עַד כַּמָּה אָמַר רָבָא אָמַר רַב יִרְמְיָה בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַב שְׁלֹשָׁה חֳדָשִׁים וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם וְרַבִּי יִצְחָק אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן חֲמִשִּׁים יוֹם אָמַר רַב שִׁימִי בַּר אַבָּיֵי הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יִצְחָק שֶׁאָמַר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בִּשְׁלָמָא רַב וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן כׇּל חַד וְחַד כִּי חוּרְפֵּיהּ אֶלָּא לִשְׁמוּאֵל כִּי הַאי גַּוְונָא מִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ The Gemara asks: How old does the child have to be so that one can assume that he already recognizes his mother? Rava said that Rav Yirmeya bar Abba said that Rav said: Three months, and Shmuel said: Thirty days, and Rabbi Yitzḥak said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Fifty days. Rav Shimi bar Abaye said: The halakha is in accordance with what Rabbi Yitzḥak said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan. The Gemara asks: Granted, Rav and Rabbi Yoḥanan are in dispute with regard to the difference between fifty days and three months, as it is possible that each baby varies according to its intelligence, as one baby is sufficiently developed at fifty days, while another knows his mother at only three months. However, according to Shmuel, can you find a case like this, a one-month-old baby who recognizes his mother?
כִּי אֲתָא רָמֵי בַּר יְחֶזְקֵאל אָמַר לָא תְּצִיתִינְהוּ לְהָנֵי כְּלָלֵי דְּכָיֵיל יְהוּדָה אֲחִי מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל הָכִי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל כׇּל זְמַן שֶׁמַּכִּירָהּ The Gemara relates: When Rami bar Yeḥezkel came from Eretz Yisrael, he said: Do not listen to, i.e., do not accept, those principles that my brother Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel, as Shmuel did not establish a particular time with regard to this matter. Rather, this is what Shmuel said: Whenever he recognizes her, i.e., there is no fixed age at which this occurs. One must check each baby to see whether he recognizes his mother.
הָהִיא דַּאֲתַאי לְקַמֵּיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל אֲמַר לֵיהּ לְרַב דִּימִי בַּר יוֹסֵף זִיל בִּדְקֵהּ אֲזַל אוֹתְבַהּ בְּדָרֵי דִנְשֵׁי וְשַׁקְלֵיהּ לִבְרַהּ וְקָמְהַדַּר לֵיהּ עֲלַיְיהוּ כִּי מְטָא לְגַבַּהּ הֲוָת קָא מְסַוֵּי לְאַפַּהּ כְּבַשְׁתִּנְהִי לְעֵינַהּ מִינֵּיהּ אֲמַר לַהּ נְטֹף עֵינִיךְ קוּם דְּרַי בְּרִיךְ סוֹמֵא מְנָא יָדַע אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי בְּרֵיחָא וּבְטַעְמָא The Gemara relates: A certain divorcée came before Shmuel, as she did not wish to nurse her son. He said to Rav Dimi bar Yosef: Go and check her, i.e., verify whether the child recognizes his mother. He went, placed her in a row of women, and took her son in his arms and passed him near them to see how the child would react. When the child reached her, he looked at her face with joy, and she averted her eyes from him, as she did not want to look at him. He said to her: Lift up your eyes, get up and take your son, as it is obvious that he knows you. The Gemara asks: If this is so, then how does a blind baby know and recognize his mother? Rav Ashi said: Through smell and through the taste of her milk.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן יוֹנֵק תִּינוֹק וְהוֹלֵךְ עַד עֶשְׂרִים וְאַרְבָּעָה חֹדֶשׁ מִכָּאן וְאֵילָךְ כְּיוֹנֵק שֶׁקֶץ דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר אֲפִילּוּ אַרְבַּע וְחָמֵשׁ שָׁנִים פֵּירַשׁ לְאַחַר עֶשְׂרִים וְאַרְבָּעָה חֹדֶשׁ וְחָזַר כְּיוֹנֵק שֶׁקֶץ § Apropos the period of time during which a child nurses, the Gemara continues to debate different aspects of this matter. The Sages taught in a baraita: A child may continue to nurse until the age of twenty-four months, and from this point forward, if he continues to nurse, he is like one who nurses from a non-kosher animal, as a woman’s milk is forbidden to anyone other than a small child; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Yehoshua says: A child may continue to nurse even for four or five years, and this is permitted. However, if he ceased, i.e., was weaned, after twenty-four months and then resumed nursing, he is like one who nurses from a non-kosher animal.
אָמַר מָר מִכָּאן וְאֵילָךְ כְּיוֹנֵק שֶׁקֶץ וּרְמִינְהִי יָכוֹל יְהֵא חֲלֵב מְהַלְּכֵי שְׁתַּיִם טָמֵא וְדִין הוּא וּמָה בְּהֵמָה שֶׁהֵקַלְתָּ בְּמַגָּעָהּ הֶחְמַרְתָּ בַּחֲלָבָהּ אָדָם שֶׁהֶחְמַרְתָּ בְּמַגָּעוֹ אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁתַּחְמִיר בַּחֲלָבוֹ The Master said in the baraita: From this point forward he is like one who nurses from a non-kosher animal. The Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita: One might have thought that the milk of bipeds, i.e., humans, would be non-kosher like that of a non-kosher animal, based on a logical derivation: Just as with regard to a non-kosher animal, where you were lenient with regard to its contact, meaning that it does not render people or items impure through contact when it is alive, you were stringent with regard to its milk, which is prohibited, even more so should this be true with regard to a person. An a fortiori inference would indicate that with regard to a person, where you were stringent about contact, as people can render other people and objects impure even when they are alive, one should be stricter. So isn’t it logical that you should be stringent with regard to his milk?
תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר אֶת הַגָּמָל כִּי מַעֲלֵה גֵרָה הוּא הוּא טָמֵא וְאֵין חֲלֵב מְהַלְּכֵי שְׁתַּיִם טָמֵא אֶלָּא טָהוֹר יָכוֹל אוֹצִיא אֶת הֶחָלָב שֶׁאֵינוֹ שָׁוֶה בַּכֹּל וְלֹא אוֹצִיא אֶת הַדָּם שֶׁהוּא שָׁוֶה בַּכֹּל תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר הוּא הוּא טָמֵא וְאֵין דַּם מְהַלְּכֵי שְׁתַּיִם טָמֵא אֶלָּא טָהוֹר This is as the verse states: “But this you shall not eat, of those that only chew the cud, or of those that only part the hoof; the camel, because it chews the cud but does not part the hoof, it is impure for you” (Leviticus 11:4). The somewhat superfluous word “it” teaches that it alone is impure, but the milk of bipeds is not impure; rather, it is kosher. Furthermore, one might have thought that I should exclude the milk of humans from the prohibition against consumption, as this issue does not apply equally to everyone, since only women produce milk, but I should not exclude from the prohibition human blood, which does apply equally to everyone. Consequently, the verse states “it” with regard to a camel, to say that it alone is impure, whereas the blood of bipeds is not impure, but rather is kosher.
וְאָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת אֲפִילּוּ מִצְוַת פְּרִישָׁה אֵין בּוֹ And Rav Sheshet said about this ruling: There is not even a rabbinic command to refrain from consuming human milk. Therefore, this presents a contradiction to the statement that a child who nurses beyond a certain age is like one who nurses from a non-kosher animal.
לָא קַשְׁיָא הָא דְּפָרֵישׁ הָא דְּלָא פָּרֵישׁ The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as this statement that the milk is permitted is referring to when it has been removed from the woman’s body, and that statement, that the milk is forbidden, is referring to when it has not been removed. Fundamentally, human milk is a permitted substance. However, it is prohibited by rabbinic law for anyone other than a very young child to nurse directly from a woman’s breasts, and one who does so is considered like one who consumes milk from a non-kosher animal.
וְחִילּוּפַהּ בְּדָם כִּדְתַנְיָא דָּם שֶׁעַל גַּבֵּי כִּכָּר גּוֹרְרוֹ וְאוֹכְלוֹ שֶׁבֵּין הַשִּׁינַּיִם מוֹצְצוֹ וְאֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ And the opposite applies to blood: Human blood that has been removed from the body is forbidden, but if it has not yet been removed, it is permitted. As it is taught in a baraita: If some human blood was on a loaf of bread, one scrapes off the blood and then he may eat the bread. Since the blood was detached from the body, it is forbidden by rabbinic law, but if blood was between the teeth, he may suck it and swallow it without concern, as the blood is permitted if it has not been removed from the body.
אָמַר מָר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר אֲפִילּוּ אַרְבַּע וְחָמֵשׁ שָׁנִים וְהָתַנְיָא רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר אֲפִילּוּ חֲבִילָתוֹ עַל כְּתֵיפָיו אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי חַד שִׁיעוּרָא הוּא אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ The Master said in the aforementioned baraita: Rabbi Yehoshua says: A child may continue to nurse even for four or five years. But isn’t it taught in a different baraita: Rabbi Yehoshua says: Even if he can carry his package on his shoulder he can continue to nurse? The Gemara answers: This is not a contradiction, since both this and that are one, the same, measure, and the difference between them is only semantic. Rav Yosef said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua.
תַּנְיָא רַבִּי מָרִינוּס אוֹמֵר גּוֹנֵחַ יוֹנֵק חָלָב בְּשַׁבָּת מַאי טַעְמָא יוֹנֵק מְפָרֵק כִּלְאַחַר יָד וּבִמְקוֹם צַעֲרָא לָא גְּזַרוּ רַבָּנַן אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי מָרִינוּס On the same topic it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Marinos says: One who is coughing due to an illness that requires milk but did not have milk available may suck milk directly from an animal’s udders on Shabbat, although milking is a prohibited labor on Shabbat. What is the reason? Sucking the milk in this way constitutes an act of extracting in an unusual manner. Although milking is an example of the labor of extracting, a subcategory of the primary category of threshing, it is prohibited by Torah law only when the labor is performed in its typical manner. One who nurses from an animal is extracting the milk in an unusual manner. Such labor is prohibited by rabbinic law, but in a situation involving pain, like one who is coughing, the Sages did not issue a decree. Rabbi Yosef said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Marinos.
תַּנְיָא נַחוּם אִישׁ גַּלְיָא אוֹמֵר צִינּוֹר שֶׁעָלוּ בּוֹ קַשְׂקַשִּׂין מְמַעֲכָן בְּרַגְלוֹ בְּצִנְעָא בְּשַׁבָּת וְאֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ מַאי טַעְמָא מְתַקֵּן כִּלְאַחַר יָד הוּא וּבִמְקוֹם פְּסֵידָא לָא גְּזַרוּ בַּהּ רַבָּנַן אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף הֲלָכָה כְּנַחוּם אִישׁ גַּלְיָא A ruling similar to the previous halakha is taught in a baraita: Naḥum of Galia says: If a drainage pipe is blocked by weeds [kashkashin] and grass, preventing water from running through the pipe, one may crush them with his foot in private on Shabbat without concern that he is performing the labor of preparing a vessel. The Gemara explains: What is the reason for this leniency? This is an example of repairing a vessel in an unusual manner, since it is uncommon to fix an item without using a tool or one’s hands. Performing labor in an unusual manner is ordinarily prohibited by rabbinic decree, but in a situation involving financial loss, the Sages did not issue a decree. Rabbi Yosef said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Naḥum of Galia.
פֵּירַשׁ לְאַחַר עֶשְׂרִים וְאַרְבָּעָה חֹדֶשׁ וְחָזַר כְּיוֹנֵק שֶׁקֶץ וְכַמָּה אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה בַּר חֲבִיבָא אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל שְׁלֹשָׁה יָמִים אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי תָּנֵי רַב יְהוּדָה בַּר חֲבִיבָא קַמֵּיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל שְׁלֹשָׁה יָמִים The Gemara continues discussing the aforementioned baraita, which states: If the child ceased nursing after twenty-four months and then resumed, he is like one who nurses from a non-kosher animal. The Gemara asks: How long must he cease nursing to be considered weaned? Rav Yehuda bar Ḥaviva said that Shmuel said: Three days. There are those who say that this was not an amoraic statement, but rather a baraita that is taught by Rav Yehuda bar Ḥaviva before Shmuel: Weaning takes effect after three days.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן מֵינֶקֶת שֶׁמֵּת בַּעְלָהּ בְּתוֹךְ עֶשְׂרִים וְאַרְבָּעָה חֹדֶשׁ הֲרֵי זוֹ לֹא תִּתְאָרֵס וְלֹא תִּינָּשֵׂא § The Gemara discusses other halakhot relating to nursing. The Sages taught: A nursing woman whose husband died within twenty-four months of her child’s birth may not be betrothed and may not get married