the handle of a spear [devortiya].
א"ל מאי דעתיך כר' מאיר רבי מאיר ורבי יוסי הלכה כרבי יוסי ורבי יוסי האמר הוזם בדיני ממונות כשר לדיני נפשות
Rav Abba bar Ya’akov said to bar Ḥama: Why did you bring these witnesses? What do you hold? Do you hold like Rabbi Meir, that one who is guilty of a monetary transgression is disqualified from bearing witness in capital cases too? But in a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, and doesn’t Rabbi Yosei say that if one was rendered a conspiring witness in a case of monetary law he is fit to testify in cases of capital law?
אמר ליה רב פפי הני מילי היכא דלא סתם לן תנא כרבי מאיר הכא סתם לן תנא כרבי מאיר
Rav Pappi immediately said to him: This statement applies only where the tanna did not teach us an unattributed mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. Here, the tanna taught us an unattributed mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.
ממאי אילימא מהא דתנן כל הראוי לדון דיני נפשות ראוי לדון דיני ממונות מני אילימא רבי יוסי היא הא איכא עד זומם דממון דכשר לדיני נפשות ופסול לדיני ממונות אלא לאו רבי מאיר היא
The Gemara asks: From what mishna is it seen that the tanna taught an unattributed mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir? If we say it is from that which we learned in a mishna (Nidda 49b): Anyone who is fit to adjudicate cases of capital law is fit to adjudicate cases of monetary law, that is inconclusive. Even though one can compare the halakhot of disqualifying judges to the halakhot of disqualifying witnesses, one cannot cite this as an example of a mishna taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. Whose opinion is recorded in this mishna? If we say it is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, isn’t there the counterexample of a conspiring witness in monetary matters, who is fit to adjudicate cases of capital law but is disqualified from adjudicating cases of monetary law? Rather, is the ruling of the mishna not the opinion of Rabbi Meir?
ממאי דילמא בפסולי יוחסין קאי
The Gemara explains why this cannot be the source: If this is the unattributed mishna Rav Pappi was referring to, from where is it derived that it is the opinion of Rabbi Meir? Perhaps the mishna is referring to those who are disqualified from serving as judges due to their lineage, e.g., converts and mamzerim, not those who are disqualified due to sin.
דאי לא תימא הכי סיפא דקתני יש ראוי לדון דיני ממונות ואין ראוי לדון דיני נפשות אמאי אינו ראוי דאיתזם בדיני נפשות ראוי לדון דיני ממונות והא דברי הכל פסול הוא אלא בפסול יוחסין קאי ה"נ בפסול יוחסין קאי
As, if you do not say so, then with regard to the latter clause of that mishna, which teaches: There is one who is fit to adjudicate cases of monetary law but is unfit to adjudicate cases of capital law, to whom could this be referring? Why would one be unfit to adjudicate cases of capital law? If it is referring to one who was rendered a conspiring witness in a case of capital law, is he fit to adjudicate cases of monetary law? But doesn’t everyone agree that he is disqualified? Rather, the mishna is clearly referring to those who are disqualified from serving as judges due to their lineage. Here too, in the first clause, the mishna is referring to those who are disqualified from serving as judges due to their lineage.
אלא הכא קא סתם לן תנא דתנן אלו הן הפסולים המשחק בקוביא ומלוי ברבית ומפריחי יונים וסוחרי שביעית והעבדים זה הכלל כל עדות שאין האשה כשירה לה אף הן אין כשרין לה
Rather, the tanna taught us an unattributed mishna here, as we learned in a mishna (Rosh HaShana 22a): These people are disqualified from bearing witness, as they are considered wicked and guilty of monetary transgressions: One who plays with dice, and those who lend money with interest, and those who fly pigeons, and merchants who trade in produce of the Sabbatical Year. And Canaanite slaves are also disqualified. This is the principle: For any testimony for which a woman is not fit, these too are not fit. Although in certain cases a woman’s testimony is accepted, e.g., testimony concerning the death of someone’s husband, in most cases her testimony is not valid.
מני אילימא רבי יוסי והאיכא עדות בדיני נפשות שאין האשה כשרה לה והן כשרין לה אלא לאו רבי מאיר היא
In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? If we say it is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, that is difficult: But isn’t there testimony in cases of capital law, for which a woman is not fit but for which those considered wicked due to having committed monetary transgressions are fit? Rather, is it not the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who maintains these people are disqualified from testifying in cases of capital law as well? Apparently, this unspecified mishna follows the opinion of Rabbi Meir. Therefore, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion.
קם בר חמא נשקיה אכרעיה וקבליה לכרגיה דכולי שניה:
Based on this conclusion, one of the witnesses who testified against bar Ḥama with regard to the murder was disqualified, and bar Ḥama was acquitted. Bar Ḥama then arose and kissed Rabbi Pappi on his feet and accepted upon himself to pay his tax [karga] for all of his years.
מתני׳ ואלו הן הקרובין אחיו ואחי אביו ואחי אמו ובעל אחותו ובעל אחות אביו ובעל אחות אמו ובעל אמו וחמיו וגיסו הן ובניהן וחתניהן וחורגו לבדו
MISHNA: And these are the ones disqualified from bearing witness or from serving as judges due to their status as relatives of one of the litigants or of each other: One’s brother, and his paternal uncle, and his maternal uncle, and his sister’s husband, and the husband of his paternal aunt, and the husband of his maternal aunt, and his mother’s husband, and his father-in-law, and his brother-in-law, i.e., the husband of his wife’s sister. They themselves, all of these people, and also their sons, and their sons-in-law are considered relatives. And his stepson alone is disqualified, but not his stepson’s sons or sons-in-law.
א"ר יוסי זו משנת רבי עקיבא אבל משנה ראשונה דודו ובן דודו וכל הראוי ליורשו וכל הקרוב לו באותה שעה
Rabbi Yosei says: This aforementioned halakha is Rabbi Akiva’s version of the mishna. But the initial version of the mishna reads as follows: His uncle and the son of his uncle, and anyone who is fit to inherit from him. Only paternal relatives, who are fit to inherit from him, are disqualified; maternal relatives, who do not inherit from him, are not disqualified from bearing witness about him or from adjudicating his case. And the halakha disqualifying a relative from bearing witness or serving as a judge is referring to anyone who is related to him at the time of the trial.
היה קרוב ונתרחק ה"ז כשר רבי יהודה אומר אפילו מתה בתו ויש לו בנים ממנה הרי זה קרוב
If one was once a relative and became unrelated by the time of the trial, e.g., he married the daughter of one of the litigants, but she died or they were divorced, in this case he is fit. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if his daughter died but her husband, the former son-in-law, has children from her, he is still considered a relative; the children cause them to remain related.
האוהב והשונא אוהב זה שושבינו שונא כל שלא דבר עמו שלשה ימים באיבה א"ל לא נחשדו ישראל על כך:
One who loves or one who hates one of the litigants is also disqualified. With regard to one who loves one of the litigants, this is referring to his groomsman. One who hates is referring to anyone who, out of enmity, did not speak with the litigant for three days. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda: The Jewish people are not suspected of bearing false witness due to love or hate.
גמ׳ מנהני מילי דת"ר (דברים כד, טז) לא יומתו אבות על בנים מה ת"ל אם ללמד שלא יומתו אבות בעון בנים ובנים בעון אבות הרי כבר נאמר (דברים כד, טז) איש בחטאו יומתו
GEMARA: From where is this matter, that relatives are disqualified from bearing witness, derived? The Gemara answers: It is as the Sages taught in a baraita: “The fathers shall not be put to death for the children, neither shall the children be put to death for the fathers; every man shall be put to death for his own sin” (Deuteronomy 24:16). Why must the verse state this first clause? If it is to teach that the fathers shall not be put to death for the sin of the children, nor shall the children be put to death for the sin of the fathers, this is unnecessary, as it is in any event stated: “Every man shall be put to death for his own sin.”
אלא לא יומתו אבות על בנים בעדות בנים ובנים לא יומתו על אבות בעדות אבות
Rather, the statement “The fathers shall not be put to death for the children” should be interpreted to mean that they shall not be put to death by the testimony of the children, and the statement “Neither shall the children be put to death for the fathers” should be interpreted to mean that they shall not be put to death by the testimony of the fathers.
ובנים בעון אבות לא והכתיב (שמות לד, ז) פוקד עון אבות על בנים
The Gemara asks: And are children not put to death for the sin of the fathers? But isn’t it written: “Visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the children’s children, unto the third and unto the fourth generation” (Exodus 34:7)?
התם כשאוחזין מעשה אבותיהן בידיהן
The Gemara answers: There, the verse is referring to a situation where the children adopt the actions of their ancestors as their own. If they do not behave like their ancestors they are not punished for their ancestors’ sins.
כדתניא (ויקרא כו, לט) ואף בעונות אבותם אתם ימקו כשאוחזין מעשה אבותיהם בידיהם אתה אומר כשאוחזין או אינו אלא כשאין אוחזין כשהוא אומר איש בחטאו יומתו הרי כשאוחזין מעשה אבותיהן בידיהן
This is as it is taught in a baraita: The verse: “And also in the iniquities of their fathers shall they pine away with them” (Leviticus 26:39), is referring to a case where they adopt the actions of their ancestors as their own. Do you say that it is referring specifically to a case where they adopt the actions of their ancestors, or perhaps it applies even where they do not adopt their ancestors’ actions? When the verse states: “Every man shall be put to death for his own sin,” the Torah explicates that one is not put to death if he did not sin. Therefore, the verse in Leviticus is clearly referring to a case where they adopt the actions of their ancestors as their own.
ולא והכתיב (ויקרא כו, לז) וכשלו איש באחיו איש בעון אחיו מלמד שכולן ערבים זה בזה
The Gemara asks: And are descendants not punished for the sins of their ancestors unless they adopt their behavior? But isn’t it written: “And they shall stumble one upon another” (Leviticus 26:37)? This verse is homiletically interpreted to mean that the Jewish people shall stumble, one due to the iniquity of another, i.e., they are punished for each other’s sins, which teaches that all Jews are considered guarantors, i.e., responsible, for one another.
התם שהיה בידם למחות ולא מיחו
The Gemara answers: There, in the verse in Leviticus, the reference is to a case where others had the ability to protest the sin but they did not protest. Consequently, they are punished for not protesting, regardless of any familial relationship they may have with the sinner.