Chullin 5bחולין ה׳ ב
The William Davidson Talmudתלמוד מהדורת ויליאם דוידסון
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5bה׳ ב

(ויקרא ד, כז) מעם הארץ פרט למומר

“And if any one of the common people sins unwittingly…and he shall bring his offering” (Leviticus 4:27–28), from which it is inferred in a baraita: “Of the common people,” indicating: But not all of the common people. This serves to exclude a transgressor, from whom a sin offering is not accepted.

ר"ש בן יוסי אומר משום ר"ש (ויקרא ד, כב) אשר לא תעשינה בשגגה ואשם השב מידיעתו מביא קרבן על שגגתו אינו שב מידיעתו אינו מביא קרבן על שגגתו

Rabbi Shimon ben Yosei says in the name of Rabbi Shimon that the verse states: “And does unwittingly one of the things…that may not be done, and he becomes guilty, or if his sin that he sinned became known to him” (Leviticus 4:22–23). From the words “become known to him” it is inferred: One who repents due to his awareness that he performed a transgression, as had he known that the action is prohibited he would not have performed it, brings an offering for his unwitting transgression in order to achieve atonement. But one who does not repent due to his awareness that he sinned, e.g., a transgressor who would have sinned even had he been aware that the act is prohibited, does not bring an offering for his unwitting action.

ואמרינן מאי בינייהו ואמר רב המנונא מומר לאכול חלב והביא קרבן על הדם איכא בינייהו

And we say: What is the difference between their two opinions? And Rav Hamnuna said: The difference is in the case of a transgressor with regard to eating the forbidden fat of a domesticated animal and he brought an offering for unwittingly consuming blood is the difference between them. According to the first tanna he may not bring an offering, as he is a transgressor. According to Rabbi Shimon, since he repented for unwittingly consuming blood, due to his awareness that he sinned, he brings a sin offering for that unwitting sin. In any event, this baraita apparently contradicts the previously cited baraita with regard to the source for the halakha that one does not accept an offering from a transgressor.

חדא בחטאת וחדא בעולה וצריכי דאי אשמעינן חטאת משום דלכפרה הוא אבל עולה דדורון הוא אימא לקבל מיניה ואי אשמעינן עולה משום דלאו חיובא הוא אבל חטאת דחיובא הוא אימא לקבל מיניה צריכא

The Gemara answers: One source teaches with regard to the sin offering of a transgressor that it is not accepted, and one source teaches with regard to the burnt offering of a transgressor that it is not accepted. And both sources are necessary, as, if the Torah had taught us this halakha only with regard to a sin offering, one might have thought that it is not accepted due to the fact that it is for atonement, and as a transgressor he is undeserving of atonement, but with regard to a burnt offering, which is merely a gift [dedoron], say that one ought to accept it from him. And if the Torah had taught us this halakha only with regard to a burnt offering, one might have thought that it is not accepted due to the fact that it is not an obligation, but with regard to a sin offering, which is an obligation, say that one ought to accept it from him. Therefore, both sources are necessary.

וכל היכא דכתיב בהמה גריעותא היא והכתיב (תהלים לו, ז) אדם ובהמה תושיע ה' ואמר רב יהודה אמר רב אלו בני אדם שהן ערומין בדעת ומשימין עצמן כבהמה התם כתיב אדם ובהמה הכא בהמה לחודיה כתיב

§ In the previous baraita the Sages derived from the phrase “from the animal” that people who are similar to an animal are included among those from whom offerings are accepted. The Gemara seeks to understand the meaning of the phrase: Similar to an animal, and asks: And everywhere that the word animal is written and interpreted as referring to a person, does it indicate a deficiency? But isn’t it written: “Man and animal You preserve, Lord” (Psalms 36:7), and Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: These are people who are clever in terms of their intellect, like people, and despite their intelligence they comport themselves humbly and self-effacingly, like an animal. The Gemara answers: There it is written “man and animal.” Here, the word “animal” alone is written.

וכל היכא דכתיב אדם ובהמה מעליותא היא והא כתיב (ירמיהו לא, כז) וזרעתי את בית ישראל זרע אדם וזרע בהמה התם הא חלקיה קרא זרע אדם לחוד וזרע בהמה לחוד

The Gemara asks: And everywhere that the terms “man” and “animal” are written together, does it indicate a virtue? But isn’t it written: “And I will sow the house of Israel and the house of Judah with the seed of man and with the seed of animal” (Jeremiah 31:26), and the Sages interpreted the phrase “seed of animal” as a reference to ignorant, inferior people. The Gemara answers: There, doesn’t the verse separate man and animal? The seed of man is discrete and the seed of animal is discrete.

(סימן נקלף)

§ The Gemara revisits the matter of slaughter by a Samaritan and cites a mnemonic for the names of the Sages that follow: Nun, for Ḥanan; kuf, for Ya’akov; lamed, for ben Levi; and peh, for bar Kappara.

א"ר חנן א"ר יעקב בר אידי א"ר יהושע בן לוי משום בר קפרא ר"ג ובית דינו נמנו על שחיטת כותי ואסרוה א"ל רבי זירא לרבי יעקב בר אידי שמא לא שמע רבי אלא בשאין ישראל עומד על גביו א"ל דמי האי מרבנן כדלא גמירי אינשי שמעתא בשאין ישראל עומד על גביו למימרא בעי

§ Rabbi Ḥanan says that Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi says that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says in the name of bar Kappara: The opinions of Rabban Gamliel and his court were counted with regard to the status of the slaughter of a Samaritan, and they prohibited it. Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi: Perhaps my teacher heard that halakha only in a case where a Jew is not standing over him. Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi said to Rabbi Zeira: This one of the Sages seems like one of the people who have not studied halakha. When a Jew is not standing over the Samaritan is it necessary to say that it is prohibited to eat from what he slaughters?

קבלה מיניה או לא קבלה מיניה ת"ש דאמר ר"נ בר יצחק א"ר אסי אני ראיתי את רבי יוחנן שאכל משחיטת כותי אף רבי אסי אכל משחיטת כותי ותהי בה רבי זירא לא שמיעא להו דאי הוה שמיעא להו הוו מקבלי לה או דלמא שמיע להו ולא קבלוה

The Gemara asks: Did Rabbi Zeira accept that response from Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi or did he not accept it from him? Come and hear a proof to resolve that dilemma from that which Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says that Rabbi Asi says: I saw that Rabbi Yoḥanan ate from the slaughter of a Samaritan. And Rabbi Asi too ate from the slaughter of a Samaritan. And Rabbi Zeira wondered about it, whether perhaps they did not hear the halakha that it is prohibited to eat from the slaughter of a Samaritan but had they heard it they would have accepted it, or perhaps they heard the halakha but did not accept it.

הדר פשיט לנפשיה מסתברא דשמיע להו ולא קבלוה דאי ס"ד לא שמיע להו ואי הוה שמיע להו הוו מקבלי לה היכי מסתייעא מילתא למיכל איסורא השתא בהמתן של צדיקים אין הקב"ה מביא תקלה על ידן צדיקים עצמן לא כל שכן

Rabbi Zeira then resolved the matter for himself. It stands to reason that they heard it and did not accept it. As, if it enters your mind that they did not hear it, but that had they heard it they would have accepted it, how did the matter eventuate, leading these Sages to eat forbidden food? Now consider: If even through the animals of the righteous, the Holy One, Blessed be He, does not generate mishaps, then is it not all the more so true that the righteous themselves would not experience mishaps?