Bava Kamma 28b:18בבא קמא כ״ח ב:יח
The William Davidson Talmudתלמוד מהדורת ויליאם דוידסון
Save "Bava Kamma 28b:18"
Toggle Reader Menu Display Settings
28bכ״ח ב

אבל הוא עצמו פטור קרקע עולם הזיקתו

But if the person himself was injured, the owner of the jug is exempt, as it is the ground that caused his injury, not the jug or the water.

כי אמריתה קמיה דשמואל אמר לי מכדי אבנו וסכינו ומשאו מבורו למדנו וכולן אני קורא בהן שור ולא אדם חמור ולא כלים

Rav Yehuda continued: When I stated this ruling of Rav before Shmuel, he said to me: After all, we derive the cases of damage caused by leaving one’s stone, one’s knife, or one’s load in the public domain from the case of one’s pit, and I therefore read, i.e., apply, with regard to all of them the inference of the Sages from the verse: “And an ox or a donkey fall therein” (Exodus 21:33), that the one who dug the pit is liable only if what incurred damage is an ox, but not a person, or a donkey, but not vessels.

והני מילי לענין קטלא אבל לענין נזקין אדם חייב וכלים פטורין

And this statement applies with regard to a situation where the person is killed, i.e., if one fell into a pit and was killed, the person who dug it is exempt from paying restitution, since the verse refers exclusively to an animal that was killed. But with regard to damage, the digger of the pit is liable to pay restitution for injury to a person, but exempt from paying restitution for damage to vessels, for which no distinction between death and injury can be applied. Therefore, the ruling in the case of the jug that broke in the public domain should be the opposite. The owner of the jug is liable to pay restitution for injury caused to another, as Shmuel holds that he is liable even if the injury is caused by the impact with the ground, but that he is exempt from paying restitution for the damage done to the clothes of the one who slipped.

ורב הני מילי היכא דאפקרינהו אבל היכא דלא אפקרינהו ממונו הוא

The Gemara asks: And how would Rav answer this difficulty? The Gemara answers: This presumption that liability for damage caused by one’s stone, knife, or load is derived from the category of Pit, thereby exempting him from payment for damage to vessels, applies only in a case where he renounced ownership of them. But in a case where he did not renounce ownership of them, it is considered to be like any other case where his property causes damage. Therefore, he is liable to pay for damage caused to the vessels.

מתיב רב אושעיא (שמות כא, לג) ונפל שמה שור או חמור שור ולא אדם חמור ולא כלים מכאן אמרו נפל לתוכו שור וכליו ונשתברו חמור וכליו ונתקרעו חייב על הבהמה ופטור על הכלים הא למה זה דומה לאבנו וסכינו ומשאו שהניחן ברה"ר והזיקו

Rav Oshaya raises an objection from a baraita discussing Pit: It is derived from the verse: “And if a man shall open a pit, or if a man shall dig a pit and not cover it, and an ox or a donkey fall therein” (Exodus 21:33), that the digger is liable to pay restitution only if what incurred damage is an ox but not a person, or a donkey but not vessels. From here the Sages stated that if an ox with its equipment fell into a pit, and the ox was wounded and the equipment broke; or if a donkey with its equipment fell in, and the donkey was wounded and the equipment tore, then the one who dug the pit is liable to pay restitution for any injury sustained by the animal but exempt from paying restitution for the damaged equipment. To what case is this similar? It is similar to the case of his stone, or his knife, or his load that he left in the public domain, and they caused damage.

אדרבה מה דומה לזה מבעי ליה אלא מאי דומה לזה אבנו וסכינו ומשאו שהניחן ברה"ר והזיקו

The Gemara questions the wording of the baraita: On the contrary, it should have stated: What is similar to this, since the cases of one’s stone, knife, or load are not mentioned in the Torah, but are derived from the case of Pit. Rather, the wording should be emended as follows: What is similar to this? It is the case of his stone, or his knife, or his load that he left in the public domain, and they caused damage.

לפיכך אם הטיח צלוחיתו באבן חייב

The baraita continues: Therefore, if one dropped his flask on a stone that was left in the public domain, breaking the flask, the owner of the stone is liable.

רישא קשיא לרב וסיפא קשיא לשמואל

The first clause of this baraita is difficult according to the opinion of Rav, since it compares the cases of a stone, a knife, and a load to the case of Pit, and it does not distinguish between a situation in which he renounced ownership of them or one where he did not. And the last clause of the baraita, which deems the owner of a stone in the public domain liable to pay restitution for the damage to the broken flask, is difficult according to the opinion of Shmuel. According to him, the owner should be liable only for causing injury and not for damaging vessels.

ולטעמיך תיקשי לך היא גופא (קשיא) רישא פטור וסיפא חייב

The Gemara responds to this objection: And according to your reasoning, the baraita itself should pose a difficulty for you, since the first clause states that one is exempt from liability for damage to vessels, and the last clause states that he is liable.

אלא רב מתרץ לטעמיה ושמואל מתרץ לטעמיה

Rather, Rav resolves the contradiction according to his line of reasoning, and Shmuel resolves it according to his line of reasoning.

רב מתרץ לטעמיה במה דברים אמורים כשהפקירן אבל לא הפקירן חייב לפיכך הטיח צלוחיתו באבן חייב

Rav resolves it according to his line of reasoning as follows: In what case is this statement said? Concerning what case does the baraita rule that a stone, a knife, and a load are analogous to Pit, exempting their owner from liability for breakage to vessels caused by them? It is where he renounced ownership of them. But if he did not renounce ownership of them he is liable. Therefore, if one dropped his flask on a stone belonging to another person in the public domain, the owner of the stone is liable to pay for the damage to the flask.

ושמואל מתרץ לטעמיה השתא דאמרת אבנו סכינו ומשאו כבורו דמי לר' יהודה דמחייב על נזקי כלים בבור לפיכך הטיח צלוחיתו באבן חייב

And Shmuel resolves the contradiction according to his line of reasoning: Now that you said that the cases of one’s stone, one’s knife, and one’s load are similar to one’s pit, then according to Rabbi Yehuda, who deems one liable to pay for damage caused to vessels by falling into a pit that he dug, one is therefore liable in a case where someone dropped his flask on a stone belonging to him, and the flask broke.

א"ר אלעזר לא שנו אלא שנתקל באבן ונשוף באבן אבל נתקל בקרקע ונשוף באבן פטור

§ Rabbi Elazar says: They taught that the owner of the stone is liable only in a case where the pedestrian stumbled on the stone and the flask scraped against the stone and broke. But if he stumbled on the ground, not the stone, and the flask consequently fell and scraped against the stone, causing the flask to break, the owner of the stone is exempt from liability for the damage.

כמאן דלא כר' נתן

In accordance with whose opinion is this statement? It is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan, who maintains that if damage is caused by two people and one of them is exempt from paying compensation, the other must pay the entire amount. Similarly here, since there is no liability for damage caused by stumbling on the ground, compensation should be collected from the owner of the stone.

איכא דאמרי א"ר אלעזר לא תימא בנתקל באבן ונשוף באבן הוא דמחייב אבל נתקל בקרקע ונשוף באבן פטור אלא אפילו נתקל בקרקע ונשוף באבן חייב כמאן כר' נתן:

There are those who say an alternative version of this discourse: Rabbi Elazar says: Do not say that it is only in a case where the pedestrian stumbled on the stone and the flask scraped against the stone, causing the flask to break, that he is deemed liable, but that if he stumbled on the ground and the flask scraped against the stone, causing the flask to break, he is exempt. Rather, even if the pedestrian stumbled on the ground and the flask scraped against the stone, causing the flask to break, he is liable. In accordance with whose opinion is this statement? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan.

ר' יהודה אומר במתכוין חייב [וכו']: ה"ד מתכוין

§ The mishna teaches that if someone’s jug broke in the public domain and one slipped in the water from the jug and was injured from the fall, or if he was injured by the shards of the broken jug, the owner of the jug is liable. Rabbi Yehuda says: In a case where the owner of the jug acted with intent, he is liable, and in a case where he acted without intent, he is exempt. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances in which it is considered that he acted with intent?

אמר רבה במתכוין להורידה למטה מכתיפו א"ל אביי מכלל דמחייב ר"מ אפילו נפשרה א"ל אין מחייב היה ר"מ אפי' אזנה בידו

Rabba says: Even where he just intends to lower the jug off his shoulder and accidentally breaks it, he is liable to pay for the damage he causes, according to Rabbi Yehuda. Abaye said to him: By inference, does Rabbi Meir, who is the anonymous first tanna of the mishna, deem him liable even if the jug cracked by itself? Rabba said to him: Indeed, Rabbi Meir would deem him liable even if he were holding the handle of the jug in his hand, the optimal manner for holding it, and the handle snapped, causing the jug to fall and break, an accident clearly beyond his control.

אמאי אנוס הוא ואונס רחמנא פטריה דכתיב (דברים כב, כו) ולנערה לא תעשה דבר

The Gemara asks: Why is this so? Isn’t he the victim of circumstances beyond his control? And the Merciful One exempts a victim of circumstances beyond his control from punishment, as it is written with regard to a betrothed young woman who is raped: “But to the young woman you shall do nothing” (Deuteronomy 22:26).

וכי תימא ה"מ לענין קטלא אבל לענין נזקין חייב והתניא נשברה כדו ולא סלקו נפל גמלו ולא העמידו ר"מ מחייב בהזיקן וחכמים אומרים

And if you would say that this matter applies only with regard to exemption from the death penalty, but with regard to damages one is liable even for circumstances beyond his control, but isn’t it taught in a baraita: If one’s jug broke and he did not remove its shards, or if his camel fell and he did not stand it up, Rabbi Meir deems him liable to pay for any damage they cause, and the Rabbis say that