up to ten handbreadths. With regard to the formulation of Rav Sheshet, the Gemara wondered: What is the meaning of the phrase: And extends up to ten? If you say that it means if there is a partition ten handbreadths high surrounding it then it is considered a karmelit, and if not, it is not considered a karmelit. And is it not a karmelit? Didn’t Rav Giddel say that Rav Ḥiyya bar Yosef said that Rav said: A house that does not have walls inside it that are ten handbreadths high, and with its roofing it reaches a height of ten handbreadths above the ground; on its roof, one may carry on all of it, as its roof is a private domain in every sense, and inside it, one may only carry four cubits, as inside, the height is insufficient to render it a private domain, and it retains karmelit status? Apparently, even an area less than ten handbreadths high has the legal status of a karmelit.

9 ט

אֶלָּא מַאי ״וְתוֹפֶסֶת עַד עֲשָׂרָה״ — דְּעַד עֲשָׂרָה הוּא דְּהָוְיָא כַּרְמְלִית, לְמַעְלָה מֵעֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים לָא הָוְיָא כַּרְמְלִית. וְכִי הָא דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ שְׁמוּאֵל לְרַב יְהוּדָה: שִׁינָּנָא, לָא תְּיהַוֵּי בְּמִילֵּי דְשַׁבְּתָא לְמַעְלָה מֵעֲשָׂרָה. לְמַאי הִלְכְתָא? אִילֵּימָא דְּאֵין רְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד לְמַעְלָה מֵעֲשָׂרָה? וְהָאָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: נָעַץ קָנֶה בִּרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד וְזָרַק וְנָח עַל גַּבָּיו, אֲפִילּוּ גָּבוֹהַּ מֵאָה אַמָּה — חַיָּיב, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד עוֹלָה עַד לָרָקִיעַ.

Rather, what is the meaning of Rav Sheshet’s formulation: And extends up to ten? Apparently, up to ten handbreadths is that which is within the parameters of a karmelit, and above ten handbreadths is not a karmelit. And as Shmuel said to Rav Yehuda: Keen scholar [shinnana], do not be involved with questions in the matters of Shabbat above ten handbreadths. The Gemara elaborates: With regard to what halakha and in the context of what issue did Shmuel make this statement? If you say his intention was that there is no private domain above ten handbreadths, didn’t Rav Ḥisda say: One who stuck a stick in the ground of the private domain and threw an object from the public domain and it landed atop it, even if the stick was a hundred cubits high, he is liable, since the private domain extends up to the sky? Apparently, there is a private domain even above ten handbreadths.