Mishneh Torah, Sabbath
Chapter 1א׳
1 א

שְׁבִיתָה בַּשְּׁבִיעִי מִמְּלָאכָה מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שמות לד כא) "וּבַיּוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי תִּשְׁבֹּת". וְכָל הָעוֹשֶׂה בּוֹ מְלָאכָה בִּטֵּל מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה וְעָבַר עַל לֹא תַּעֲשֶׂה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים ה יד) "לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה כָל מְלָאכָה". וּמַה הוּא חַיָּב עַל עֲשִׂיַּת מְלָאכָה. אִם עָשָׂה בִּרְצוֹנוֹ בְּזָדוֹן חַיָּב כָּרֵת. וְאִם הָיוּ שָׁם עֵדִים וְהַתְרָאָה נִסְקָל. וְאִם עָשָׂה בִּשְׁגָגָה חַיָּב קָרְבַּן חַטָּאת קְבוּעָה:

To rest on the seventh day of the week is a positive command, for it is written: "On the seventh day you shall rest" (Exodus 23:12). Anyone who works on it negates a positive command while transgressing a negative command, for it is written: "You shall do no work" (Exodus 20:10). What penalty does he deserve for doing work? If he did it voluntarily, willfully, he deserves kareth; if he acted in the presence of witnesses who forewarned him, he is stoned; if he acted unintentionally, he must bring a standard sin-offering.

2 ב

כָּל מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר בְּהִלְכוֹת שַׁבָּת שֶׁהָעוֹשֶׂה דָּבָר זֶה חַיָּב הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב כָּרֵת. וְאִם הָיוּ שָׁם עֵדִים וְהַתְרָאָה חַיָּב סְקִילָה. וְאִם הָיָה שׁוֹגֵג חַיָּב חַטָּאת:

In Sabbath laws, wherever it is stated that someone deserves punishment for doing something, he deserves kareth; if he acted despite the forewarning of witnesses, he deserves stoning; if he committed the transgression inadvertently, he has to bring a sin-offering.

3 ג

וְכָל מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר שֶׁהָעוֹשֶׂה דָּבָר זֶה פָּטוּר הֲרֵי זֶה פָּטוּר מִן הַכָּרֵת וּמִן הַסְּקִילָה וּמִן הַקָּרְבָּן אֲבָל אָסוּר לַעֲשׂוֹת אוֹתוֹ דָּבָר בְּשַׁבָּת וְאִסּוּרוֹ מִדִּבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים וְהוּא הַרְחָקָה מִן הַמְּלָאכָה. וְהָעוֹשֶׂה אוֹתוֹ בְּזָדוֹן מַכִּין אוֹתוֹ מַכַּת מַרְדּוּת. וְכֵן כָּל מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר אֵין עוֹשִׂין כָּךְ וְכָךְ אוֹ אָסוּר לַעֲשׂוֹת כָּךְ וְכָךְ בְּשַׁבָּת הָעוֹשֶׂה אוֹתוֹ דָּבָר בְּזָדוֹן מַכִּין אוֹתוֹ מַכַּת מַרְדּוּת:

And any place where it is stated that one who does this thing is exempt (patur), [it means] that he is exempt from excision, from stoning and from a sacrifice; but it is [still] forbidden to do this thing on Shabbat, the prohibition being rabbinic (literally, from the words of the scribes). And it is a distancing from forbidden work [forbidden by the Torah itself]. And one who does it volitionally is struck with lashes of rebellion. Likewise, any place where it is stated, “We do not do such and such,” or “It is forbidden to do such and such on Shabbat”; one who does it volitionally is struck with lashes of rebellion.

4 ד

וְכָל מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר מֻתָּר לַעֲשׂוֹת כָּךְ וְכָךְ הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר לְכַתְּחִלָּה. וְכֵן כָּל מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר אֵינוֹ חַיָּב כְּלוּם אוֹ פָּטוּר מִכְּלוּם אֵין מַכִּין אוֹתוֹ כְּלָל:

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5 ה

דְּבָרִים הַמֻּתָּרִים לַעֲשׂוֹתָן בְּשַׁבָּת וּבִשְׁעַת עֲשִׂיָּתָן אֶפְשָׁר שֶׁתֵּעָשֶׂה בִּגְלָלָן מְלָאכָה וְאֶפְשָׁר שֶׁלֹּא תֵּעָשֶׂה. אִם לֹא נִתְכַּוֵּן לְאוֹתָהּ מְלָאכָה הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר. כֵּיצַד. גּוֹרֵר אָדָם מִטָּה וְכִסֵּא וְסַפְסָל וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן בְּשַׁבָּת וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יִתְכַּוֵּן לַחְפֹּר חָרִיץ בַּקַּרְקַע בִּשְׁעַת גְּרִירָתָן. וּלְפִיכָךְ אִם חָפְרוּ הַקַּרְקַע אֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ בְּכָךְ לְפִי שֶׁלֹּא נִתְכַּוֵּן. וְכֵן מְהַלֵּךְ אָדָם עַל גַּבֵּי עֲשָׂבִים בְּשַׁבָּת וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יִתְכַּוֵּן לַעֲקֹר אוֹתָן. לְפִיכָךְ אִם נֶעֶקְרוּ אֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ. וְרוֹחֵץ יָדָיו בַּעֲפַר הַפֵּרוֹת וְכַיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַשִּׁיר הַשֵּׂעָר. לְפִיכָךְ אִם נָשַׁר אֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ. וְכֵן פִּרְצָה דְּחוּקָה מֻתָּר לְהִכָּנֵס בָּהּ בְּשַׁבָּת אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁמַּשִּׁיר צְרוֹרוֹת. וְכֵן כָּל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוֵּן כְּגוֹן זֶה הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר:

Things that are permissible to do on Shabbat, but it is possible that while doing it, he will do forbidden work through them and it is also possible that the will not do so; if he does not have intention to do that particular work, it is permissible. How is this? A man may drag a bed, a chair or a bench and that which is similar to them on Shabbat, so long as he does not intend to dig a ditch in the ground at the time that he drags them. Hence if they dug a ditch into the ground, he need not be concerned, since he did not have intention [for it]. Likewise, a man may walk on top of grass on Shabbat, so long as he does not intend to uproot it. Hence if they are uprooted, he need not be concerned. And he may wash his hands with “fruit dust” and that which is similar to it, so long as he does not intend to remove the hair [on his hands]. Hence if they fall out, he need not be concerned. It is likewise permissible to enter a small breach on Shabbat even though he removes small pieces [of the wall]. And likewise with anything that he does not intend like this – it is permissible.

6 ו

אֲבָל עָשָׂה מַעֲשֶׂה וְנַעֲשֵׂית בִּגְלָלוֹ מְלָאכָה שֶׁוַּדַּאי תֵּעָשֶׂה בִּשְׁבִיל אוֹתוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא נִתְכַּוֵּן לָהּ חַיָּב. שֶׁהַדָּבָר יָדוּעַ שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר שֶׁלֹּא תֵּעָשֶׂה אוֹתָהּ מְלָאכָה. כֵּיצַד. הֲרֵי שֶׁצָּרִיךְ לְרֹאשׁ עוֹף לְצַחֵק בּוֹ הַקָּטָן וְחָתַךְ רֹאשׁוֹ בְּשַׁבָּת אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין סוֹף מְגַמָּתוֹ לַהֲרִיגַת הָעוֹף בִּלְבַד חַיָּב שֶׁהַדָּבָר יָדוּעַ שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר שֶׁיַּחְתֹּךְ רֹאשׁ הַחַי וְיִחְיֶה אֶלָּא הַמָּוֶת בָּא בִּשְׁבִילוֹ. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:

But if he did an act and forbidden work is done through it such that it is certain that it would be done from that act, he is liable [for it] even if he did not intend [to do the work]. For it is well-known that it is impossible that this work would not be done [through his act]. How is this? If one needs the head of a chicken for an infant to play with and he cuts off its head on Shabbat – even though his end purpose is not solely to kill the chicken – he is liable, since it is well-known that it is impossible to cut off the head of a living being and that it should live. Rather, death comes as a result of [his action]. And likewise with anything that is similar to this.

7 ז

כָּל הָעוֹשֶׂה מְלָאכָה בְּשַׁבָּת אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לְגוּפָהּ שֶׁל מְלָאכָה חַיָּב עָלֶיהָ. כֵּיצַד. הֲרֵי שֶׁכִּבָּה אֶת הַנֵּר מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא צָרִיךְ לַשֶּׁמֶן אוֹ לַפְּתִילָה כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יֹאבַד אוֹ כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יִשָּׂרֵף אוֹ כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יִבָּקַע חֶרֶשׂ שֶׁל נֵר. מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהַכִּבּוּי מְלָאכָה וַהֲרֵי נִתְכַּוֵּן לְכַבּוֹת וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לְגוּף הַכִּבּוּי וְלֹא כִּבָּה אֶלָּא מִפְּנֵי הַשֶּׁמֶן אוֹ מִפְּנֵי הַחֶרֶשׂ אוֹ מִפְּנֵי הַפְּתִילָה הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב. וְכֵן הַמַּעֲבִיר אֶת הַקּוֹץ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים אוֹ הַמְכַבֶּה אֶת הַגַּחֶלֶת כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יִזּוֹקוּ בָּהֶן רַבִּים חַיָּב וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לְגוּף הַכִּבּוּי אוֹ לְגוּף הַהַעֲבָרָה אֶלָּא לְהַרְחִיק הַהֶזֵּק הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:

Anyone who does forbidden work on Shabbat even though he does not need the work itself is [nevertheless] liable for it. How is this? If he extinguishes a lamp because he needs the oil or the wick so that it not to be consumed, or so that it not be burned or that it should not crack the clay of the lamp – he is liable. For extinguishing is forbidden work and he intended to extinguish [it], even though he did not need the extinguishing itself, and he only extinguished it for the sake of the oil or for the sake of the clay or for the sake of the wick. Likewise, one who transports a thorn four ells in the public domain or extinguishes a coal so that the public is not hurt by them is liable. As even though he does not need the extinguishing itself or the transporting itself but rather [just wants] to remove the danger, he is liable. And likewise anything that is similar to this.

8 ח

כָּל הַמִּתְכַּוֵּן לַעֲשׂוֹת מְלָאכָה וְנַעֲשָׂה לוֹ מְלָאכָה אַחֶרֶת שֶׁלֹּא נִתְכַּוֵּן לָהּ פָּטוּר עָלֶיהָ לְפִי שֶׁלֹּא נַעֲשֵׂית מַחֲשַׁבְתּוֹ. כֵּיצַד. זָרַק אֶבֶן אוֹ חֵץ בַּחֲבֵרוֹ אוֹ בִּבְהֵמָה כְּדֵי לְהָרְגָן וְהָלַךְ וְעָקַר אִילָן בַּהֲלִיכָתוֹ וְלֹא הָרַג הֲרֵי זֶה פָּטוּר. הֲרֵי זֶה קַל וָחֹמֶר אִם נִתְכַּוֵּן לְאִסּוּר קַל וְנַעֲשָׂה אִסּוּר חָמוּר. כְּגוֹן שֶׁנִּתְכַּוֵּן לִזְרֹק בְּכַרְמְלִית וְעָבְרָה הָאֶבֶן לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים שֶׁהוּא פָּטוּר. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה. נִתְכַּוֵּן לַעֲשׂוֹת דָּבָר הַמֻּתָּר וְעָשָׂה דָּבָר אַחֵר כְּגוֹן שֶׁנִּתְכַּוֵּן לַחְתֹּךְ אֶת הַתָּלוּשׁ וְחָתַךְ אֶת הַמְחֻבָּר אֵינוֹ חַיָּב כְּלוּם. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:

Anyone who intends to do forbidden work, but a different forbidden work that he did not intend is done [instead]; he is exempt for it, as he did not fulfill his thought. How is this? When he threw a stone or an arrow at his fellow or at an animal to kill them, and it went and uprooted a tree in its trajectory but it did not kill [the target], he is exempt. And it is an a fortiori case if he intends to do a lighter prohibition and he does a stringent prohibition. For example, if he intends to throw within a karmelit (a rabbinically defined public domain) and the stone reaches a public domain, he is exempt. And likewise, anything that is similar to this. If he intended to do something permissible and does something else – such as if he intends to cut detached [vegetation], but he cuts attached [vegetation] – he is not liable at all. And likewise anything that is similar to this.

9 ט

נִתְכַּוֵּן לִלְקֹט תְּאֵנִים שְׁחוֹרוֹת וְלִקֵּט לְבָנוֹת אוֹ שֶׁנִּתְכַּוֵּן לִלְקֹט תְּאֵנִים וְאַחַר כָּךְ עֲנָבִים וְנֶהְפַּךְ הַדָּבָר וְלִקֵּט הָעֲנָבִים בַּתְּחִלָּה וְאַחַר כָּךְ תְּאֵנִים פָּטוּר אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלִּקֵּט כָּל מַה שֶּׁחָשַׁב הוֹאִיל וְלֹא לִקֵּט כַּסֵּדֶר שֶׁחָשַׁב פָּטוּר שֶׁבְּלֹא כַּוָּנָה עָשָׂה שֶׁלֹּא אָסְרָה תּוֹרָה אֶלָּא מְלֶאכֶת מַחְשֶׁבֶת:

One who intended to pluck black figs but plucked [green] figs, or intended to first pluck figs and then grapes but the matter was switched and he plucked grapes first and then figs, is exempt. Even though he plucked all that he thought, since he did not pluck [them] in the order that he thought, he is exempt – as he did it without intention. For the Torah only prohibits thought out work (melakhet machshevet).

10 י

הָיוּ לְפָנָיו שְׁתֵּי נֵרוֹת דּוֹלְקוֹת אוֹ כְּבוּיוֹת נִתְכַּוֵּן לְכַבּוֹת זוֹ וְכִבָּה אֶת זוֹ לְהַדְלִיק זוֹ וְהִדְלִיק אֶת זוֹ חַיָּב שֶׁהֲרֵי עָשָׂה מִן הַמְּלָאכָה שֶׁחָשַׁב לַעֲשׂוֹתָהּ. הָא לְמָה הוּא דּוֹמֶה לְמִי שֶׁנִּתְכַּוֵּן לִלְקֹט תְּאֵנָה זוֹ וְלִקֵּט תְּאֵנָה אַחֶרֶת. אוֹ לְמִי שֶׁנִּתְכַּוֵּן לַהֲרֹג אֶת זֶה וְהָרַג אֶת זֶה שֶׁהֲרֵי נַעֲשֵׂית מְלָאכָה שֶׁחָשַׁב לַעֲשׂוֹתָהּ:

When there are two lit lamps or two extinguished lamps in front of him and he intended to extinguish the one but extinguished [the other], or to light this one but he lit [the other], he is liable – as he did [the category] of the work that the thought to do. Behold what this resembles: One who intended to pluck this fig and he plucked [another]; or one who intended to kill this one and killed [another]. For you see that the forbidden work that he thought to do was done.

11 יא

אֲבָל אִם נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַדְלִיק רִאשׁוֹנָה וּלְכַבּוֹת שְׁנִיָּה אַחֲרֶיהָ וְנֶהְפַּךְ הַדָּבָר וְכִבָּה רִאשׁוֹנָה וְאַחַר כָּךְ הִדְלִיק שְׁנִיָּה אַחֲרֶיהָ פָּטוּר. כִּבָּה זוֹ וְהִדְלִיק זוֹ בִּנְשִׁימָה אַחַת חַיָּב. שֶׁאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא הִקְדִּים הַהַדְלָקָה הֲרֵי זֶה לֹא אִחֵר אוֹתָהּ אֶלָּא שְׁתֵּיהֶן כְּאַחַת וּלְפִיכָךְ חַיָּב. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה. וְכָל הָעוֹשֶׂה מְלָאכָה בְּמִתְעַסֵּק וְלֹא נִתְכַּוֵּן לָהּ פָּטוּר:

But if he intended to light [one] first and to then extinguish the [other one] after it, but the matter was switched and he first extinguished [the one] and then lit [the other] after it, he is exempt. [But] when he extinguished this one and lit [the other] one in one breath, he is liable. As even though he did not have the lighting precede, he surely did not delay it, but rather both of them were as one and he is therefore liable. And likewise anything that is similar to this. And anyone who does forbidden work while unaware (of his actions) and did not intend it is exempt.

12 יב

כָּל הַמִּתְכַּוֵּן לַעֲשׂוֹת מְלָאכָה וְנַעֲשֵׂית בְּיוֹתֵר עַל כַּוָּנָתוֹ חַיָּב. בְּפָחוֹת מִכַּוָּנָתוֹ פָּטוּר. כֵּיצַד. הֲרֵי שֶׁנִּתְכַּוֵּן לְהוֹצִיא מַשָּׂא לְאַחֲרָיו וּבָא לוֹ לְפָנָיו חַיָּב שֶׁהֲרֵי נִתְכַּוֵּן לִשְׁמִירָה פְּחוּתָה וְנַעֲשֵׂית שְׁמִירָה מְעֻלָּה. אֲבָל אִם נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהוֹצִיא לְפָנָיו וּבָא לוֹ לְאַחֲרָיו פָּטוּר שֶׁהֲרֵי נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהוֹצִיא בִּשְׁמִירָה מְעֻלָּה וְהוֹצִיא בִּשְׁמִירָה פְּחוּתָה. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:

Anyone who intends to do forbidden work, but more than his intention is done, is liable. [If] less than his intention [is done], he is exempt. How is this? If he intended to transport a load behind him and it came to be in front of him, he is liable. For he intended an inferior safekeeping [of the load] and it became a superior safekeeping. But if he intended to transport [it] in front of him and it came to be behind him, he is exempt. For he intended to transport it with a superior safekeeping and he transported it with an inferior safekeeping. And likewise anything that is similar to this.

13 יג

הָיָה חָגוּר בְּסִנָּר וְהִשְׁלִיךְ הַמַּשָּׂא בֵּין בְּשָׂרוֹ וַחֲלוּקוֹ בֵּין שֶׁבָּא זֶה הַמַּשָּׂא שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לְהוֹצִיאוֹ בַּדֶּרֶךְ הַזֹּאת לְפָנָיו בֵּין שֶׁבָּא לְאַחֲרָיו חַיָּב שֶׁכֵּן דַּרְכּוֹ לִהְיוֹת חוֹזֵר:

When he is bound with a sash and he placed a load between his flesh and his cloak; whether this load, the way of which is to be transported in this way, comes to be in front of him or it comes to be behind him, he is liable. As it is its way [of carrying in this manner], that it shifts.

14 יד

כָּל הַמִתְכַּוֵּן לַעֲשׂוֹת מְלָאכָה בְּשַׁבָּת וְהִתְחִיל בָּהּ וְעָשָׂה כַּשִּׁעוּר חַיָּב. אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא הִשְׁלִים כָּל הַמְּלָאכָה שֶׁנִּתְכַּוֵּן לְהַשְׁלִימָהּ. כֵּיצַד. הֲרֵי שֶׁנִּתְכַּוֵּן לִכְתֹּב אִגֶּרֶת אוֹ שְׁטָר בְּשַׁבָּת אֵין אוֹמְרִים לֹא יִתְחַיֵּב זֶה עַד שֶׁיַּשְׁלִים חֶפְצוֹ וְיִכְתֹּב כָּל הַשְּׁטָר אוֹ כָּל הָאִגֶּרֶת אֶלָּא מִשֶּׁיִּכְתֹּב שְׁתֵּי אוֹתִיּוֹת חַיָּב. וְכֵן אִם נִתְכַּוֵּן לֶאֱרֹג בֶּגֶד שָׁלֵם מִשֶּׁיֶאֱרֹג שְׁנֵי חוּטִין חַיָּב וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁכַּוָּנָתוֹ לְהַשְׁלִים הַבֶּגֶד הוֹאִיל וְעָשָׂה כַּשִּׁעוּר בְּכַוָּנָה חַיָּב. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:

Anyone who intends to do forbidden work on Shabbat, begins it and does a [requisite] amount is liable – even if he does not finish all of the work that he intended to do. How is this? If he intended to write a letter or a deed on Shabbat, we do not say that he is not liable until he fulfills his intent and writes the whole bill or the whole letter. Rather, he is liable from when he writes two letters (of the Hebrew alphabet). Likewise if he intended to weave a whole garment, he is liable from when he weaves two threads. And even though his intention is to finish the garment, since he did the [requisite] amount with intention, he is liable. And likewise anything that is similar to this.

15 טו

כָּל מְלָאכָה שֶׁהַיָּחִיד יָכוֹל לַעֲשׂוֹת אוֹתָהּ לְבַדּוֹ וְעָשׂוּ אוֹתָהּ שְׁנַיִם בְּשֻׁתָּפוּת בֵּין שֶׁעָשָׂה זֶה מִקְצָתָהּ וְזֶה מִקְצָתָהּ כְּגוֹן שֶׁעָקַר זֶה הַחֵפֶץ מֵרְשׁוּת זוֹ וְהִנִּיחוֹ הַשֵּׁנִי בִּרְשׁוּת אַחֶרֶת בֵּין שֶׁעָשׂוּ אוֹתָהּ שְׁנֵיהֶם כְּאֶחָד מִתְּחִלָּה וְעַד סוֹף כְּגוֹן שֶׁאָחֲזוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם בְּקֻלְמוֹס וְכָתְבוּ אוֹ אָחֲזוּ כִּכָּר וְהוֹצִיאוּהוּ מֵרְשׁוּת לִרְשׁוּת הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ פְּטוּרִין:

Any forbidden work that an individual can do by himself, but it is done by two in partnership – whether this one does part of it and that one part [of it], such as when one lifts up an object in this domain and the other puts it down in another domain; or whether the two of them did it together from beginning to end, such as when the two of them grabbed a quill and wrote or grabbed a loaf (of bread) and transported it from [one] domain to [another] domain – they are surely exempt.

16 טז

וְאִם אֵין אֶחָד מֵהֶן יָכוֹל לַעֲשׂוֹתָהּ לְבַדּוֹ עַד שֶׁיִּצְטָרְפוּ כְּגוֹן שְׁנַיִם שֶׁאָחֲזוּ קוֹרָה וְהוֹצִיאוּהָ לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים הוֹאִיל וְאֵין כֹּחַ בְּאֶחָד מֵהֶן לַעֲשׂוֹתָהּ לְבַדּוֹ וְעָשׂוּ אוֹתָהּ בְּשֻׁתָּפוּת מִתְּחִלָּה וְעַד סוֹף שְׁנֵיהֶן חַיָּבִין וְשִׁעוּר אֶחָד לִשְׁנֵיהֶן. הָיָה כֹּחַ בְּאֶחָד לְהוֹצִיא קוֹרָה זוֹ לְבַדּוֹ וְהַשֵּׁנִי אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְהוֹצִיאָהּ לְבַדּוֹ וְנִשְׁתַּתְּפוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם וְהוֹצִיאוּהָ. זֶה הָרִאשׁוֹן שֶׁיָּכוֹל חַיָּב וְהַשֵּׁנִי מְסַיֵּעַ הוּא וּמְסַיֵּעַ אֵינוֹ חַיָּב כְּלוּם. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:

But if neither of them is able to do it by himself unless they are combined, such as two that grabbed a beam and transported it to the public domain – since there is not enough strength in either of them to do it by himself and they did [the work] in partnership from beginning to end – they are both liable. And there is one [requisite] amount for both of them (i.e. as if they were one person). [But] if one of them had enough strength to transport it by himself, [yet] the two of them transported it [together], this first one who was able [to do it by himself] is liable, and the second one is [only considered] a helper – and a helper is not liable at all. And likewise anything that is similar to this.

17 יז

כָּל הַמְקַלְקְלִין פְּטוּרִין. כֵּיצַד. הֲרֵי שֶׁחָבַל בַּחֲבֵרוֹ אוֹ בִּבְהֵמָה דֶּרֶךְ הַשְׁחָתָה וְכֵן אִם קָרַע בְּגָדִים אוֹ שְׂרָפָן אוֹ שָׁבַר כֵּלִים דֶּרֶךְ הַשְׁחָתָה הֲרֵי זֶה פָּטוּר. חָפַר גּוּמָא וְאֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ אֶלָּא לַעֲפָרָהּ הֲרֵי זֶה מְקַלְקֵל וּפָטוּר. אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁעָשָׂה מְלָאכָה הוֹאִיל וְכַוָּנָתוֹ לְקַלְקֵל פָּטוּר:

All that damage are exempt. How is this? If he injured his fellow or an animal in a destructive way, and likewise if he tore clothing or burned them or broke vessels in a destructive way, he is surely exempt. When he dug a hole but only needs the dirt, this is damaging and he is [thus] exempt. Since his intention was to damage, even though he did forbidden work, he is exempt.

18 יח

כָּל הַמְקַלְקֵל עַל מְנָת לְתַקֵּן חַיָּב. כֵּיצַד. הֲרֵי שֶׁסָּתַר כְּדֵי לִבְנוֹת בִּמְקוֹמוֹ אוֹ שֶׁמָּחַק כְּדֵי לִכְתֹּב בַּמָּקוֹם שֶׁמָּחַק אוֹ שֶׁחָפַר גּוּמָא כְּדֵי לִבְנוֹת בְּתוֹכָהּ יְסוֹדוֹת וְכָל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה חַיָּב. וְשִׁעוּרָן כְּשִׁעוּר הַמְתַקֵּן:

Anyone who damages in order to improve is liable. How is this? If he destroys [something] in order to build in its place, or erased in order to write in the place that he erased or dug a hole in order to build foundations in it, and likewise anything that is similar to this, he is liable. And their [requisite] amount is like the [requisite] amount of the one that improves [corresponding to that particular damage].

19 יט

כָּל הָעוֹשֶׂה מְלָאכָה בְּשַׁבָּת מִקְצָתָהּ בְּשׁוֹגֵג וּמִקְצָתָהּ בְּזָדוֹן בֵּין שֶׁהֵזִיד וּלְבַסּוֹף שָׁגַג בֵּין שֶׁשָּׁגַג וּלְבַסּוֹף הֵזִיד פָּטוּר עַד שֶׁיַּעֲשֶׂה שִׁעוּר הַמְּלָאכָה כֻּלָּהּ מִתְּחִלָּה וְעַד סוֹף בְּזָדוֹן וְאַחַר כָּךְ יִהְיֶה חַיָּב כָּרֵת. וְאִם יִהְיֶה בְּעֵדִים וְהַתְרָאָה חַיָּב סְקִילָה. אוֹ שֶׁיַּעֲשֶׂה שִׁעוּר מְלָאכָה כֻּלָּהּ בִּשְׁגָגָה מִתְּחִלָּה וְעַד סוֹף וְאַחַר כָּךְ יִהְיֶה חַיָּב חַטָּאת קְבוּעָה:

Anyone who does forbidden work on Shabbat, part of it inadvertently and part of it volitionally – whether he was volitional and in the end became inadvertent or he was inadvertent and in the end became volitional – is exempt. [But when] he would do the entire [requisite] amount of the forbidden work from beginning to end volitionally, he would then be liable for excision. And if it would be with witnesses and a warning, he [would be] liable for stoning. And [if] he would do the entire [requisite] amount of the forbidden work inadvertently from beginning to end, he would then be liable for a set sin-offering.