עַד שֶׁיִּמְשׁוֹךְ וְיַחְזִיק מְשָׁכוֹ בְּמָנֶה וְלֹא הִסְפִּיק לִפְדּוֹתוֹ עַד שֶׁעָמַד בְּמָאתַיִם נוֹתֵן מָאתַיִם מַאי טַעְמָא וְנָתַן הַכֶּסֶף וְקָם לוֹ until he pulls or takes possession of it. Additionally, the Temple treasury has the following advantage: If a commoner pulled a consecrated item for the purpose of acquiring it with one hundred dinars, and he did not manage to redeem it by paying the one hundred dinars to the Temple treasurer before the item’s price stood at two hundred dinars, he gives two hundred dinars. What is the reason for this? It states: He will give the money and it will be assured to him (see Leviticus 27:19). This indicates that one can acquire an item from the Temple treasury only by the actual transfer of money.
מְשָׁכוֹ בְּמָאתַיִם וְלֹא הִסְפִּיק לִפְדּוֹתוֹ עַד שֶׁעָמַד בְּמָנֶה נוֹתֵן מָאתַיִם מַאי טַעְמָא לֹא יְהֵא כֹּחַ הֶדְיוֹט חָמוּר מֵהֶקְדֵּשׁ By contrast, in the reverse case, when the commoner pulled an item when it was worth two hundred dinars, and he did not manage to redeem it before the value of the item stood at one hundred dinars, he gives two hundred dinars. What is the reason for this? The power of a commoner should not be greater than that of the Temple treasury of consecrated property. Since a commoner completes his acquisition by pulling, the item is acquired by him at that price, and the Temple treasury should not suffer a loss in a case where the commoner could not have reneged on his commitment had he been dealing with another commoner.
פְּדָאוֹ בְּמָאתַיִם וְלֹא הִסְפִּיק לְמוֹשְׁכוֹ עַד שֶׁעָמַד בְּמָנֶה נוֹתֵן מָאתַיִם מַאי טַעְמָא וְנָתַן הַכֶּסֶף וְקָם לוֹ פְּדָאוֹ בְּמָנֶה וְלֹא הִסְפִּיק לְמוֹשְׁכוֹ עַד שֶׁעָמַד בְּמָאתַיִם מַה שֶּׁפָּדָה פָּדוּי וְאֵין נוֹתֵן אֶלָּא מָנֶה Similarly, if the commoner redeemed it at two hundred dinars, but he did not manage to pull it before its value stood at one hundred dinars, he gives two hundred dinars. What is the reason? It states: He will give the money and it will be assured to him, which indicates that the redemption of consecrated property is effected with money. By contrast, if he redeemed it at one hundred dinars and did not manage to pull it before it stood at two hundred dinars, what he redeemed is redeemed, and he gives only one hundred dinars.
אַמַּאי הָכִי נָמֵי נֵימָא לֹא יְהֵא כֹּחַ הֶדְיוֹט חָמוּר מֵהֶקְדֵּשׁ The Gemara asks: Why is this the halakha? So too, let us say: The power of a commoner should not be greater than that of the Temple treasury of consecrated property, and if this occurred in a case where he was dealing with another commoner he would need to pay the full two hundred dinars, which was the value of the item when he pulled it. Shouldn’t the Temple treasury have as much power as a common person?
אַטּוּ הֶדְיוֹט לָאו בְּמִי שֶׁפָּרַע קָאֵי The Gemara answers: There is an additional impediment to reneging on an agreement with another commoner. Is that to say that a commoner who gave a seller money and changed his mind before acquiring the item is not forced to accept upon himself the curse of: He Who exacted payment from the generation of the flood (see Genesis, chapter 7) and the generation of the dispersion (see Genesis, chapter 11) will punish one who does not keep his word? Although a commoner can legally renege on his agreement at this stage, the Sages disapproved of such dishonest conduct, and one who did so would be cursed in this manner. Consequently, the power of a commoner is not greater than that of the Temple treasury, as it is not a simple matter to renege on an agreement with another commoner.
מַתְנִי' כׇּל מִצְוֹת הַבֵּן עַל הָאָב אֲנָשִׁים חַיָּיבִין וְנָשִׁים פְּטוּרוֹת וְכׇל מִצְוֹת הָאָב עַל הַבֵּן אֶחָד אֲנָשִׁים וְאֶחָד נָשִׁים חַיָּיבִין וְכׇל מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁהַזְּמַן גְּרָמָהּ אֲנָשִׁים חַיָּיבִין וְנָשִׁים פְּטוּרוֹת וְכׇל מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁלֹּא הַזְּמַן גְּרָמָהּ אֶחָד הָאֲנָשִׁים וְאֶחָד הַנָּשִׁים חַיָּיבִין MISHNA: With regard to all mitzvot of a son with regard to his father, men are obligated to perform them and women are exempt. And with regard to all mitzvot of a father with regard to his son, both men and women are obligated to perform them. The mishna notes an additional difference between the obligations of men and women in the performance of mitzvot: With regard to all positive, time-bound mitzvot, i.e., those which must be performed at specific times, men are obligated to perform them and women are exempt. And with regard to all positive mitzvot that are not time bound, both men and women are obligated to perform them.
וְכׇל מִצְוֹת לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה בֵּין שֶׁהַזְּמַן גְּרָמָהּ בֵּין שֶׁלֹּא הַזְּמַן גְּרָמָהּ אֶחָד הָאֲנָשִׁים וְאֶחָד הַנָּשִׁים חַיָּיבִין חוּץ מִבַּל תַּקִּיף וּבַל תַּשְׁחִית וּבַל תִּטַּמֵּא לְמֵתִים And with regard to all prohibitions, whether they are time-bound or whether they are not time-bound, both men and women are obligated to observe them, except for the prohibitions of: Do not round the corners of your head, and: Do not destroy the corners of your beard, which are derived from the verse: “You shall not round the corners of your head and you shall not destroy the corners of your beard” (Leviticus 19:27), and a prohibition that concerns only priests: Do not contract ritual impurity from a corpse (see Leviticus 21:1). These mitzvot apply only to men, not women, despite the fact that they are prohibitions.
גְּמָ' מַאי כׇּל מִצְוֹת הַבֵּן עַל הָאָב אִילֵּימָא כׇּל מִצְוֹת דְּמִיחַיַּיב בְּרָא לְמִיעְבַּד לְאַבָּא נָשִׁים פְּטוּרוֹת וְהָתַנְיָא אִישׁ אֵין לִי אֶלָּא אִישׁ אִשָּׁה מִנַּיִן כְּשֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר אִישׁ אִמּוֹ וְאָבִיו תִּירָאוּ הֲרֵי כָּאן שְׁנַיִם GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase: All mitzvot of a son with regard to his father? If we say that it is referring to all mitzvot that the son is obligated to perform with regard to his father, are women exempt from obligations of this kind? But isn’t it taught in a baraita concerning a verse that deals with the mitzva of honoring one’s father and mother: “A man shall fear [tira’u] his mother and his father” (Leviticus 19:3)? I have derived only that a man is obligated in this mitzva. From where do I derive that a woman is also obligated? When it says in the same verse: “A man shall fear [tira’u] his mother and his father” (Leviticus 19:3), employing the plural form of the verb, this indicates that there are two that are obligated here, both a man and a woman.
אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה הָכִי קָאָמַר כׇּל מִצְוֹת הַבֵּן הַמּוּטָּלוֹת עַל הָאָב לַעֲשׂוֹת לִבְנוֹ אֲנָשִׁים חַיָּיבִין וְנָשִׁים פְּטוּרוֹת Rav Yehuda said that this is what the mishna is saying: With regard to all mitzvot of a son that are incumbent upon his father to perform for his son, men are obligated in them and women are exempt.
תְּנֵינָא לְהָא דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן הָאָב חַיָּיב בִּבְנוֹ לְמוּלוֹ וְלִפְדוֹתוֹ וּלְלַמְּדוֹ תּוֹרָה וּלְהַשִּׂיאוֹ אִשָּׁה וּלְלַמְּדוֹ אוּמָּנוּת וְיֵשׁ אוֹמְרִים אַף לַהֲשִׁיטוֹ בַּמַּיִם רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר כֹּל שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְלַמֵּד אֶת בְּנוֹ אוּמָּנוּת מְלַמְּדוֹ לִיסְטוּת לִיסְטוּת סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אֶלָּא כְּאִילּוּ מְלַמְּדוֹ לִיסְטוּת The Gemara comments: According to this interpretation, we learn in this mishna that which the Sages taught in a baraita: A father is obligated with regard to his son to circumcise him, and to redeem him if he is a firstborn son who must be redeemed by payment to a priest, and to teach him Torah, and to marry him to a woman, and to teach him a trade. And some say: A father is also obligated to teach his son to swim. Rabbi Yehuda says: Any father who does not teach his son a trade teaches him banditry [listut]. The Gemara expresses surprise at this statement: Can it enter your mind that he actually teaches him banditry? Rather, the baraita means that it is as though he teaches him banditry. Since the son has no profession with which to support himself, he is likely to turn to theft for a livelihood. This baraita accords with Rav Yehuda’s interpretation of the mishna.
לְמוּלוֹ מְנָלַן דִּכְתִיב וַיָּמׇל אַבְרָהָם אֶת יִצְחָק בְּנוֹ וְהֵיכָא דְּלָא מַהְלֵיהּ אֲבוּהּ מִיחַיְּיבִי בֵּי דִינָא לְמִימְהֲלֵיהּ דִּכְתִיב הִמּוֹל לָכֶם כׇּל זָכָר וְהֵיכָא דְּלָא מַהְלוּהּ בֵּי דִינָא מִיחַיַּיב אִיהוּ לְמִימְהַל נַפְשֵׁיהּ דִּכְתִיב וְעָרֵל זָכָר אֲשֶׁר לֹא יִמּוֹל אֶת בְּשַׂר עׇרְלָתוֹ וְנִכְרְתָה § The baraita teaches that a father is obligated to circumcise his son. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? The Gemara answers that this is as it is written: “And Abraham circumcised his son Isaac” (Genesis 21:4). The Gemara comments: And in a case where one’s father did not circumcise him the court is obligated to circumcise him, i.e., if this obligation is not fulfilled by the father it applies to the community as a whole, as it is written: “Every male among you shall be circumcised” (Genesis 17:10), in the form of a general mitzva that does not apply only to the father. And in a case where the court did not circumcise him the son is obligated to circumcise himself when he reaches adulthood, as it is written: “And the uncircumcised male, who is not circumcised in the flesh of his foreskin, that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Genesis 17:14).
אִיהִי מְנָלַן דְּלָא מִיחַיְּיבָא דִּכְתִיב כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוָּה אֹתוֹ אֱלֹהִים אוֹתוֹ וְלֹא אוֹתָהּ From where do we derive that his mother is not obligated to circumcise her son? As it is written: “And Abraham circumcised his son Isaac when he was eight days old, as God commanded him” (Genesis 21:4). The verse emphasizes that God commanded him, and not her.
אַשְׁכְּחַן מִיָּד לְדוֹרוֹת מְנָלַן תָּנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל כָּל מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר צַו אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא זֵירוּז מִיָּד וּלְדוֹרוֹת We found a source for this mitzva immediately, i.e., when it was given to Abraham; from where do we derive that this is the halakha for the men of all generations? The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught that any place where it is stated: “Command,” it is nothing other than an expression of galvanization both immediately and for generations. The mitzva of circumcision is presented by means of this term.
זֵירוּז דִּכְתִיב וְצַו אֶת יְהוֹשֻׁעַ וְחַזְּקֵהוּ וְאַמְּצֵהוּ מִיָּד וּלְדוֹרוֹת דִּכְתִיב מִן הַיּוֹם אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה ה' וָהָלְאָה לְדֹרֹתֵיכֶם The Gemara elaborates: From where is it derived that the term “command” indicates a galvanization? As it is written: “And command Joshua, and encourage him and strengthen him” (Deuteronomy 3:28). In this context, the term “command” is not referring to a specific command but is a general expression of galvanization. From where is it derived that this applies immediately and for generations? As it is written: “From the day that the Lord commanded and onward throughout your generations” (Numbers 15:23). This shows that whenever the word “command” is used it is referring to that day onward for all generations.
לִפְדּוֹתוֹ מְנָלַן דִּכְתִיב כׇּל בְּכוֹר בָּנֶיךָ תִּפְדֶּה וְהֵיכָא דְּלָא פַּרְקֵיהּ אֲבוּהּ מִיחַיַּיב אִיהוּ לְמִפְרְקֵיהּ דִּכְתִיב תִּפְדֶּה תִּפָּדֶה § The baraita teaches that a father is obligated to redeem his son. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? The Gemara answers that this is as it is written: “All the firstborn of your sons you shall redeem” (Exodus 34:20). And in a case where one’s father does not redeem him he is obligated to redeem himself, as it is written: “You shall redeem [pado tifde]” (Numbers 18:15). The repetition of the verb indicates that a firstborn is required to be redeemed in any case, even if his father neglects to do so.
וְאִיהִי מְנָלַן דְּלָא מִיפַּקְדָה דִּכְתִיב תִּיפָּדֶה תִּפְדֶּה כֹּל שֶׁמְּצֻוֶּוה לִפְדּוֹת אֶת עַצְמוֹ מְצֻוֶּוה לִפְדּוֹת אֶת אֲחֵרִים וְכֹל שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְצֻוֶּוה לִפְדּוֹת אֶת עַצְמוֹ אֵינוֹ מְצֻוֶּוה לִפְדּוֹת אֲחֵרִים And from where do we derive that a mother is not commanded to redeem her son? As it is written: “You shall redeem [tifde]” which can be read as: You shall be redeemed [tippadeh]. This indicates that whoever is commanded to redeem himself is commanded to redeem others, and whoever is not commanded to redeem himself is not commanded to redeem others. Since a woman is not commanded to redeem herself, she is not commanded to redeem her son either.
וְאִיהִי מְנָלַן דְּלָא מִיחַיְּיבָא לְמִיפְרַק נַפְשַׁהּ דִּכְתִיב תִּפְדֶּה תִּיפָּדֶה כֹּל שֶׁאֲחֵרִים מְצֻוִּוים לִפְדּוֹתוֹ מְצֻוֶּוה לִפְדּוֹת אֶת עַצְמוֹ וְכֹל שֶׁאֵין אֲחֵרִים מְצֻוִּוים לִפְדּוֹתוֹ אֵין מְצֻוֶּוה לִפְדּוֹת אֶת עַצְמוֹ וּמִנַּיִן שֶׁאֵין אֲחֵרִים מְצֻוִּוין לִפְדּוֹתָהּ דְּאָמַר קְרָא כׇּל בְּכוֹר בָּנֶיךָ תִּפְדֶּה בָּנֶיךָ וְלֹא בְּנוֹתֶיךָ The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that she is not obligated to redeem herself? The Gemara answers that this is as it is written: “You shall redeem [tifde],” which can be read as: You shall be redeemed [tippadeh]. This indicates that any person whom others are commanded to redeem is commanded to redeem himself, and any person whom others are not commanded to redeem is not commanded to redeem himself. Since there is no mitzva for a parent to redeem his daughter, there is similarly no mitzva for a daughter to redeem herself. And from where is it derived that others are not commanded to redeem a daughter? As the verse states: “All the firstborn of your sons you shall redeem” (Exodus 34:20), i.e., your sons and not your daughters.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן הוּא לִפְדּוֹת וּבְנוֹ לִפְדּוֹת הוּא קוֹדֵם לִבְנוֹ רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר בְּנוֹ קוֹדְמוֹ שֶׁזֶּה מִצְוָתוֹ עַל אָבִיו וְזֶה מִצְוַת בְּנוֹ עָלָיו The Sages taught: If a firstborn has not yet been redeemed and he himself has a firstborn son, he is obligated to redeem himself and he is also obligated to redeem his firstborn son, and he takes precedence over his son. If he does not have enough money to redeem both of them, he redeems himself. Rabbi Yehuda says: His son takes precedence over him. Rabbi Yehuda’s reasoning is that with regard to this one, the father, the mitzva of his redemption was upon his father, and only when his father did not observe the mitzva did it apply to the adult son. And that mitzva of the redemption of his firstborn son applies to him directly. Consequently, he should first fulfill the mitzva that applies to him by redeeming his son.
אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה הַכֹּל מוֹדִין Rabbi Yirmeya says: Everyone agrees