ומיחל ושותה מיד דברי ר"מ רבי יהודה ורבי יוסי ורבי שמעון אוסרין
And he deconsecrates the second tithe that he will separate in the future, transferring its sanctity to money, and he may drink the wine immediately, relying on the separation that he will perform later, which will clarify retroactively which log he designated for the tithes and for teruma. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. However, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon prohibit this practice, as they hold that in this case there is no retroactive clarification. It is therefore evident that according to Rabbi Yehuda, there is no retroactive clarification where one makes the clarification dependent on his own decision.
תולה בדעת אחרים אית ליה ברירה דתנן מה היא באותן הימים
By contrast, in a case where one makes the outcome dependent on the decision of others, Rabbi Yehuda accepts the principle of retroactive clarification, as we learned in a mishna (73a): In a case where an ill husband says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from now if I die due to this illness, if he dies, the bill of divorce takes effect from the time of his statement. The mishna asks: What is the halakhic status of the wife in those days between when the bill of divorce was given but before the husband died?
ר' יהודה אומר הרי היא כאשת איש לכל דבריה ולכי מיית הוי גיטא
Rabbi Yehuda says: She is like a married woman with regard to all of her matters, and she remains forbidden to other men; and when he will die, it is a bill of divorce. Death is equivalent to a matter that is dependent on the decision of others. Since Rabbi Yehuda agrees that the bill of divorce takes effect retroactively, as it cannot take effect after the death of the husband, he evidently holds that there is retroactive clarification where one makes the clarification dependent on the decision of others.
אמר ליה רב משרשיא לרבא הא ר"ש דתולה בדעת עצמו לית ליה ברירה ותולה בדעת אחרים אית ליה ברירה
Furthermore, Rav Mesharshiyya said to Rava: But isn’t there Rabbi Shimon, who, in a case where one makes the outcome dependent on his own decision, does not accept the principle of retroactive clarification, but when one makes it dependent on the decision of others, he accepts the principle of retroactive clarification?
תולה בדעת עצמו לית ליה ברירה הא דאמרן תולה בדעת אחרים אית ליה ברירה דתניא הריני בועליך על מנת שירצה אבא אע"פ שלא רצה האב מקודשת ר' שמעון בן יהודה אומר משום רבי שמעון רצה האב מקודשת
The Gemara elaborates: When one makes the outcome dependent on his own decision, Rabbi Shimon does not accept the principle of retroactive clarification. This is understood from that which we said in the case of wine purchased from Samaritans. When one makes the outcome dependent on the decision of others, Rabbi Shimon accepts the principle of retroactive clarification, as it is taught in a baraita in the Tosefta (Kiddushin 3:7): If a man said to a woman: I am engaging in sexual intercourse with you for the purpose of betrothal on the condition that my father will desire our betrothal, and then he married her without specification, then even if the father did not desire it she is nevertheless betrothed through this act of intercourse. Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: If the father desires it, she is betrothed,