משנה: הֲרֵי זֶה גִּיטֵּיךְ עַל מְנָת שֶׁתְּשַׁמְּשִׁי אֶת אַבָּא עַל מְנָת שֶׁתָּנִיקִי אֶת בְּנִי כַּמָּה הִיא מְנִיקַתּוּ שְׁתֵּי שָׁנִים. רִבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר שְׁמוֹנָה עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ. מֵת הַבֵּן אוֹ שֶׁמֵּת הָאָב הֲרֵי זֶה גֵט. עַל מְנָת שֶׁתְּשַׁמְּשִׁי אֶת אַבָּא שְׁתֵּי שָׁנִים וְעַל מְנָת שֶׁתָּנִיקִי אֶת בְּנִי שְׁתֵּי שָׁנִים. מֵת הַבֵּן אוֹ שֶׁאָמַר הָאָב אֵי אֶפְשִׁי שֶׁתְּשַׁמְּשֵׁנִי שֶׁלֹּא בְהַקְפָּדָה אֵינוֹ גֵט. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר כָּזֶה גֵּט. כְּלָל אָמַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל כָּל־עַכָּבָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ מִמֶּנָּה הֲרֵי זֶה גֵט. MISHNAH: “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you serve my father,” “on condition that you breast-feed my son,” how long does she have to breast-feed him? Two years122This is R. Meїr’s opinion; cf. Soṭah 4:4, Notes 55 ff. She does not have to nurse the baby for two years after the divorce but only until he reaches the age of two years (Tosephta 5:6). Since the expenses of child-rearing are the father’s responsibility, the mother does not have to nurse her child if she is divorced before the child is weaned.; Rebbi Jehudah says, eighteen months. If the son or the father died, it is a valid divorce123This may mean that, if the father or the child died immediately after the bill of divorce was handed over, the divorce nevertheless stands. It is a matter of dispute in the Halakhah..
“On condition that you serve my father for two years,” or “on condition that you breast-feed my son for two years;” if the son died or the father said, I cannot stand you serving me (without being offended)124She did nothing to offend the father., it is no divorce125Since the condition was not satisfied. The Mishnah in the Babli and most Mishnah mss. adds: “or if the father died in the meantime”.. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, that is a divorce. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel stated a principle: Given any hindrance which is not from her side, it is a divorce.
הלכה: הֲרֵי זֶה גִּיטֵּיךְ עַל מְנָת שֶׁתְּשַׁמְּשִׁי אֶת אַבָּא כול׳. אָמַר רִבִּי בָּא. בְּחַייָו וְהוּא שְׁתְּשַׁמְּשֶׁינּוּ כָּל־צוֹרְכוֹ. וְהוּא שֶׁתָּנִיקִי כָּל־צוֹרְכוֹ. אֲפִילוּ לֹא שִׁימְּשַׁתּוּ כָּל־צוֹרְכוֹ. אֲפִילוּ לֹא הֵנִיקַתּוּ כָּל־צוֹרְכוֹ. אֶלָּא אֲפִילוּ שִׁימְּשַׁתּוּ שָׁעָה אַחַת. אֲפִילוּ הֵנִיקַתּוּ שָׁעָה אַחַת. לְאַחַר מִיתָה אֲפִילוּ לֹא שִׁימְּשַׁתּוּ וְלֹא הֵנִיקַתּוּ כְּלוּם. מַתְנִיתָא פְלִיגָא עַל רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ. כַּמָּה הִיא מְנִיקַתּוּ. שְׁתֵּי שָׁנִים. רִבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר. שְׁמוֹנָה עָשָׂר חוֹדֶשׁ. אָמַר רִבִּי אָבִין. בִּשְׂכַר מֵנִיקָה שָׁנוּ. HALAKHAH: “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you serve my father,” etc. Rebbi Abba126The scribe first wrote “R. Ḥiyya bar Abba” and then deleted “R. Ḥiyya”. The editio princeps has “R. Ḥiyya bar Abba”. But since the opposite opinion is referred to as R. Simeon ben Laqish’s, one of R. Ḥiyya bar Abba’s teachers, the final text of the ms. is the correct one, against the editio princeps. said: During his lifetime, on condition that she serve all his needs, on condition that she breast-feed all his needs127His interpretation of Mishnah 6 is that the absence of any time limit in the condition implies that the divorcee has to be the husband’s father’s geriatric nurse for the rest of the latter’s life or to breast-feed her child for a full 24 months.. 128It seems from the following that a note “Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said,” was omitted here. In the Babylonian sources, Babli 75b, Tosephta 5:6, it is a tannaïtic text. Even if she did not serve all his needs, even if she did not breast-feed all his needs, but even if she served him for one hour, or breast-fed him for one hour129He opts for a minimalist interpretation of the condition. Since no time limit was given, any service or any breast-feeding satisfies the condition and validates the divorce.. After death123,This may mean that, if the father or the child died immediately after the bill of divorce was handed over, the divorce nevertheless stands. It is a matter of dispute in the Halakhah.130It could also mean, "after the husband's death." Cf. S. Lieberman's commentary to Tosephta 5:6., even if she never served him or never breast-fed him. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “How long does she have to breast-feed him? Two years, Rebbi Jehudah says, eighteen months.” Rebbi Abin said, this was taught about the cost of a wet-nurse131R. Abin reads the condition not as a request that the ex-wife breastfeed her child for 24 months and therefore be forbidden to remarry during all this time (cf. Soṭah 4:4, Notes 55 ff.) but that the wife pay for a wet-nurse to care for the child in the husband’s house, with the wife being free to remarry 90 days after the divorce..
אָמַר רִבִּי אַבָּהוּ בְשֵׁם רִבּי יוֹחָנָן. סֶדֶר סִימְפוֹן כָּךְ הוּא. אֲנָא פְּלָן בַּר פְּלָן מְקַדֵּשׁ לִיךְ אַנְתְּ פְּלָנִית בַּת פְּלָן עַל מְנָת לִיתֵּן לָךְ מִיקְמַת פְּלָן ומנכסים לְיוֹם פְּלָן. דְּאִין אָתָא יוֹם פְּלָן וְלָא כְּנַסְתִּיךְ לָא יְהַוֵּי לִי עָלַיִךְ כְּלוּם. אִירַע לוֹ אוֹנֶס. רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר. אוֹנְסָא כְּמָאן דְּלָא עֲבַד. רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר. אוֹנְסָא כְּמָאן דַּעֲבָד. עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אִין הֲוָה צְרִיךְ לְמֵיעֲבַד. וְאִין אֲתָא יוֹם פְּלָן וְלָא כְנָסָתָהּ לִי לֹא יְהַוֵּי לִי עָלַיִךְ כְּלוּם. רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן מִי דְמִיךְ פְּקִיד לִבְנָתֵיהּ דִּי יְהַווְייָן עָֽבְדָן כְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ. אָמַר. שֶׁמָּא יַעֲמֹד בֵּית דִּין אַחֵר וְיִסְבֹּר דִּכְווָתֵיהּ. וְנִמְצְאוּ בָנָיו בָּאִין לִידֵּי מַמְזֵרוּת. 132The text is also in Qiddušin 3:2 (63d 1. 20), readings noted ק. The contract text is also in Erubin 3 (21b 1. 20), noted ע. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text133Greek τὸ σύμφωνον “(written) agreement”. In general, a preliminary marriage was concluded by an act of the male, with passive acceptance by the female. Since a preliminary marriage can also be effected by contract (Mishnah Qiddušin 1:1), in certain circles in Galilee this was the preferred course of action (it is not mentioned in the Babli.) The main attraction of the contractual marriage for the woman was that it provided insurance against foot-dragging by the groom (cf. Mishnah Ketubot 13:5).: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I shall give you property A anddefinitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in134The translation follows the parallel texts in Qiddušin and Erubin. The text here would read: “but not transfer real estate to you”., I shall have no claim on you135The preliminary marriage is conditional. If the condition is not satisfied, the marriage is non-existent and the woman may marry another man without needing a bill of divorce from the first. She may even marry a Cohen, which would be impossible if the first preliminary marriage had been valid..” If anything intervened beyond his control? Rebbi Joḥanan said, matters beyond his control are as if he were inactive136The condition is absolute. If the definitive marriage did not take place before the contracted date, the preliminary marriage is annulled.. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, matters outside his control are as if he had acted137If the only reason that the definitive marriage did not take place were circumstances beyond the groom’s control, the preliminary marriage is not annulled.. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, what would be necessary? “If that day should pass without you having taken me in, I shall have no claim on you.138The condition has to be formulated not for the male, who actively has to take the woman in and therefore can claim unavoidable circumstances, but for the passive female. Since the contract is σύμφωνον, a mutual agreement, she gives her passive acceptance of the preliminary marriage only on condition that she be definitively married by a fixed date. If she refuses her agreement, no preliminary marriage is possible and no bill of divorce due.” When Rebbi Joḥanan was dying, he told his daughters to act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. He said, maybe in the future there might be a court which follows him; then his descendants might be in danger of bastardy139If a woman contracts a preliminary marriage by the terms of R. Joḥanan’s formulation of the contract and is not married by the time specified because of unavoidable circumstances, and then contracts another marriage without a bill of divorce in the domain of jurisdiction of a court following R. Simeon ben Laqish, her children from the second marriage will be illegitimate if the first groom claims her as his wife..
חַד בַר נַשׁ אַקְדַּם פְּרִוּטִין לְאִילְפָא וּנְגַב נַהֲרָא. אָתָא עוֹבְדָא קוֹמֵי רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יַעֲקֹב. הָא אִילְפָא. אֵייְתֵי נַהֲרָא. אַבָּא בַּר הוּנָא בְשֵׁם רִבִּי אַבָּא הֲוָא מַצְלֵי דִייגַב נַהֲרָא בְּגִין דְּנִיסַּב פְּרִיטוֹי. אָמַר. רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן וְרִבִּי אַבָּא סָֽבְרִין כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל. חָֽתְכָה כְּמִי שֶׁעִיכְּבָה. נֶחְתַּךְ יָדָהּ כְּמִי שֶׁלֹּא עִיכְּבָה. A person gave money for a ship when the canal dried up140This is in Babylonia, where most transport is by water. A person rented a ship for some future transport and then could not use it since in the meantime the canal had dried up. This shows that the disappearance of the old system of canals between Euphrates and Tigris cannot all be dated to the Arab conquest but that the neglect of the canal system already started early in Sassanid times.. The case came before Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: There is the ship, bring the canal141Rav Naḥman holds with R. Simeon ben Laqish that circumstances beyond the contracting party’s control do not invalidate the contract.! Abba bar Huna in the name of Rebbi Abba was praying that the canal should dry up and he could recover his money. He said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Abba are of the same opinion as Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel142Who holds in the Mishnah that any circumstance beyond the woman’s control does not interfere with her having complied with the terms of the divorce. (Rashba, Novellae ad 75b, prefers to switch the attributions. He reads אשכחת אמר “it turns out that one has to say”, making the sentence an editorial remark, not R. Abba’s statement.). If she cut off, she hindered. If her hand143In order to make sense of this statement, it is necessary with Rashba (Novellae ad 75b) and the commentators to read דַּד instead of ׃יָד “If the woman who was divorced under the condition of breast-feeding her child cut off her breast herself, she violated her contract. If her breast was cut off by others, the hindrance is not her fault and the divorce stands.” (?) was cut off, it is not as if she hindered.