מדמשכה עובד כוכבים קנייה יין נסך לא הוי עד דנגע ביה from the moment that he pulled it, the gentile acquired it, whereas it did not become wine used for a libation until he touched it. Therefore, the seller can receive payment for the wine he sold, because at the time of the acquisition the wine was permitted.
אי דקא כייל ורמי למנא דישראל ה"נ לא צריכא דקא כייל ורמי למנא דעובד כוכבים The Gemara rejects this proof: If it is a case where the seller measures the wine and pours it into the vessel of a Jew, it is indeed permitted to do so without receiving payment first. Rav’s ruling is not necessary except in a case where he measures the wine and pours it into the vessel of the gentile, which contains wine used for a libation, and the wine is rendered forbidden upon contact with the vessel even before the gentile acquires it by pulling it.
סוף סוף כי מטא לאוירא דמנא קנייה יין נסך לא הוי עד דמטי לארעיתיה דמנא ש"מ נצוק חבור The Gemara raises an objection: Ultimately, even in this case, when the wine reaches the interior airspace of the gentile’s vessel, he acquires it, as this too is a mode of acquisition. And it does not become wine used for a libation until it reaches the bottom of the vessel, making contact with it, so the acquisition occurs before the wine becomes forbidden. Can one conclude from this that in the opinion of Rav a stream of liquid serves as a connection between two bodies of liquid? If so, when the Jew pours the wine into the gentile’s vessel, the flow of wine that is in contact with the forbidden wine at the bottom of the vessel would render all the wine being poured into the vessel forbidden.
לא אי דנקיט ליה עובד כוכבים לכלי בידיה ה"נ לא צריכא דמנח אארעא The Gemara rejects this conclusion: No, a stream of liquid does not serve as a connection, and therefore if the gentile is holding the vessel in his hand, the gentile indeed acquires the wine before it becomes forbidden, and therefore the money paid for it is permitted. Rav’s ruling is not necessary unless the gentile’s vessel is set on the ground, so that there is no act of acquisition before the wine becomes forbidden.
ותיקני ליה כליו שמעת מינה כליו של לוקח ברשות מוכר לא קנה לוקח The Gemara asks: But let the vessels of the gentile acquire the wine from the moment it enters the interior airspace. Can one conclude from this that if the buyer’s vessels are in the domain of the seller, the buyer does not acquire the merchandise once it is placed in his vessels? This is an issue that is subject to a dispute between the Sages, which remains unresolved.
לא לעולם אימא לך קנה לוקח והכא במאי עסקינן כגון דאיכא עכבת יין אפומיה דכוזנתא דקמא קמא אינסיך ליה The Gemara rejects this: No, actually, I could say to you that the buyer acquires the merchandise in such a case. But here, where the wine is rendered forbidden before being acquired by the gentile, we are dealing with a case where there is a remnant of wine remaining on the mouth of the gentile’s jug [kuzanta], which renders the wine poured into the jug forbidden, as each bit of wine becomes libation wine when it comes into contact with the remnant of wine on the mouth as it is poured into the jug. This is why Rav told the wine shopkeepers to take the money before measuring the wine into the gentile’s vessel.
וכמאן דלא כרשב"ג דאי רשב"ג האמר ימכר כולו לעובדי כוכבים חוץ מדמי יין נסך שבו The Gemara raises an objection: And in accordance with whose opinion does Rav say this? It is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel; as, if it were in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, doesn’t he say that libation wine that became mixed with other wine may all be sold to gentiles for the monetary value of the entire mixture except for the value of the wine used for a libation that is in the mixture? Accordingly, it is permitted to accept payment for wine that was poured into a gentile’s vessel, and the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.
מידי הוא טעמא אלא לרב האמר רב הלכה כרשב"ג חבית בחבית אבל לא יין ביין The Gemara answers: The explanation of this ruling can be only according to the opinion of Rav, who issued the ruling. And doesn’t Rav say that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel only in the case of a barrel of permitted wine that became intermingled with another barrel of libation wine, but not in the case of wine that became mixed with other wine in the same barrel? Therefore, explaining Rav’s statement as contradicting the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is not problematic; consequently, it cannot be proven from his statement that a gentile does not acquire an item by pulling it.
מיתיבי הלוקח גרוטאות מן העובדי כוכבים ומצא בהן עבודת כוכבים אם עד שלא נתן מעות משך יחזיר אם משנתן מעות משך יוליך לים המלח אי ס"ד משיכה בעובד כוכבים קונה אמאי יחזיר אמר אביי משום דמיחזי כי מקח טעות The Gemara raises another objection to the statement of Ameimar that a gentile can acquire an object by pulling it. It is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who buys broken vessels made of gold or silver from the gentiles and finds among them an object of idol worship, if he pulled the object of idol worship, thereby performing an act of acquisition, before he gave the money to the gentile, he may return the object of idol worship to the gentile. But if he pulled it after he gave the money to the gentile, he may not return it. Since the idol’s status was not revoked, he must take it and cast it into the Dead Sea. In that case, if it enters your mind that pulling an object acquires it in a transaction with a gentile, as Ameimar maintains, then why may he return the object once he has pulled it, since it is his? Abaye said: He may return it because it appears to be a mistaken transaction, since he clearly did not intend to purchase an object of idol worship.
אמר רבא רישא מקח טעות סיפא לאו מקח טעות אלא אמר רבא רישא וסיפא מקח טעות ורישא דלא יהיב זוזי לא מיתחזי כעבודת כוכבים ביד ישראל סיפא דיהיב זוזי מיתחזי כעבודת כוכבים ביד ישראל Rava said: Then why, in the second instance, where he paid the money, may he not return it? Is the purchase in the first clause a mistaken transaction but the purchase in the latter clause not a mistaken transaction? Rather, Rava said: The purchase in the first clause and the purchase in the latter clause are both a mistaken transaction, but in the case presented in the first clause, where he did not pay him the dinars, it does not appear as though there is an object of idol worship in the possession of a Jew, and so he may return it. By contrast, in the latter clause, where he did pay him the dinars, it appears as though there is an object of idol worship in the possession of a Jew, and therefore he must cast away the object rather than return it.
א"ל מר קשישא בריה דרב חסדא לרב אשי ת"ש המוכר יינו לעובד כוכבים פסק עד שלא מדד דמיו מותרים ואי אמרת משיכה בעובד כוכבים אינה קונה אמאי דמיו מותרין הכא במאי עסקינן דאקדים ליה דינר § The Gemara cites a claim against Rav Ashi’s opinion that a gentile cannot acquire an item by pulling it: Mar Kashisha, son of Rav Ḥisda, said to Rav Ashi: Come and hear an objection to your opinion from the mishna: In the case of a Jew who sells his wine to a gentile, if he fixed a price before he measured the wine into the gentile’s vessel, deriving benefit from the money paid for the wine is permitted, as the wine was acquired by the gentile before he touched it. And if you say that pulling an item does not acquire it in a transaction involving a gentile, why is the money paid for it permitted? Rav Ashi replied: Here we are dealing with a case where the gentile paid him a dinar in advance, before the measuring, thereby acquiring the wine with money.
א"ה אימא סיפא מדד עד שלא פסק דמיו אסורין ואי דקדים ליה דינר אמאי דמיו אסורין One of the Sages raised an objection: If that is so, say the last clause: But if the Jew measured the wine into the gentile’s vessel, thereby rendering it forbidden, before he fixed a price, the money paid for the wine is forbidden. And if he paid him a dinar in advance, why should the money paid for it be forbidden?
א"ל ולדידך דאמרת משיכה בעובד כוכבים קונה אמאי רישא דמיו מותרין וסיפא דמיו אסורין Rav Ashi said to him: And according to you, as you say that pulling acquires items in a transaction involving a gentile, why in the first clause is the money paid for it permitted, and in the latter clause the money paid for it is forbidden?
אלא מאי אית לך למימר פסק סמכא דעתיה לא פסק לא סמכא דעתיה Rather, what have you to say to explain the distinction between the two cases? You say that when the Jew fixed a price, the gentile consequently relied on him that the sale would not be canceled, and so the sale was concluded by the pulling. But in a case where he did not fix a price, the gentile did not rely on him that the sale would not be canceled, and therefore the sale was not concluded.
לדידי נמי אע"ג דקדים ליה דינר פסק סמכא דעתיה לא פסק לא סמכא דעתיה According to my opinion as well, even though the gentile gave him a dinar in advance, if he fixed a price, the gentile relied on him that the sale would not be canceled, and if he did not fix a price, the gentile did not rely on him that the sale would not be canceled.
א"ל רבינא לרב אשי ת"ש דאמר ר' חייא בר אבא א"ר יוחנן בן נח נהרג על פחות משוה פרוטה ולא ניתן להישבון ואי אמרת משיכה בעובד כוכבים אינה קונה אמאי נהרג Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Come and hear another proof against your opinion, as Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: A descendant of Noah, i.e., a gentile, is executed by the court for theft of even less than the value of one peruta; but if he stole less than the value of one peruta from a Jew, it is not subject to restitution, i.e., he is not obligated to return it, as the Jew presumably waived the debt. And if you say that pulling an item does not acquire it in a transaction involving a gentile, why should he be executed? He did not commit a legally significant act by stealing the item, as it remains in the possession of the owner.
משום דצעריה לישראל The Gemara answers: He is executed because he caused a Jew distress by stealing the item, even though by the halakhot of acquisition the thief did not acquire it.