Ketubot 33a:5-6כתובות ל״ג א:ה׳-ו׳
The William Davidson Talmudתלמוד מהדורת ויליאם דוידסון
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חובל בחבירו נמי א"כ בטלת (דברים כה, ג) לא יוסיף פן יוסיף עדים זוממין נמי א"כ בטלת (דברים כה, ב) והיה אם בן הכות הרשע אלא עדים זוממין אפשר לקיומה בבן גרושה ובן חלוצה חובל בחבירו נמי איכא לקיומה כגון שהכהו הכאה שאין בה שוה פרוטה

The Gemara asks: Based on that reasoning, the same would hold true for one who injures another as well; if so, if he pays and is not lashed, you have rendered moot the prohibition “Forty he shall strike him; he shall not exceed, lest if he should exceed” (Deuteronomy 25:3). The same would hold true for conspiring witnesses as well; if so, you have rendered moot the verse interpreted as addressing the matter of conspiring witnesses: “And it shall be if the wicked man deserves to be flogged” (Deuteronomy 25:2). Rather, with regard to conspiring witnesses, that verse can be fulfilled in the case of the son of a divorcée or the son of a ḥalutza. If witnesses testified that a priest is the son of a divorcée or a ḥalutza and were discovered to be conspiring witnesses, there is no payment and they are flogged. With regard to one who injures another as well, the verse can be fulfilled in a case where he struck him with a blow that does not cause damage amounting to the value of a peruta.

אחותו נמי איכא לקיומה באחותו בוגרת אמר לך ר' יוחנן האי תחת אשר עינה מיבעי ליה לכדאביי דאמר אביי אמר קרא (דברים כב, כט) תחת אשר עינה האי תחת אשר עינה מכלל דאיכא בושת ופגם

The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, with regard to one’s sister as well, the lashes can be fulfilled in the case of one who had forced relations with his sister who is a grown woman. Since there is no fine in that case, he is flogged and the verse is not moot. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoḥanan could have said to you that he does not agree with Ulla because this verse: “Because he tormented her” (Deuteronomy 22:29), is not available for a verbal analogy, as he requires it to derive in accordance with that which Abaye said, as Abaye said that the verse states: The fine of fifty dinar is payment “because he tormented her”; by inference one may conclude that beyond the fine, there is compensation for humiliation and degradation.

ועולא נפקא ליה מדרבא דאמר רבא אמר קרא (דברים כב, כט) ונתן האיש השוכב עמה לאבי הנערה חמשים כסף הנאת שכיבה חמשים מכלל דאיכא בושת ופגם

The Gemara asks: And Ulla, who uses this verse to derive a verbal analogy, from where does he derive the halakha stated by Abaye? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the statement of Rava, who derives that halakha from the same verse, as Rava said that the verse states: “And the man who lay with her shall give to the father of the young woman fifty shekels of silver” (Deuteronomy 22:29). The superfluous phrase “who lay with her” teaches that it is for the pleasure of lying with her that he pays fifty shekels, i.e., fifty sela; by inference one may conclude that beyond the fine, there is compensation for humiliation and degradation.

רבי אליעזר אומר עדים זוממין ממונא משלמי ומילקא לא לקי משום דלאו בני התראה נינהו אמר רבא תדע ניתרי בהו אימת ניתרי בהו מעיקרא אמרי אישתלין ניתרי בהו בשעת מעשה פרשי ולא מסהדי ניתרי בהו לבסוף מאי דהוה הוה

§ Rabbi Eliezer says: The reason that conspiring witnesses pay money but are not flogged is due to the fact that they are not subject to forewarning, and without forewarning there are no lashes. Rava said: Know that this is true, since there is no practical manner to forewarn them, as when would we forewarn them? Perhaps let us forewarn them initially, before they come to testify; in that case, the forewarning would be ineffective because they could say: We forgot the forewarning. Then let us forewarn them at the moment of the action, just before they testify; in that case they will leave and not testify at all, as concern for potential repercussions will intimidate them into silence. Or, let us forewarn them at the end after their testimony; in that case that which was, was, and forewarning at that point is pointless.

מתקיף לה אביי וניתרי בהו בתוך כדי דבור מתקיף לה רב אחא בריה דרב איקא וניתרי בהו מעיקרא ונרמז בהו רמוזי

Abaye strongly objects to this: And let us warn them within an interval equivalent to the time of speaking, during the brief period after they completed their statements, at which time the testimony is not yet considered to have concluded. Since they can still retract or amend their testimony during that period, a warning delivered at that point would be timely and effective. Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, also strongly objects to this: And let us forewarn them initially, before they testify, and gesture to them during the actual testimony, reminding them of the forewarning so they will be unable to claim that they forgot it.

הדר אמר אביי לאו מילתא היא דאמרי אי סלקא דעתך עדים זוממין צריכין התראה כי לא מתרינן בהו לא קטלינן להו מי איכא מידי דאינהו בעו קטיל בלא התראה ואינהו בעו התראה הא בעינן ועשיתם לו כאשר זמם לעשות לאחיו וליכא

Abaye then said: That which I stated is not a significant matter. Instead, if it enters your mind that conspiring witnesses require forewarning, when we do not forewarn them we do not kill them. However, is there a matter in which they sought to kill the defendant without forewarning him, as their testimony was false, and in order to punish them they require forewarning? Don’t we require that their punishment reflect the verse “And you shall do unto him as he conspired to do unto his brother” (Deuteronomy 19:19)? And if they require forewarning that is not the case.

מתקיף לה רב סמא בריה דרב ירמיה אלא מעתה בן גרושה ובן חלוצה דלא מכאשר זמם קא מיתרבי ליבעי התראה אמר קרא (ויקרא כד, כב) משפט אחד יהיה לכם משפט השוה לכולכם

Rav Samma, son of Rav Yirmeya, strongly objects to this: However, if what you say is so, when witnesses falsely accuse a priest of being the son of a divorcée or the son of a ḥalutza, as their punishment is not amplified from the verse “As he conspired” but rather they are punished for violating the prohibition “You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor,” let them require forewarning. The Gemara answers that the verse states: “You shall have one manner of law” (Leviticus 24:22), meaning that there must be a law equal for all of you. Since in standard cases of conspiring witnesses no forewarning is required, even in exceptional cases like testimony that a priest is the son of a divorcée or a ḥalutza, forewarning is not required.

רב שישא בריה דרב אידי אמר חובל בחבירו נמי ממונא משלם ומילקא לא לקי מהכא (שמות כא, כב) וכי ינצו אנשים ונגפו אשה הרה ויצאו ילדיה ואמר רבי אלעזר במצות שבמיתה הכתוב מדבר דכתיב (שמות כא, כג) ואם אסון יהיה ונתת נפש תחת נפש

§ Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, said: The fact that in the case of one who injures another as well he pays money and is not flogged is derived not by means of a verbal analogy but from here: “If men quarrel and hurt a pregnant woman so that her child departs from her, and yet no harm follow, he shall be punished as imposed upon him by the woman’s husband” (Exodus 21:22). And Rabbi Elazar said: The verse is speaking of a quarrel that involves death, i.e., they sought to kill each other, as it is written: “And if any harm follow, then you shall give a soul for a soul” (Exodus 21:23).

היכי דמי אי דלא אתרו ביה אמאי מיקטיל אלא פשיטא דאתרו ביה ומותרה לדבר חמור הוי מותרה לדבר הקל ואמר רחמנא ולא יהיה אסון ענוש יענש

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this case? If they did not forewarn one not to kill the other, why is he killed if the death of his opponent ensues? Rather, obviously it is a case where they forewarned him, and the principle is that one who is forewarned with regard to a severe matter, murdering his counterpart, is forewarned with regard to a lesser matter, injuring his counterpart. And although he is forewarned against injuring another, which violates a prohibition and is punishable by lashes, the Merciful One states: “And yet no harm follow, he shall be punished” (Exodus 21:22), indicating that one pays and is not flogged.

מתקיף לה רב אשי ממאי דמותרה לדבר חמור הוי מותרה לדבר הקל דלמא לא הוי אם תמצא לומר הוי ממאי דמיתה חמורה

Rav Ashi strongly objects to this proof. First of all, with regard to your initial assumption, from where do you ascertain that one who is forewarned with regard to a severe matter is forewarned with regard to a lesser matter? Perhaps he is not considered forewarned with regard to the lesser matter. Furthermore, even if you say that one is in fact forewarned with regard to a lesser matter, from where do you ascertain that the death penalty is a more severe punishment than lashes?