מסתברא בין לרבי אליעזר בין לרבנן כיון דפסקה פסקה:
It stands to reason, both according to Rabbi Eliezer and according to the Rabbis, that once he separates her, he has separated her entirely. By rendering her entirely permitted for one day he dissolves the bond between them and the divorce takes effect.
ת"ר הרי זה גיטך ע"מ שתנשאי לפלוני הרי זו לא תנשא ואם נשאת לא תצא
§ The Sages taught (Tosefta 6:7) that if a man says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you marry so-and-so, she may not marry that man, but if she marries him the marriage is valid and she need not leave her husband.
מאי קאמר אמר רב נחמן ה"ק הרי זו לא תנשא לו שמא יאמרו נשיהן נותנין במתנה ואם נשאת לאחר לא תצא
The Gemara asks: What is the baraita saying? She is forbidden from marrying whom? Rav Naḥman said that this is what the baraita is saying: She may not marry him, i.e., she may not marry the man mentioned by her husband in the condition, lest people say that these people are giving their wives to each other as a gift. But if she marries another man she need not leave him.
ומשום גזרה לא מפקינן מיניה ושרינן אשת איש לעלמא
The Gemara asks: Do we not remove her from him, thereby allowing a married woman to marry anyone, due to a rabbinic decree, lest people say that the husband is giving her as a gift? As long as the condition that she would marry a specific man is not fulfilled, she is a married woman by Torah law.
אלא אמר רב נחמן הכי קאמר הרי זו לא תנשא לו שמא יאמרו נשיהם נותנין במתנה ואם נשאת לו לא תצא דמשום גזרה לא מפקינן
Rather, Rav Naḥman said that this is what the baraita is saying: She may not marry him, i.e., the man who was specified in the condition, lest people say that they are giving their wives to each other as a gift. But if she marries him she need not leave him, as we do not remove a woman from her husband due to a decree.
א"ל רבא לו הוא דלא תנשא הא לאחר תנשא והא בעי קיומי לתנאה
Rava said to Rav Naḥman: It may be inferred from your statement that it is specifically to him that she may not get married, but she may marry another man ab initio. But isn’t she required to fulfill the condition by marrying the specified man before marrying someone else?
וכי תימא אפשר דמינסבא היום ומיגרשה למחר ומקיימא לתנאה ולהך דפליגת עליה דרב יהודה קמדמית ליה דאתמר קונם עיני בשינה היום אם אישן למחר אמר רב יהודה אל יישן היום שמא יישן למחר
And if you would say that it is possible for her to get married today to someone else and get divorced from him tomorrow and then fulfill her condition by marrying the specified man, and you can compare it to that halakha over which you disagree with Rav Yehuda. As it was stated with regard to one who says: Sleeping is forbidden to me as if it were an offering [konam] for my eyes today if I will sleep tomorrow, Rav Yehuda says that he may not sleep today lest he sleep tomorrow, causing the vow to have been violated today, retroactively.
ורב נחמן אמר יישן היום ואין חוששין שמא יישן למחר
And Rav Naḥman says: He may sleep today, as there is currently no prohibition, and we are not concerned that perhaps he will sleep tomorrow, as he will be careful not to sleep. This dispute pertains to the general issue of a prohibition that will take effect retroactively if a condition is not fulfilled. Rav Yehuda holds that the prohibition must be observed until the condition is fulfilled, whereas Rav Naḥman maintains that it is not necessary to observe the prohibition, as he assumes that the condition will be fulfilled. Here too, perhaps Rav Naḥman allows the woman to marry another man because she can fulfill the condition after she is divorced from him.
הכי השתא התם בדידיה קיימא דאי בעי מבריז נפשיה בסילואתא ולא נאים הכא בדידה קיימא לאיגרושי
How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of the vow, the fulfillment of the condition is in his capability, as, if he wants to prevent himself from falling asleep he can prick himself with thorns [silevata] and he will not fall asleep. Here, is it in the woman’s power to get divorced? Perhaps her husband will not agree to divorce her and the condition will not be fulfilled.
אלא אמר רבא הרי זו לא תנשא לא לו ולא לאחר לו לא תנשא שמא יאמרו נשותיהם נותנין במתנה לאחר לא תנשא דבעיא קיומיה לתנאה
Rather, Rava said that the baraita should be interpreted in the following manner: This woman may marry neither the man who was specified in the condition nor another man. She may not marry him lest people say that these men are giving their wives to each other as a gift, and she may not marry another man because she is required to fulfill the condition.
ואם נשאת לו לא תצא דמשום גזרה לא מפקינן לאחר תצא דבעיא לקיומיה לתנאה
And if she marries the specified man she need not leave him, as we do not remove a woman from her husband due to a decree. But if she gets married to another man she must leave him, as she is required to fulfill the condition before marrying another man.
תניא כוותיה דרבא הרי זו לא תנשא לא לו ולא לאחר ואם נשאת לו לא תצא לאחר תצא:
It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rava: This woman may marry neither him nor another man, but if she marries him she need not leave him. But if she gets married to another man she must leave him.
ת"ר ה"ז גיטך ע"מ שתעלי לרקיע ע"מ שתרדי לתהום ע"מ שתבלעי קנה של ד' אמות ע"מ שתביאי לי קנה בן ק' אמה ע"מ שתעברי את הים הגדול ברגליך אינו גט
§ The Sages taught (Tosefta 7:8) that if a man says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you ascend to the sky, or on the condition that you descend to the depths of the sea, or on the condition that you swallow a four-cubit reed, or on the condition that you bring me a hundred-cubit reed, or on the condition that you cross the Great Sea, i.e., the Mediterranean Sea, by foot, or on any other condition that it is impossible to fulfill, it is not a valid bill of divorce.
רבי יהודה בן תימא אומר כזה גט כלל אמר ר' יהודה בן תימא כל תנאי שאי אפשר לו לקיימו בסופו והתנה עליו מתחילתו אינו אלא כמפליגה בדברים וכשר
Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima says: A bill of divorce like this is a valid bill of divorce, as the condition is void. Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima said the following principle: With regard to any condition that cannot be fulfilled in the end, yet even so the husband stipulated it initially, he is only hyperbolizing. It is assumed that he did not really intend to attach a condition to the divorce, but rather, to cause her distress, and therefore the divorce is valid without her fulfilling the condition.
אמר רב נחמן אמר רב הלכה כר' יהודה בן תימא א"ר נחמן בר יצחק מתני' נמי דיקא דקתני כל שאפשר לו לקיימו בסופו והתנה עליו בתחילתו תנאו קיים הא אי אפשר תנאו בטל ש"מ
Rav Naḥman says that Rav says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: The language of the mishna is also precisely formulated in support of this opinion, as it teaches: With regard to any condition that can be fulfilled in the end and the husband stipulated it initially, his condition stands (Bava Metzia 94a). Consequently, if his condition cannot be fulfilled it is void. The Gemara concludes: Learn from it that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima.
איבעיא להו הרי זה גיטיך ע"מ שתאכלי בשר חזיר מהו אמר אביי היא היא רבא אמר אפשר דאכלה ולקיא
A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If a husband said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you eat pig meat, what is the halakha? Abaye said: It is the same. This is also a condition that cannot be fulfilled, as it is forbidden by Torah law. Therefore, the condition is void. Rava said: It is possible for her to eat it and be flogged for it. Consequently, the condition can be fulfilled, although it is forbidden for her to do so.
לאביי כלל לאתויי בשר חזיר לרבא כזה למעוטי בשר חזיר
The Gemara elaborates: According to Abaye, the principle stated by Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima serves to include a condition to eat pig meat. When a tanna states a general principle, it expands the halakha beyond the specific case mentioned previously. In this case, the stating of the principle serves to apply the halakha to a condition subject to a Torah prohibition, in addition to a physical impossibility. According to Rava, when Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima stated: A bill of divorce like this is a valid bill of divorce, the limiting term of: Like this, serves to emphasize that only when there is a condition that cannot be physically fulfilled is the bill of divorce valid, and serves to exclude a condition to eat pig meat, which cannot be fulfilled due to a Torah prohibition. Therefore, if she does not fulfill this condition the divorce is invalid.
מיתיבי הרי זה גיטך ע"מ שתבעלי לפלוני נתקיים התנאי הרי זה גט ואם לאו אינו גט על מנת שלא תבעלי לאבא ולאביך אין חוששין שמא נבעלה להן
The Gemara raises an objection to Rava’s opinion from a baraita: If a man says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you engage in sexual intercourse with so-and-so, and the condition is fulfilled, this is a valid bill of divorce. And if the condition is not fulfilled then it is not a valid bill of divorce. If he says to her: On the condition that you do not engage in sexual intercourse with my father or your father, she is permitted to remarry, as we are not concerned that perhaps she engaged in sexual intercourse with them.
ואילו על מנת שתבעלי לאבא ולאביך לא קתני לאביי ניחא לרבא קשיא
But the baraita does not teach that the condition is binding when the husband says: On the condition that you engage in sexual intercourse with my father or your father, which is forbidden by Torah law. According to Abaye it works out well, as in his opinion a condition that violates Torah law is void. According to Rava it is difficult.
אמר לך רבא בשלמא בשר חזיר אפשר דאכלה ולקיא פלוני נמי אפשר דמשחדא ביה בממונא אלא אבא ואביך בדידה קיימא נהי דאיהי עבדא איסורא אבא ואביך מי עבדי איסורא
The Gemara answers that Rava could have said to you: Granted, with regard to pig meat it is possible for her to eat it and be flogged. Similarly, if the condition is that she engage in sexual intercourse with so-and-so, it is also possible for her to bribe him with money to engage in sexual intercourse with her. But with regard to the case of my father or your father, is it in her power to engage in sexual intercourse with them? Though she can potentially perform a forbidden act in order to fulfill her desire to get married, would my father or your father perform a forbidden act? They certainly would not cooperate. There-fore, this is a condition cannot be fulfilled, and it is considered hyperbole.
לרבא כלל לאתויי אבא ואביך כזה למעוטי בשר חזיר
Based on this analysis, according to Rava, Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima stated his principle in order to include the condition of my father and your father, as this condition is also considered impossible to fulfill. And the expression: A bill of divorce like this is a valid bill of divorce, serves to exclude the condition of eating pig meat, in which case the divorce is not valid unless she fulfills the condition.