Gittin 75b:3-8גיטין ע״ה ב:ג׳-ח׳
The William Davidson Talmudתלמוד מהדורת ויליאם דוידסון
Save "Gittin.75b.3-8"
Toggle Reader Menu Display Settings
75bע״ה ב

דתנאי ומעשה בדבר אחד אלא אמר רב אדא בר אהבה משום דתנאי ומעשה בדבר אחד

where the condition and the action are about the same matter, the giving of the bill of divorce. Accordingly, the condition would not be valid even if one were to disregard the concern of the action preceding the condition. Rather, Rav Adda bar Ahava said that this condition is void because the condition and the action are about the same matter, and therefore the bill of divorce is valid even without fulfillment of the condition.

רב אשי אמר הא מני רבי היא דאמר רב הונא אמר רב כל האומר על מנת כאומר מעכשיו דמי

Rav Ashi said: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as Rav Huna says that Rav says: Anyone who states a condition employing the language: On the condition, is like one who states: The agreement will take effect retroactively from now, even though the condition is fulfilled only later on. Consequently, the bill of divorce is effective immediately, even if the woman will later be required to return the document itself to him.

אתקין שמואל בגיטא דשכיב מרע אם לא מתי לא יהא גט ואם מתי יהא גט

§ With regard to conditions in a bill of divorce, Shmuel instituted that in a bill of divorce of a person on his deathbed the following expression should be written: If I do not die this will not be a valid bill of divorce, and if I die it will be a valid bill of divorce.

ולימא אם מתי יהא גט ואם לא מתי לא יהא גט לא מקדים איניש פורענותא לנפשיה

The Gemara asks about the wording used here: But let us say this statement in a more intuitive order: If I die it will be a valid bill of divorce, and if I do not die this will not be a valid bill of divorce. The Gemara explains: A person does not hasten a calamity upon himself. Consequently, he does not wish to mention his death first.

ולימא לא יהא גט אם לא מתי בעינן תנאי קודם למעשה

The Gemara asks: Why did Shmuel use this phrasing? But let us say the condition using the following formulation: It will not be a valid bill of divorce if I do not die, and it will be a valid bill of divorce if I do die. The Gemara asks: When stipulating a condition, we require the condition to come before the action, but in this formulation the resultant action, that the bill of divorce is valid, precedes the condition, if I do not die.

מתקיף לה רבא מכדי כל תנאי מהיכא גמרינן מתנאי בני גד ובני ראובן מה התם הן קודם ללאו אף כל לאפוקי הכא דלאו קודם להן

Rava objects to this explanation: Now, from where do we learn the principles of all conditions? They are derived from the condition of the children of Gad and the children of Reuben. Just as there, the affirmative precedes the negative, meaning that the positive portion that speaks about what will occur if the condition is fulfilled appears before the negative portions that describe what will exist if the condition is not fulfilled, so too, all conditions must be formulated in this manner. This serves to exclude the case here, instituted by Shmuel, where the negative precedes the affirmative.

אלא אמר רבא אם לא מתי לא יהא גט אם מתי יהא גט אם לא מתי לא יהא גט

Rather, Rava said that the condition in the bill of divorce of a dying man should be worded in the following manner: If I do not die this will not be a bill of divorce. If I die this will be a bill of divorce, and if I do not die this will not be a bill of divorce.

אם לא מתי לא יהא גט לא מקדים איניש פורענותא לנפשיה אם מתי יהא גט אם לא מתי לא יהא גט בעינן הן קודם ללאו:

The Gemara explains the necessity for such a formulation: The husband first says: If I do not die this will not be a bill of divorce, because a person does not hasten a calamity upon himself. Therefore, he first mentions the possibility that he will not die. Then he states the compound condition in the following order: If I die this will be a bill of divorce, and if I do not die this will not be a bill of divorce. This is because we require that the affirmative precedes the negative.

מתני׳ הרי זה גיטיך ע"מ שתשמשי את אבא על מנת שתניקי את בני כמה היא מניקתו שתי שנים רבי יהודה אומר שמנה עשר חדש מת הבן או שמת האב הרי זה גט

MISHNA: If a husband says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will serve my father, or: On the condition that you will nurse, i.e., breastfeed, my son, without specifying a time period, how long is she required to nurse him in order to fulfill the condition? She is required to nurse the baby for two years from his birth, which is the length of time generally designated for nursing. Rabbi Yehuda says: The time for nursing is only eighteen months. If the baby son died or the husband’s father died, this is a valid bill of divorce, even though the condition was not fulfilled.

הרי זה גיטיך ע"מ שתשמשי את אבא שתי שנים ע"מ שתניקי את בני שתי שנים מת הבן או שאמר האב אי אפשי שתשמשני שלא בהקפדה אינו גט

But if the husband said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will serve my father for two years, or: On the condition that you will nurse my son for two years, and the son died before she nursed him for two years, or the father said: I do not want you to serve me, then even if the father did not say this in anger and she did everything she was expected to do, it is not a valid bill of divorce because the condition was not fulfilled.

רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר כזה גט כלל אמר רבן שמעון בן גמליאל כל עכבה שאינה הימנה הרי זה גט:

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: In a case like this it is a valid bill of divorce. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel stated a principle: If there is any hindrance to the fulfillment of the condition that does not result from her, then it is a valid bill of divorce.

גמ׳ ומי בעינן כולי האי ורמינהי שמשתו יום אחד הניקתו יום אחד ה"ז גט

GEMARA: But do we require that she serve the father or nurse the son for all of this time that was stipulated? And the Gemara raises a contradiction based on what was taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Nidda 2:2): If she served the father for one day or she nursed the son for one day it is a valid bill of divorce.

אמר רב חסדא לא קשיא הא רבנן והא רבן שמעון בן גמליאל

Rav Ḥisda said that this is not difficult: This baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who disagreed in the previous mishna (74a) with regard to a coat that was lost. According to the opinion of the Rabbis there, if there is no possibility that the wife can fulfill the condition by returning the coat, as it was lost, the bill of divorce is not valid. According to the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel there, she can give the husband the coat’s value and the bill of divorce is valid.

מתניתין רשב"ג וברייתא רבנן

The Gemara explains: The mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who claims that the wife can give the husband the equivalent of the stipulated item to render the bill of divorce valid, as the primary factor is his receiving the benefit he intended when stating his condition. Therefore, she must nurse the child for the standard length of time, as that is the benefit he intended when stating his condition, or else the bill of divorce is not valid. And the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that the wife must fulfill the literal terms of the condition. If she nurses the baby for even one day, or serves the father for a single day, the literal terms of the condition have been fulfilled.

הא מדסיפא רבן שמעון בן גמליאל הוי מכלל דרישא לאו רשב"ג אלא ברייתא רשב"ג היא דמיקל בתנאי מתני' רבנן

The Gemara challenges: Is this explanation possible? But from the fact that the latter clause of the mishna is attributed to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, it can be derived by inference that the first clause is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. Rather, the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who is lenient with regard to a condition, and interprets it so that it can be fulfilled. The mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who interpret the condition in an expanded manner.

רבא אמר לא קשיא כאן בסתם כאן במפרש

Rava offered an alternative explanation and said that the apparent contradiction is not difficult: Here, in the mishna, where the husband spoke without specification and did not set a time, the Sages assigned what they understand to be the standard time for the stipulated action. There, in the baraita, it is referring to where the husband said explicitly that she should perform the action for only one day.

רב אשי אמר כל סתם נמי כמפרש יום אחד דמי

Rav Ashi offered a different alternative explanation and said: Any unspecified statement is also considered to be as though he explicitly said one day. Since the husband did not mention a specific amount of time in which to perform the action, one day should be sufficient.

תנן כמה היא מניקתו שתי שנים רבי יהודה אומר שמנה עשר חדש בשלמא לרבא ניחא אלא לרב אשי למה לי שתי שנים למה לי שמנה עשר חדש ביום אחד סגי

The Gemara challenges Rav Ashi’s explanation: We learned in the mishna: How long is she required to nurse him in order to fulfill the condition? She is required to nurse the baby for two years from his birth. Rabbi Yehuda says: The time for nursing is only eighteen months. Granted, according to the opinion of Rava, it works out well that if the husband does not specify the length of time, the wife must nurse the baby for the generally accepted time. But according to the opinion of Rav Ashi, why do I need her to nurse the baby for two years or why do I need her to nurse him for eighteen months? One day should suffice to fulfill the husband’s condition.

הכי קאמר יום אחד משתי שנים לאפוקי לאחר שתי שנים דלא יום אחד משמנה עשר חדש לאפוקי לאחר שמנה עשר חדש דלא

The Gemara answers: This is what the mishna is saying according to the opinion of Rav Ashi: How long is the wife required to nurse the baby? One day from within the two years of the baby’s birth, to exclude the case where the one day that she nursed him occurred after he was two years old, in which case the husband’s condition would not be fulfilled, for that is the accepted length of time for a mother to nurse a baby. Or according to Rabbi Yehuda one day from within the eighteen months of the baby’s birth, to exclude the case where the one day that she nursed him occurred after he was she nursed him occurred after he was eighteen months old, in which case the bill of divorce would not be valid.

מיתיבי הרי זה גיטיך על מנת שתשמשי את אבא שתי שנים על מנת שתניקי את בני שתי שנים מת הבן או שאמר האב אי אפשי שתשמשני שלא בהקפדה אינו גט

The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rav Ashi from the latter clause of the mishna: If a husband said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will serve my father for two years, or: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will nurse my son for two years, and the son died or the father said: I do not want you to serve me, then even though the father did not say this in anger, it is not a valid bill of divorce.