הֵיכָא דְּאִי בָּעֵי לְעָרוֹבֵי מֵאֶתְמוֹל מָצֵי מְעָרֵב — בַּטּוֹלֵי נָמֵי מָצֵי מְבַטֵּל, אֲבָל הַאי כֵּיוָן דְּאִי בָּעֵי לְעָרוֹבֵי מֵאֶתְמוֹל — לָא מָצֵי מְעָרֵב, לָא מָצֵי מְבַטֵּל.
The Gemara explains the two sides of the question: On the one hand, perhaps only in a case where, if the person wanted to establish an eiruv on the previous day he could have established an eiruv, he can also renounce his rights on Shabbat. But this heir, since, if he wanted to establish an eiruv the previous day he could not have established an eiruv, as he was not then a resident of the courtyard, therefore, today he cannot renounce his rights either.
אוֹ דִּלְמָא: יוֹרֵשׁ כַּרְעֵיהּ דַּאֲבוּהּ הוּא?
Or perhaps an heir is like his father’s foot, i.e., he is considered an extension of his father and substitutes for him in all regards, which means that just as his father could have renounced his rights, so can he.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֲנִי אוֹמֵר מְבַטֵּל, וְהָנֵי דְּבֵי שְׁמוּאֵל תָּנוּ אֵין מְבַטֵּל. אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: זֶה הַכְּלָל, כׇּל שֶׁמּוּתָּר לְמִקְצָת שַׁבָּת — הוּתַּר לְכׇל הַשַּׁבָּת, וְכׇל שֶׁנֶּאְסַר לְמִקְצָת שַׁבָּת — נֶאְסַר לְכׇל הַשַּׁבָּת חוּץ מִמְּבַטֵּל רְשׁוּת.
Rav Naḥman said to him: I myself say that an heir can indeed renounce rights in a courtyard, while those scholars of the school of Shmuel taught: He cannot renounce rights in a courtyard. Rava raised an objection to Rav Naḥman from the following baraita: This is the principle: Anything that is permitted for part of Shabbat is permitted for all of Shabbat, and anything that is prohibited for part of Shabbat is prohibited for all of Shabbat, apart from one who renounces his rights in a courtyard, for renunciation can provide an allowance halfway through Shabbat.
כׇּל שֶׁהוּתַּר לְמִקְּצָת שַׁבָּת, מוּתָּר לְכׇל הַשַּׁבָּת — כְּגוֹן עֵירַב דֶּרֶךְ הַפֶּתַח, וְנִסְתַּם הַפֶּתַח. עֵירַב דֶּרֶךְ חַלּוֹן, וְנִסְתַּם חַלּוֹן.
The Gemara now explains each element of the baraita: Anything that is permitted for part of Shabbat is permitted for all of Shabbat. For example, if an eiruv was established between two adjacent courtyards that are connected via an opening between them, and that opening was closed up on Shabbat, the eiruv is valid. Alternately, if an eiruv was established between the two courtyards that are connected via a window opening from one to the other, and that window was closed up on Shabbat, the eiruv is valid. As carrying from one courtyard to another was permitted at the beginning of Shabbat, it is permitted throughout Shabbat.
זֶה הַכְּלָל — לְאֵתוֹיֵי מָבוֹי שֶׁנִּיטְּלוּ קוֹרוֹתָיו אוֹ לְחָיָיו.
The Gemara comments: The words this is the principle come to include the case of an alleyway whose cross beams or side posts were removed on Shabbat, teaching that one may nonetheless use the alleyway, as it had been permitted at the outset of Shabbat.
כׇּל שֶׁנֶּאְסַר לְמִקְצָת שַׁבָּת, נֶאְסַר לְכׇל הַשַּׁבָּת כּוּלָּהּ — כְּגוֹן שְׁנֵי בָתִּים בִּשְׁנֵי צִידֵּי רְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, וְהִקִּיפוּם גּוֹיִם מְחִיצָה בְּשַׁבָּת.
The Gemara continues its explanation of the baraita: Anything that is prohibited for part of Shabbat is prohibited for all of Shabbat. For example, if there were two houses on two sides of a public domain, which gentiles enclosed with a wall on Shabbat, the enclosed area remains prohibited. Even though a partition of this kind is considered a proper one with regard to Shabbat domains, it is prohibited to carry objects from either house into the enclosed area, even if the owner of the first house renounces his rights in the area in favor of the owner of the second house, as they could not have established an eiruv between them before Shabbat.
זֶה הַכְּלָל לְאֵתוֹיֵי מַאי? לְאֵתוֹיֵי מֵת גּוֹי בְּשַׁבָּת.
The Gemara asks: What do the words this is the principle come to include in this part of the baraita? The Gemara answers: It comes to include the case of a gentile resident of the courtyard who died on Shabbat without having rented out his domain to a Jew for the purpose of an eiruv. In this case, the Jewish neighbors are prohibited from carrying in the courtyard. Because it was prohibited to establish an eiruv the previous day, carrying in the courtyard continues to be prohibited on Shabbat, even though the gentile is now deceased.
וְקָתָנֵי: חוּץ מִמְּבַטֵּל רְשׁוּת. אִיהוּ — אִין, יוֹרֵשׁ — לָא.
And the baraita teaches: Apart from one who renounces his rights in a courtyard, which teaches that a person may renounce his rights in a courtyard even on Shabbat, despite the fact that the courtyard was prohibited prior to his renunciation. The Gemara infers: He himself, i.e., the original owner, yes, he may renounce his rights even on Shabbat, but with regard to his heir, no, he may not renounce his rights on Shabbat, which contradicts Rav Naḥman’s opinion.
אֵימָא: חוּץ מִתּוֹרַת בִּיטּוּל רְשׁוּת.
Rav Naḥman replied: Say that the baraita must be understood as follows: Apart from anyone who falls into the halakhic category of one who renounces his rights in a domain. In other words, the baraita is not referring to a particular person who renounces his rights, but rather to the category of renunciation in general, which includes an heir.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: אֶחָד מִבְּנֵי חָצֵר שֶׁמֵּת, וְהִנִּיחַ רְשׁוּתוֹ לְאֶחָד מִן הַשּׁוּק, מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם — אוֹסֵר, מִשֶּׁחָשֵׁיכָה — אֵינוֹ אוֹסֵר.
Rava raised a further objection to the opinion of Rav Naḥman from a different baraita: If a resident of a courtyard died and left his domain, the use of his house, to one from the marketplace, i.e., a non-resident of the courtyard, the following distinction applies: If he died while it was still day, i.e., before Shabbat, the one from the marketplace renders carrying prohibited, for it is assumed that he received his portion before the onset of Shabbat and should have joined in an eiruv with the others. Since he failed to establish an eiruv with the other residents of the courtyard, he renders carrying prohibited in the entire courtyard. If, however, he died after nightfall, he does not render carrying prohibited, for so long as it was permitted to carry for part of Shabbat it remains permitted for the entirety of Shabbat.
וְאֶחָד מִן הַשּׁוּק שֶׁמֵּת וְהִנִּיחַ רְשׁוּתוֹ לְאֶחָד מִבְּנֵי חָצֵר, מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם — אֵינוֹ אוֹסֵר, מִשֶּׁחָשֵׁיכָה — אוֹסֵר.
And alternatively, if one from the marketplace who owned a residence in the courtyard but did not dwell there died and left his domain to a resident of the courtyard who does live there and usually joins in an eiruv with his neighbors, the following distinction applies: If the person from the marketplace died while it was still day, i.e., before Shabbat, the courtyard resident does not render carrying prohibited, as when he establishes his eiruv it includes his new residence as well. If, however, the person from the marketplace died after nightfall without having established an eiruv, the deceased renders carrying prohibited. As this residence was prohibited at the beginning of Shabbat, it can no longer be permitted on that Shabbat.
אַמַּאי אוֹסֵר? נִיבַטֵּיל! מַאי ״אוֹסֵר״ נָמֵי דְּקָתָנֵי — עַד שֶׁיְּבַטֵּל.
Rava’s question is based on the first case discussed in the baraita: According to Rav Naḥman, why does the heir render carrying prohibited in this case? Let him renounce his rights in the courtyard to the other residents, as Rav Naḥman maintains that an heir may renounce rights. Rav Naḥman replied: What is the meaning of the word prohibits that the baraita teaches here? It means he renders carrying prohibited until he renounces his rights, i.e., although there is no way of rectifying the situation by means of an eiruv, it can be corrected by way of renunciation.
תָּא שְׁמַע: יִשְׂרָאֵל וְגֵר שְׁרוּיִין בִּמְגוּרָה אַחַת, וּמֵת גֵּר מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם,
Come and hear a different proof challenging Rav Naḥman’s opinion, from the following baraita: If a Jew and a convert were living in a single residency comprised of several rooms, and the convert died childless while it was still day, such a convert has no heirs, and therefore the first to take possession of his property acquires it.